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ABSTRACT
The building of compromise is a recently emerging building
type which combines high rise new construction with adaptive
reuse and preservation. The design process for producing
them is a highly political and generally controversial one.
Because there have been so few of them, we are not yet able
to integrate intelligent evaluations of alternative ap-
proaches to compromise with the brokering process between
competing interest groups.
The thesis uses 53 State Street, a highly controversial case
in downtown Boston, as a vehicle for analysis. Through a
three stage feasibility analysis involving physical design,
financial analysis, and institutional analysis, an alterna-
tive approach to the site is identified. This alternative
is then compared to those actually considered in the case,
and was found to have been feasible and, according to sever-
al criteria, superior to the others.
The thesis then analyzes what adjustments could be made in
the public and private domains to allow such a full range of
alternative schemes to be identified, explored, and consi-
dered in the brokering process. Possible improvements are
identified, and include reduction of risk levels through
information exchange, structural change within the city
regulatory agencies, and change in the financial parameters
governing rehabilitation and new development.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
One of the perennial conflicts in American urban de-
sign and land development is the one between develop-
er and preservationist. The developer is often car-
icatured as a greedy, short-sighted character who
blinks dollar signs and will bulldoze anything to win
high financial returns. The preservationist, by con-
trast, is stereotyped as the self-appointed curator
of the city as museum, the nostalgic academician who
throws himself in front of the developer's bulldozer
to protect the past from future evil.
In recent years, however, the interests of these two
traditionally opposed interest groups have merged.
During the 1970's, particularly in the northeastern
United States, the adaptive re-use of older struct-
ures became acceptable, profitable, and fashionable.
This segment of the design and development world has
matured to a $40 billion a year enterprise. In-
deed, the reuse movement has grown so in depth and
breadth that it is now possible to discern sub-types
of adaptive re-use, to develop measures of success
for judging them, and to devise regulatory
11
frameworks for guiding their production.
One distinct trend within adaptive re-use in older
central cities is the development of the "hybrid
building". The "hybrid" building is an ensemble of
structures or portions of structures of disparate his-
tories, styles, materials, scales, and heights devel-
oped on a single site by a single owner. The hybrid
building is a literal collage of old and new, partial-
ly high rise and partially low-rise. It is charact-
erized by powerful contradictions in architectural
style, and most important, urban design objectives
and development economics. Members of the architect-
ural press have called them "piggybacks or shoe-horn
buildings"2 and "prosthetic architecture." 3
In fact, the hybrid building is a building of compro-
mise. The compromise may be the end product of compe-
tition between interest groups each achieving partial
success on the same site, as exemplified by the 53
State Street development in downtown Boston. It can
also represent an internal compromise between con-
flicting forces acting on a single owner. The
12
Exhibit 1-1
53 State Street
Boston, MA
Exhibit 1-2
Museum of Modern Art
N.Y., N.Y.
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condominium addition to the Museum of Modern Art can
be interpreted as such a compromise; one between the
Museum's interest in preserving its institutional in-
tegrity (a purveyor of fine design and urban amenity)
and its very real need to be financially self-
sustaining (Exhibit 1-1, 1-2).
The writer believes the trend toward these buildings
of compromise may represent new potential for balanc-
ing between competing interests for old and new arch-
itecture, and possible solutions to difficult con-
flicts between development pressure and preserving
urban amenity. Nearly all cities have sites current-
ly occupied by older low rise structures which may be
subjected to development pressure for more intensive
(denser, taller, and more efficient floor plans) use.
Traditionally the futures of these sites has been
determined by a win-loss game between developer and
preservationist; the hybrid building type opens other
possibilities. In the writer's view, the new build-
ing of compromise, because of its convenience in re-
solving urban design and development disputes, may
rapidly become the expedient favorite of preservation-
ist, developer, and local official alike.
14
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Exhibit 1-3
New Yorker Hotel
Miami, Florida
original structure
demolished, January 1991
Exhibit 1-4
Compromise Scheme
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The making of a building of compromise involves a
political as well as a design process. Inevitably,
these events are highly controversial, and solutions
to a given site may be more representative of the
balance of power between participants than any design
intentions.
The thesis uses 53 State Street, a major current dev-
elopment project on a prime downtown site in Boston,
Massachusetts, as an vehicle for examining the pro-
cess of making a building of compromise. In this
highly controversial case, many participants and
observers were left wondering if the eventual solu-
tion represented much more than a "lowest common de-
nominator solution", and whether or not all available
alternatives were seriously considered. This thesis
will attempt to shed light on both these issues as a
way of furthering our understanding of the general
set of issues governing buildings of compromise.
The retrospective analysis in Chapter 2 establishes
the factual account of the process which led to the
compromise approach to developing the site. Chapter
3, in the projective mode, identifies different
16
Exhibit 1-5
Foreground building
by Skidmore, Owings,
and Merrill, 1960.
High-rise addition to
rear proposed 1981.
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operating assumptions for the site and conducts a
three-stage feasibility analysis for alternative dev-
elopment programs. First, an illustrative alterna-
tive development approach is presented investigating
the physical feasibility of alternative schemes for
the site. Next, this scheme is analyzed for finan-
cial feasibility, and compared to the range of alter-
natives actually identified during the case. This ex-
panded range of alternatives is then compared and ev-
aluated. Chapter 4 examines the political feasibil-
ity of the alternative scheme, and is the third stage
of the feasibility analysis. An analysis of the dev-
elopment process is presented, offering explanations
for the failure of the process to consider the full a
range of development alternatives.
In Chapters 5 and 6, these ideas are tested against
two analogous cases to the 53 State Street develop-
ment; The Old Federal Reserve Bank Complex and The
United Shoe Machinery Corporation Building, both
recent compromise cases in Boston.
Finally, in Chapters 7 and 8, possibilities for
change in the private and public domains are identi-
fied to improve the process for making buildings of
compromise.
18
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-7
53 State Street Entrance
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CHAPTER 2
53 STATE STREET: A BUILDING OF COMPROMISE
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
This chapter reconstructs, by way of detailed narra-
tive, the development process for 53 State Street
during the landmarks designation proceedings. Through
this "storytelling", the reader can become familiar
with the problem, the actors, and the rules by which
they interected. This understanding is fundamental
to the analysis and critique which follows in
subsequent chapters. The chronology of events is
summarized in Exhibit 2-1, "Development Process
Flow Chart".
THE DEVELOPER: BACKGROUND
Olympia and York Developments, Ltd., began in 1955 as
a small floor and wall tile importing company in Tor-
onto. Founded by Samuel Reichmann, an Austrian immi-
grant, and his three sons, the firm first entered the
real estate development market in the early 1960's
when it developed an industrial and commercial park
in the Toronto municipality of York. In 1963,
Olympia and York built a data center for Bell Canada,
the country's largest telephone utility, who were so
20
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pleased with the facility that they accepted the
firm's proposal to build an office tower in Ottawa.
This project was the first in what was to become a
huge portfolio of downtown prime office properties.
Olympia and York's real estate development operations
blossomed. By concentrating on establishing a reput-
ation for quality construction and reliability for
delivering projects on time and on budget, Olympia
and York soon became known as one of the select group
of first class, top notch developers worldwide. In
Canada they won commisions from such prestige clients
as the Toronto Star (Canada's largest newspapaper)
the Bank of Montreal, and the Canadian subsidiaries
of Sun Co., Texaco Inc., and Xerox Corporation.
Prospective clients were impressed not only by the
company's list of prestige commissions, but also by
its unique ability to move decisively without delays.
Because Olympia and York is essentially a family-held
business (the seven-member board of directors con-
sists of the three brothers, their wives, and their
mother) with a very narrow upper management group,
corporate decisions are made without the costly and
frustrating time delays which clients had come to
22
expect from its larger, more complex competitors. As
well, Olympia and York built a widespread reputation
for creative and astute project management. The
Reichmanns, for instance, after observing and ana-
lyzing construction methods in the U.S. and Canada,
built a gigantic temporary people and equipment mover
when they constructed First Canadian Place, an office
complex in Toronto. This temporary system cost $2
million, but it saved an estimated 1.3 million man-
hours of work over conventional construction methods.
In the late 1970's, with their operations soundly est-
ablished in Cananda, Olympia and York began looking
for areas for expansion. Frustrated by the restrain-
ed growth and increasing regulatory constraints in
Canadian cities at that time, Olympia and York joined
several of the largest Canadian developers, including
Cadillac-Fairview, Trizec Corporation, and Daon, in
looking to the U.S. for development opportunities.
These firms believed that their large-scale opera-
tions could compete favorably, if not brilliantly, in
the U.S. market, which was populated primarily by
smaller, more locally-oriented development
companies.1
23
The aggressiveness of Olympia and York's entry into
the U.S. real estate development market reflected
this confidence. Olympia and York became involved in
several major American market areas, including Dal-
las, San Francisco, Denver, and Los Angeles. By far
the most dramatic move, however, was in the country's
most competitive and symbolic market -- New York
City. In September 1977 Olympia and York purchased
eight prime office buildings in downtown Manhattan,
housing blue-chip tenants such as ITT, American
Brands, Sperry-Rand, and Harper & Rowe, and overnight
became one of New York's largest commercial real
estate land-owners. 2
In late 1978 Olympia and York became interested in
developing in Boston. The city apparently first
caught the attention of one of the Reichmann brothers
when he came to visit a daughter at nearby Brandeis
University. Reportedly, Reichmann instinctively
sensed the burgeoning growth potential in the city's
downtown, and sent, after returning tq Toronto, a
team to investigate sites in the central business dis-
trict for a possible office building development. 3
24
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Whatever the reason for Reichmann's initial interest
in Boston, there is no doubt that his instincts about
the city's development prospects were correct. His
reconnaissance team found the city ripe for develop-
ment of all kinds, particularly commercial office
space, in late 1978. The Boston Redevelopment Auth-
ority (BRA), had published a series of reports docu-
menting and projecting a real estate development boom
for the city. In "A Decade of Development in
Boston", a comprehensive report on development in the
public and private sectors from 1968 to 1978, BRA
Director Robert Ryan wrote:
"The achievements of the 1968-78 decade
provide a solid base for very substantial
advances over the next ten years. An
impressive array of public and private
investment projects are already in the pipe-
line, and the prospects and potential for
the future are oustanding.... In response to
the scarcity of new office space, the rise
in rent levels, and the expansion plans of
firms occupying Boston's office buildings,
more than eight million square feet of new
office constructiin is anticipated over
the next decade."
Indeed, Boston's office market had begun to blossom
after many decades of relatively low productivity.
The decade from 1968-78 had been the most productive,
25
in terms of square footage of new construction and
rehabilitations, in the city's history. Approximate-
ly 13.2 million square feet of new space, and one-
half million of converted space had been added during
this time period.5 Aside from a temporary soft-
ness in the market during the 1975-77 recession, of-
fice vacancy remained low.6  This data is repre-
sented in a bar chart in Exhibit 2-2.
Exhibit 2-3 shows that the 1977 peak in vacancy
rate occurred in 1977, and was a temporary condition
due to overbuilding in the downtown core. Sixty
State Street, completed in 1977, a 38-story tower
with a prime location in the heart of the government
center/ financial district, was a "barometer" for
these changing market conditions. After early
rent-up difficulties, the project made a dramatic
recovery and boasted a 97% rent-up at the highest
rents in the city at the time it was available for
occupancy.
The BRA's forecast for the late 1970's and early
1980's was highly optimistic. Based on an office ten-
ant survey conducted in 1977, the BRA projected an an-
nual absorption rate of approximately 600,000 square
26
Exhibit 2-2
DOWNTOWN BOSTON'S CURRENT OFFICE STOCK
BY DECADE OF COMPLETION
(In Thousands of Square Feet)
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Exhibit 2-3
DOWNTOWN BOSTON
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feet in downtown Boston from 1978-1982. 58% of this
market was projected in Class A, or roughly 350,000
square feet per year. The BRA anticipated construct-
ion of an additional 1 million square feet during the
early 1980's. 7 The projections are summarized in
Exhibit 2-4.
Market forecasts from private industry were equally
optimistic. The overall office space vacancy rate
had steadily declined from the post World War II peak
of 15.1% in April 1977, reported by the Building Own-
ers and Managers Association (BOMA). The April 1978
vacancy rate was 10.9%; this continued to fall to
9.0% by October 1978. This aggregate rate is divided
into market segments in Exhibit 2-5. As can be
seen from this data, the expansion strength within
the overall office market was in the Class A
category. This was Olympia and York's specialty.
Although the financial component of the economic equa-
tion was not quite as bright as the market forecast
for Boston at this time, development in the late
1970's was certainly achievable with conventional
terms.
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DOWNTOWN BOSTON'S YEARLY ABSORPTION RATE FOR
OFFICE SPACE TO 1982-
THREE DIFFERENT PROFILES
Exhibit 2-4
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The prime interest rate from 1977 to 1979 ranged from
11% to 13.5%. Construction financing was commonly
available at 10.5%, and large-scale projects could
attract permanent financing at 9.5% with a 40 year
term.8 Developers view this period nostalgically
as the final days of the conventional development fin-
ance--an era featuring fixed rates, long terms, and
undiluted ownership by the developer.
As the case unfolds, the reader will see that financ-
ing was of secondary concern to the capital-deep Can-
adian developers, whose access to favorable financing
is the envy of many competitors. Nonetheless, Olym-
pia and York's began preliminary project planning for
an entry into the Boston office market under finan-
cial conditions which did not introduce significant
uncertainty to the development formula, as might be
the case today.
THE POLITICAL CLIMATE
The political climate for development was as sunny as
the economic. Mayor Kevin White, anxious to erase
Boston's anti-development reputation, was decidedly
pro-development at this time. Furthermore, he saw
32
commercial office building as the key element in the
city's renaissance. ""First and forremost," he wrote
in 1973,"is Boston's office building boom--the vehi-
cle for the transformation of the City into a high-
grade service activity center." 9 He stated,
"There is an extraordinary commitment to
Boston's growth, and this commitment is ex-
panding...The commitment highlights the out-
standing prospects for the City's economy,
with all that they signify for jobs and in-
come for the people of Boston. The public
and private commitment to growth, and the
favorable prospects for the City's economy,
provide new opportunities f?5 business in-
vestment and social gains."
The Mayor's boosterism for development continued
throughout the decade, and in 1979 White wrote,
"I am alert to the acute shortage of office
space, the absorption of vacancies, the
sharp rise in office rents, and the need
for new office construction. A number of
developer proposals for new office build-
ings are currently under review. The pros-
pects for growth in Boston's office-based
services are one of the brightest elements
in the City's future and I will work with
the private 1 ector to help make that future
a reality."
33
The Mayor was not alone in welcoming the projected
development boom to Boston. The Greater Boston Cham-
ber of Commerce, the Greater Boston Real Estate
Board, and the print media all projected continuing
economic renaissance for Boston. Seizing upon the
opportunity to become a national magnet for high tech-
nology and professionals, services, and frustrated by
its image as a no-growth, overtaxed business commun-
ity, all sectors of Boston seemed to anxious to host
the investment promised by the 1980's.
THE LAND SEARCH
It was against this backdrop of market, financial,
and political optimisim that Olympia and York began
their land search in late 1978. The Olympia and York
team identified prime areas of the dowtwon for a po-
tential office building. The government center and
financial district were easily trageted as the optim-
al areas for Class A office development. The Olympia
and York team looked at several potential sites,
weighing factors of location, land area, access, and
ease of assembly.
The strongest of these parcels was the block between
34
State, Congress, Kilby Streets and Exchange Place, at
the heart of downtown. It contained several build-
ings, including the original building for the Boston
Stock Exchange, known as 53 State Street. The parcel
was known as the Exchange Block, and its location was
absolutely prime (See Exhibit 2-6).
THE PROPERTY
The Exchange Block is located at the heart of
Boston's central business district on the boundary
between the government center and the financial dis-
trict, on Congress Street, the main avenue which con-
nects the two (See Exhibit 2-7). To the north and
west is the government center, including City Hall
and numerous government office buildings for state
and federal agencies. To the south and east was the
financial district, including the headquarters of
many Boston financial institutions. It is arguably
the finest business location in the city. Land use
in the district was almost exclusively retail and
commercial. The financial district and government
center accounted for 25.6 million, or over 68% of the
entire competitive office space market for downtown
Boston. The financial district, to which the
35
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Exchange Block served as a gate from the north, alone
accounted for 55% of the overall market. It also had
the highest concentration of Class A, B, and C space
in the downtown.12 See Exhibits 2-8 and 2-9.
The Exchange Block was also a strong location for re-
tail use. The parcel lay between the two strongest
retail magnets in the downtown; the phenomenally suc-
cessful Faneuil Hall Markets to the north, and the
established Washington Street Mall shopping area to
the west, which had two anchor regional department
stores. Lafayette Place, a proposed $190 million
mixed-use development project containing retail and
hotel facilities, would further reinforce the Washing-
ton Street Mall as as Boston's core shopping dis-
trict. The Exchange Block fell on the natural pedest-
rian route between these two prime areas, and could
be favorably positioned to capture a limited portion
of the retail market.
The overall retail market was increasing in overall
volume as well. Research conducted by consultants to
the BRA in 1978 analyzed the economic and social pro-
file of the typical office tower worker, and found
38
Exhibit 2- 8
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that downtown workers did a majority of their shop-
ping for certain items in the central business dis-
trict. This consumer population, labelled the
"captive" retail market, was expanding due to the
concentration of business investment in Boston's
downtown. 13
Overall, the Exchange Block seemed ideally located
for a prime commercial office development and had
strong potential for a limited retail program. Other
possible uses, such as hotel or residential, were not
as suitable for the site. The location was inferior
for these uses to other previously announced projects
in the vicinity, which were scheduled to enter the
market at the time of the anticipated demand.
ACCESS
The site was well supported by public infrastructure.
Its location within the government/financial core pro-
vided access to four MBTA (public transit) subway
lines within five blocks of the site. Direct access
to one of these lines was even available through the
basement of the buildings on site, and could potent-
ially bring even more pedestrian traffic through the
development (See Exhibit 2-9).
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The site was also surrounded by public streets on all
four sides. In addition to State and Congress
Streets which provided excellent pedestrian access,
visibility, and a choice of prestigious business ad-
dress. Kilby Street and Exchange Place provided
enough secondary frontage to comfortably accomodate
service access, loading docks, and entrance and exits
for an undergound garage.
PHYSICAL FEATURES
The site was a textbook example of a perfect site for
a downtown high rise building. Nearly rectangular,
the site contained 49,924 square feet, providing am-
ple room for the "ideal" tower footprint (18,000 to
25,000 square feet per floor) with a low or medium-
rise base and an open plaza or entry court. Its con-
figuration was regular and compact, allowing for a
conventional floor plan layout (Exhibit 2-10).
Since the site had been occupied by three structures
for a number of years, the developers believed no
complications would arise from the construction of a
high rise tower. Borings from adjacent high rise
sites confirmed that the soil was competent and
42
Exhibit 2-10
Parcel Layout
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stable. 14 The closer Olympia and York analyzed the
Exchange Block, the more feasible it seemed.
EXISTING BUILDINGS
The Exchange Block was part of a contiguous district
populated by buildings of an average height of ten
stories, dating from the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries (See Exhibit 2-11). More
recent buildings from the late 1960's and the 1970's
occupied sites to the north and west, including Sixty
State Street, One Boston Place, and the New England
National Bank Building, all high rise office towers.
These new high rises, together with small historic
structures such as the Old State House, dating from
1747, created a heterogenous neighborhood of start-
ling contrasts which spanned the history of the city.
The site was occupied by three seemingly incongruous
buildings. Fronting State Street and Kilby Street
was the largest--an eleven story granite structure
called the Exchange Building, which was built in 1899
to house the Boston Stock Exchange. Above its ground
floor panelled banking hall and marble lobby were ten
floors of office space. The building, although
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massive and well-crafted, seemed a poor use of the
site to the Olympia and York team. In their view,
the State/Congress Street corner was the site's most
valuable asset--and the natural focus for the site.
The existing Exchange Building, however, ended in a
raw brick wall about forty feet shy of this corner
and instead was oriented towards the Kilby/State
Street Corner (See Exhibit 2-12). A five story
building, Ten Congress Street, which was connected on
its floor levels to the Exchange Building, filled in
the remaining 40 feet of site. Another lower struc-
ture, 30 Congress Street, occupied the Exchange
Place/Congress Street corner (See Exhibit 2-13).
The fourth corner, at Exchange Place and Kilby
Street, was undeveloped and was currently used for
parking.
Olympia and York considered these buildings essen-
tially worthless. Not only did they seem poorly
sited, but the structures were old and in poor condi-
tion. Even the largest and most substantial of the
three, the Exchange Building, had been sub-divided in
a hopelessly confused and ad-hoc manner. The devel-
opers were convinced that these buildings were a dras-
tic underutilization of the development potential of
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Exhibit 2-12
View of Exchange Building
.from State Street
showing raw wall at
prime corner.
'I
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Exhibit 2-13
View of the Exchange Building and
30 Congress Street from the State/
Congress Corner.
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the site.
OWNERSHIP
Further encouraging to the Olympia and York was the
fact that the entire block was under single owner-
ship. It had been purchased from the State Street
Bank, who still remained a tenant in the building, by
Old State Trust, in 1973. Albert I. Edelman and
Harold Theran, beneficiaries of the trust, were ap-
proached for a disicussion of a purchase or lease
arrangement. The owners, who had no interest in dev-
eloping the site themselves, were receptive. Olympia
and York was further encouraged, and began to analyze
the development potential of the site.
EXISTING ZONING
The site was in a downtown B-10 zoning district, as
is almost all of downtown Boston. (See Exhibit 2-14)
This zoning category allows for retail and commercial
uses up to a maximum allowable FAR of 10. The exist-
ing buildings together totalled close to this ceiling
of 499,240 square feet. However, given the prime loc-
ation, the neighboring high rise projects completed
during the previous decade, and the city's strong pro-
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Exhibit 2-14 Zoning Mlap of Boston
development policy, Olympia and York were confident a
density increase could be obtained through a vari-
ance or special district designation.
PRELIMINARY PLANNING
Having found a clearly developable site in a prime
location with a cooperative owner, Olympia and York
began preliminary site analysis and planning. In
September 1978, Olympia and York hired WZMH-Intern-
ational, a Toronto-based architecture and planning
firm, as architects for the office tower on the Ex-
change Block. WZMH-International had designed numer-
ous facilities for Olympia and York in the previous
fifteen years. WZMH-International had ten offices in
Canada and the United States, and had designed build-
ings for sites from Saudi Arabia to Los Angeles.
Given that floor-area-ratios of recent development
projects Boston had been in the 16-20 range, well
above the official 10, Olympia and York looked at
precedents to establish a target program. At nearby
28 State Street, the FAR was 21.7. At One Boston
Place it was 21.58. At the 100 Federal Street site
it was 18, and at One Beacon Street it was 17.26.
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The recently completed One Post Office Square Pro-
ject, at the Old Federal Reserve Site, had an FAR of
21.6 over its office sub-parcel. In fact, no project
since 1968 within the downtown business district
which sought a variance had an FAR of less that
18.15 Using this as a first approximation, Olympia
and York programmed the site for FAR 18, or roughly
900,000 square feet total, including approximately
40,000 s.f. for retail and the remainder for Class A
office space. The developers assumed, as they had in
first investigating the site, that the existing build-
ings would be cleared.
FINANCIAL MODEL
Although neither the city nor this writer have been
able to confirm the financial structure of Olympia
and York's venture, conventional assumptions would
produce the investment expectation represented by the
capital cost estimate and operating pro forma present-
ed in Exhibits 2-15 and 2-16. This is most likely
baseline from which the developers worked.
DESIGN INTENTIONS
WZMH-Habib developed a design proposal for the
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total office retail
'DTAL SF: 898632 New Construction: 898632 858632 40000
Retail: 40000 Retained/Rehab: 0 0 0
Office: 858632
Development Cost Estinate
Direct
New Ccustruction/sf: 74 66499
Rehab. Construct/sf: 34 0
Denolition Costs: 2600
Total Direct Costs: 69099
Indirect Costs:
Legal & Acct @ 2% IDC: 1382
Arch/Eng. @ 6% IDC: 4146
Marketing @ 20% of rents: 3595
Project Administration @ 6%: , 4146
Financing Fees @ 3% of '10C: 2073
Construction Interest
18 no. @ 45% @ 13% 6063
Rent-up Deficit @ 10% rents: 1797
Carrying Cost on Land: 825
Contingency @ 5% IUC: 3455
Tenant Finish @ $10/sf: 8586
Total Indirect Costs: 27482
Total Project Costs: %581
New: 96581
Old: 0
Sources of Funds:
Mortgage, assune @ 75% 72436
Equity: 24145
Exhibit 2-15 Phase I Capital Cost
option I FAR: 18
ixrMne an tmpense Anatysis
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Gross Potential Income:
office @ newt 22 0 18890 20401 22033 23796 25700 27755 29976 32374 34964 37761 40782
@od: 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Retail new: 24 0 %0 1037 1120 1209 1306 1411 1523 1645 1777 1919 2073
0 old: 22 0 0 0 0
Total: 0 19850 21438 23153 25005 27006 29166 31499 34019 36741 39680 42854
Vacancy 8 5% GPI:
office: 0 -944 -1020 -1102 -1190 -1285 -1388 -1499 -1619 -1748 -1888 -2039
Retail: 0 -48 -52 -56 -60 -65 -71 -76 -82 -89 -96 -104
Net Rental Incorne: 0 18857 20366 21995 23755 25655 27708 29924 32318 34904 37696 40712
office Conpanent: 0 17945 19381 20932 22606 24415 26368 28477 30755 33216 35873 38743
Retail Component: 0 912 985 1064 U49 1241 1340 1447 1563 1688 1823 1969
Operating Eenses 6 R. R. Taxes
Office @ $7.04/sf: 6045 6528 7051 7615 8224 8882 9592 10360 11188 12064 13050
Energy @ $1.00/sf.
Insurance @ .08/sf.
Janitorial @ .75/sf.
Management 8 4%, .88/sf.
Maintenance @ 4%, .88/sf.
Rep. Reserve @ 2%, .44/sf.
R.E. Taxes @ $3.00/sf.
Retail: Net, carry vacant @ 14 15 16 1 19 21 22 24 26 28 30
$7 /sf. Assune 5% vacancy.
Net Incoxe Before Ground Rents
Office: 11901 12853 13881 14991 16191 17486 18885 20396 22027 23789 25693
Retails 898 970 1047 1131 1222 1319 1425 1539 1662 1795 1939
Total: 12799 13823 14928 16123 17412 18805 20310 21935 23689 25585 27631
Ground Rents -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900
Free & Clear Incoee: 11899 12923 14028 15223 16512 17905 19410 21035 22789 24685 26731
Debt Service: (assume 11%, 30 yr., -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479
72436 loan)
CFAF: 3420 4444 5549 6744 8033 9426 10931 12556 14310 16206 18252
Depreciation: New: 40/150 Life: 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30
Base: 96581 -3622 -3575 -3528 -3481 -3432 -3383 -3333 -3293 -3232 -3180 -3127
Old: 5/SL Base: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Asortization: k-11.43%4M 72436 -311 -545 -605 -672 -746 -829 -919 -1020 -1132 -1257 -1395
Taxable Incosu: -202 868 2021 3263 4601 6043 7597 9273 11079 13026 15126
Tax Savings 8 50%: -101 434 1011 1631 2301 3022 3799 4636 5539 6513 7563
Cpitalized Value: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 222761
Mortgage Balance: -63005
Residtal Value (includes 28% cg tax) 160472
A'?I: 3521 4009 4539 5112 5733 6405 7132 7919 8771 9693 171161
NFV @ 12%:
15%:
18o:
81230
64569
52030
Profitability Index 8 12%: 3.36 RaIR: (yr. 1) 12.32
0 15%: 2.67 Cash/tah (yr. 1) 14.16
* 19%: 2.15
Exhibit 2-16
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Olympia and York program from September 1978 to June
1979 (See Exhibits 2-17 and 2-18). This scheme,
called the "Phase One Tower", was characterized by
several fundamental urban design intentions:
1. Frame the Old State House at State and
Congress Streets by adding a tower to the
"family" of towers which surrounded it on
the north and west sides;
2. Relieve the compression at the State/
Congress intersection by locating the tower
on the southest corner of the site. (Ex-
change Place and Kilby Street) This massing
concept, working with an assumed floor area
of 25,000 square feet per floor, resulted
in an overall height of approximately 36
stories.
3. Intensify the street-level activity by
locating two levels of retail space at the
base of the building and using a transpar-
ent, cellular-frame architectural vocabu-
lary for this portion.
4. Allow diagonal pedestrian movement
through the site from the State/Congress
Corner to the Exchange/Kilby corner, which
faced onto Liberty Square. This design par-
ameter was introduced by the BRA, who felt
this pass-through would create a valuable
linkage with the Broad Street district to
the s~gthest, an area targeted for develop-
ment.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE PROJECT
The preliminary review of the Olympia and York devel-
opment for the Exchange Block was extremely
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Exhibit 2-18 Phase I Model
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favorable. In the spring of 1979, Olympia and York
presented the design and development proposal to
mayor Kevin White, who, according to one participant,
"loved it"17  The BRA staff encouraged further dev-
elopment of the concept. Olympia and York subsequent-
ly prepared for design development and wind tunnel
testing. It was preparing for its preliminary public
reviews for zoning and other permits when news of the
project first became public.
PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL
Before plans of the proposed building were even re-
leased to the press, public controversy over Olympia
and York's intentions began to brew. The mere
thought of a forty-story tower on the site provoked
alarm and suspicion. The idea that such a major add-
ition to the Boston skyline would be the work of non-
Bostonians also seemed to bother the public. The dev-
elopers were characterized in the press as "One of
the giants in real estate development from across the
northern border. "118
WZMH-Habib, who at that time maintained offices in
nearby Cambridge, acknowledged they had produced the
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Phase One tower design of 40 stories, but maintained
that "...the model is not valid. It has been scrap-
ped and we still have no idea of concept."1 9
Harold Theran of. Old State Trust would not confirm
that Olympia and York were negotiating for the site,
and insisted that he was looking at several potential
offers. This coordinated effort to maintain a low
profile with such a major project, particularly when
reporters had seen a model of the scheme in the May-
or's office, was interpreted by many as a suspicious
collusion between the city and the developer. Olym-
pia and York were laying low, so the press wrote, un-
til "a viable project with the blessing of the city
can be put together."20 An atmosphere of mistrust
was early established between the general public, the
developer, and the city.
Opposition to the project fell into two camps-- those
who regarded the Exchange Building as an historic
landmark worthy of preservation, and those who were
categorically opposed to high rise development on the
site. The former group found a forum for their is-
sues before the Boston Landmarks Commission (BLC)
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through the landmarks designation process.
ter constituency, as we shall see, lacked a real for-
um for its concerns, although they were subsumed in
the historic preservation debates.
THE BOSTON LANDMARKS COMMISSION (BLC)
As the result of a home rule petition backed by the
City Council, Mayor, and the Governor in 1975, the
Boston Landmarks Commission had been established by
Chapter 772 of the Massachusetts General Laws, to
fulfill five purposes:
1. To protect the beauty of the city of
Boston and improve the quality of its envi-
ronment through identification, recogni-
tion, conservation, maintenance, and en-
hancement of areas, sites, structures, and
fixtures which constitute or reflect dist-
inctive features of the political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, or architectural
history of the city;
2. To foster appropriate use and wider
public knowledge and appreciation of such
features, areas, sites, structures, and
fixtures;
3. To resist and restrain environmental
influences adverse to such purposes;
4. To encourage private efforts in support
of such purposes; and
5. By furthering such purposes, to promote
the public welfare, to strengthen the cult-
ural and educational life of the city and
the Commonwealth and to make the city a
more attractive and des fable place in
which to live and work.
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The lat-
The Commission is a body of nine members and nine
alternates, drawn both from professional disciplines
related to development and preservation--architects,
planners, preservationists, real estate developers,
business leaders--and the general public. Profes-
sional membership groups (the Boston Society of Arch-
itects, The Greater Boston Real Estate Board, etc.)
nominate the commisioners for appointment by the
Mayor. Technically, the Landmarks Commission is a
city department. It is a functional unit of the Re-
development Authority (BRA), which provides profes-
sional staff to the Commission. The BLC's powers in-
clude the authority to conduct surveys, take proper-
ty by eminent domain, initiate and accept grants for
historic preservation, carry on educational activi-
ties in furtherance of its mission, and advise offi-
cials of the city and state on preservation issues.
The Commission also acts as the local historical com-
mission for the city, and therefore inititates the
federal listing process by considering and nominat-
ing properties to the National Register of Historic
Places.
The Commission's primary function, in statute and
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practice, is the designation of landmarks, landmark
or architectural districts, or protection areas. Al-
though neither districts nor protection areas can be
designated in centtal Boston, individual landmarks
or historic districts can be, subject to the approv-
al of the Mayor and the City Council.
BLC LANDMARKS DESIGNATION PROCESS
The designation process follows six basic steps:
1. Petition: Any ten -registered voters in
the city of Boston or any Commission mem-
bers may submit a petition to the Commis-
sion requesting that a property be consider-
ed for designation. The petition states
the general arguments supporting the struc-
ture's landmark quality, and formally ini-
tiates the process.
2. Preliminary Hearing: Within 30 days of
the filing of the petition the Commission
holds an informal preliminary hearing to
hear the arguments for designation from the
petitioners. A decision is then made ei-
ther to proceed with consideration or to re-
ject the petition.
3. Study Report: If the Commission dec-
ides to follow the designation procedures
for the site or structure, the BLC staff
then prepares a study report on the proper-
ty. The report researches the history, own-
ership, and planning characteristics of the
subject property. After determining the
significance of the site and considering al-
ternatives for its future use, the report
recommends standards for future develop-
ment, which may or may not include land-
marks designation. General standards and
criteria for demolition, construction, re-
habilitation are recommended.
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4. Public Hearing: Within 21 days follow-
ing the completion of the study report the
Commission holds a public hearing to hear
arguments in suppport and in opposition of
the designation. Petitioners, preservation-
ists, representatives of organized interest
groups, abutters, project proponents,
architects, and real estate professionals
may prepare testimony and appear at the
hearing.
5. Vote: Following the public hearing the
Commission votes to decide for or against
designation. A two-thirds majority of the
nine member Commission is required for
approval. Specific standards and criteria
are adopted as part of, and are considered
to govern, a landmark designation decision.
The process of writing such standards and
criteria may determine the time frame
between a hearing and a decision.
6. Reviews: The Commission's decision in
favor of designation is subject to Mayoral
veto within 15 days of the decsion. If the
Mayor approves the designation, the City
Council may veto the decision by a two-
thirds vote taken within thirty days of the
Mayor's approval.
The entire landmarks designation process may take
anywhere from three months to over a year, depending
on the complexity of the case, the extent of disagree-
ment between proponents and opponents of the designa-
tion, and the work load of the BLC staff. The differ-
ences in the duration of landmarks proceedings gener-
ally occur between the study report, the public
63
hearing, and the Commission vote, the stages in the
process where the bulk of the consultant's reports,
feasibility analyses, and lobbying efforts are
concentrated.
BLC REGULATORY POWERS
Once designation has been completed, *the Commission
performs a regulatory function through its design re-
view processes. A district commission, consisting of
three members of the BLC and two members/ alternates
who own property or reside in the district, is ap-
pointed by the Mayor and is approved by the City Coun-
cil. The district commission implements the desig-
nation decision by approving or disapproving any pro-
posed modifications to the designated property . The
district commission's permission to proceed with such
modifications is rendered through either a Certifi-
cate of Design Approval or a Certificate of Exemp-
tion. The latter is issued for work undertaken for
ordinary repair, rectifying conditions hazardous to
public health, or for avoiding substantial hardship
to the owner. The process for design review includes
appeals to the superior court of Suffolk County if
the commission's decision is contested.
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DESIGNATION OF THE EXCHANGE BUILDING
Although the process for designation of landmarks
appears straightforward and clear in the statute, in
practice the interaction of developer, preservation-
ist, the Commission, and other city departments is
extraordinarily complex. In the sections following,
each stage of the designation and negotiation is
described.
PETITION
On July 10, 1979, ten registered voters of Boston
filed a petition to designate the Exchange Building,
or 53 State Street, a landmark of the city of Boston.
The petition claimed that the building was worthy of
designation because it was the only remaining work in
the downtown area of Peabody and Stearns, the notable
Boston architectural firm. The petitioners argued
that the Exchange Building, together with a few other
buildings in the area, "marks the zenith of granite,
load-bearing walled commercial architecture in
Boston. ,22
LEGAL COUNSEL
Olympia and York had been aware of the preservation
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sympathy for the structure but considered it unfound-
ed. They considered 53 State Street a poorly sited,
inefficient building which had fallen into disrepair
and vastly underutilized the site's potential. Wary
of the complications which might ensue during a land-
marks designation process, Olympia and York hired the
law firm Fine and Ambrogne, who had served as counsel
to the developers the Faneuil Hall Marketplace, and
who had a reputation for successful negotiations with
the city in large-scale development projects in Bos-
ton. Attorney Phil David Fine would represent
Olympia and York in all deliberations with the city
and the landmarks commission.
The first contact between the development interests
and the BLC came a few days before the petition was
filed. Attorney Fine requested a meeting with BLC
Executive Director Marcia Myers to discuss the proce-
dures for designation. At this meeting Fine gave a
presentation of the background of Olympia and York,
and explained the proposal, outlining why he felt the
development made sense to the city--the tax arrear-
age on the property, the prospect of tax-producing
development, the strong demand for Class A office
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space, and the jobs the development would bring to
Boston--arguments which would resurface throughout
the subsequent BLC deliberations. About one week
after this initial meeting, the BLC was advised that
Fine and Ambrogne also represented Old State Trust,
the current owners of the property.
On July 24, 1979, the BLC held its preliminary
hearing to decide whether or not to proceed with the
designation process. Speaking at this hearing were
the petitioners and the President of the New England
Chapter of the Society of Architectural Historians.
Written testimony from Wheaton Holden, an historian
and expert on the work of Peabody and Stearns, was
also submitted. Cited as reasons for designation
were the quality of the building's design and con-
struction, the notoriety of the firm which designed
it, and the role of the building in Boston's finan-
cial history. Added to the list of arguments in sup-
port of designation were the less "historical" fea-
tures of the building--the texture of its stone, the
building's scale, and the way that it "fit into the
neighborhood"2 3 --qualities the petitioners argued
no new office building could match.
67
Attorney Fine also appeared before the BLC on the
same day in its business session. His arguments
against designation were purely economic. He repeat-
ed his themes of tax benefits to the city, economic
loss to the current and potential owners of the prop-
erty stemming from either delays imposed by a desig-
nation process or designation itself. 2 4  The debate
over the fate of 53 State Street was thus cast as a
choice between the BLC's mission to "protect the beau-
ty of the city of Boston" 2 5 and the obligation of
the regulatory process to weigh "economic considera-
tions... the permanent jobs, supplies, and services
sustained by such a huge investment." 2 6
On August 14, 1979, the BLC voted to proceed with the
preparation of the study report. In the two months,
required to complete the study, letters supporting
landmark desingation began to pour in to the Mayor's
office and the BLC. Architects, planners, preserva-
tionists, and other concerned citizens wrote to regis-
ter their support of designation, echoing the fami-
liar themes of quality design and construction, hist-
oric value, the influence of Peabody and Stearns, and
the scale and massing relationships of the existing-
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building to the neighborhood. Letters were received
from an estimated 1000 people, an extraordinary out-
pouring of support for a single designation case.
Support for designation was also registered by numer-
ous professional societies and preservation groups.
The Boston Society of Architects, the Bostonian Soci-
ety, the City Conservation League, the Architectural
Conservation Trust, and the regional office of the
National Trust for Historic Preservation were among
the many organized groups who registered support of
the designation.
THE BOSTON PRESERVATION ALLIANCE (BPA)
The most visible proponents of the designation was
the Boston Preservation Alliance, an "umbrella" group
which coordinates preservation activities of public
and private preservation groups in Boston. Formed in
April 1978, the BPA boasts a membership of some twen-
ty-five organizations, including the Boston Land-
marks Coimmission itself. 3 2 The Alliance serves as
a clearinghouse for preservation information, a coor-
dinating body for preservation activities, a lobby-
ing group at the state and local levels, and as an
educational forum for preservation and urban design.
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The BPA felt the Exchange Building was a crucial
case. They believed the building was an irreplace-
able component of the low and medium rise downtown
district, and a significant individual building.
Furthermore, they believed rehabilitation of the
structure might be financially feasible. The BPA
began coordinating and organizing support for the
designation and the public hearing, which had been
scheduled for November 13, 1979.
REASSESSMENT BY THE DEVELOPER: A SECRET COMPROMISE
Meanwhile', Olympia and York's architects had been
quietly re-assessing their design. Although the pre-
liminary review of the Phase One tower by the Mayor
and the BRA had been enthusiastic, the architects had
sensed as early as June 1979, when news of the pro-
ject was beginning to appear in the press, that the
preservation issue was not one to be treated lightly.
Director of Design for WZMH-Habib, Chung Lee, re-
calls that he began to conceptualize a compromise
scheme integrating parts of the Exchange Building
with a new office tower at this time.27 This
concept was developed into what became known as the
Phase Two Tower, developed in late summer 1979, shown
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in Exhibits 2-19 and 2-20. Shaped by the same
urban design concerns for the placement of the tower,
the movement of pedestrians through the site, and the
same 900,000 square foot development program, the
Phase Two Tower shared many conceptual underpinnings
with the original scheme for the site. Lee worked to
keep the "L" shaped portion of the Exchange Building
which faced Kilby and State Streets (Exhibit 2-20).
As he recalls, he recognized that this partial
retention offered the only possible solution to the
mounting controversy. He felt the scheme would
retain the best parts of the existing building and
also meet the needs of both his client and the city.
Olympia and York agreed this compromise approach
could potentially satisfy the preservationists'
swelling opposition to their development. The devel-
opers felt the concept of a partial retention offered
a politically tractable solution, and instructed the
architects to continue to develop the scheme. The
team decided, however, to keep the compromise ap-
proach a secret from the city and the preservation-
ists. Olympia and York still felt the original
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Exhibit 2-19
Early Rendering of
Phase II Tower
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Exhibit 2-20 The Kilby/State "L"
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scheme had a chance to succeed, and wanted to proceed
on that basis. The refinement of the compromise
scheme proceeded quietly. Other participants in the
case eventually claimed authorship of the compromise
concept. BRA Director Robert Ryan stated in January
of 1980, when the controversy had subsided, that "the
meetings on this project go back to last summer, when
I first asked the developers to explore the
possibility of a design which would allow retention
of the facades of 53 State Street. 2 8
Indeed, Boston Globe columnist Anthony Yudis wrote
on July 9, 1979, which was before the petition for
designation was even filed, "It is conceivable that a
compromise plan saving the best features of the old
building could be worked out, similar to the compro-
mise development on the old Federal Reserve Bank site
in Post Office Square."29 Yet another author of
the compromise concept was an architect who wrote the
Mayor in late summer and suggested a similar
approach.30
MEETING THE MAYOR
On October 22, a group of preservationists met with
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the Mayor to present their arguments in favor of
designating the Exchange Building at 53 State Street.
Organized by Landmarks Commission Executive Director
Marcia Myers, the preservationists discussed the sig-
nificance of the building relative to American archi-
tectural and commercial history, the effects of high
rise development on the site, the reuse potential for
the building and the site, and the extent of the
support for the designation among the general public.
Mayor White's response was non-committal and discour-
aging to the preservationists. He professed dissatis-
faction with the prospect of high rise development on
the site, but stated he preferred a "strong develop-
ment" to a "weak compromise".31 The preservation-
ists interpreted these comments to mean that the
Mayor would veto any designation which obviated dra-
matic development on the site. This introduced a
difficult dilemma for the preservationists. Although
they still advocated designation, they were now
afraid a strict designation would ultimately result
in an immediate mayoral veto and the eventual loss of
the entire building. They too began to wonder if a
compromise was the only remaining approach--and if it
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was feasible.
Unbeknown to the preservationists, just such a comp-
romise scheme was actually presented to the Land-
marks Commission the day after their meeting with the
Mayor. This, the Phase Two design developed by the
architects over the summer, was presented to the BLC
on October 23. Ironically, this was also the day
that the Commission staff Study Report was also
released. Attention quickly focussed on the anxious-
ly awaited Study Report, and the existence of a comp-
romise scheme went largely unnoticed for several
months.
THE STUDY REPORT
The Study Report examined the history, significance,
economic status, and planning context of the Exchange
building. It recommended, "without qualification or
reservation, that The Exchange Building be designated
a Landmark.. .and that the property be considered for
nomination to the National Register of Historic
Places. ,32 In addition, 10 Congress Street was rec-
ommended for designation. This recommendation was
made because 10 Congress St. was connected through on
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all floors through the west wall of the Exchange
Building, in spite of the staff's admission that the
building itself was not worthy of designation. 3 3
In recommending the Exchange Building for landmark
status, the study report found that the building met
all four of the Commission's criteria for designa-
tion. It was a distinguished architectural design,
possessed distinctive characteristics of construc-
tion, was of a style inherently valuable for study,
and a notable work of an influential architecture
firm. A section of the report, summarizing the prop-
erty's historic importance, appears in Appendix A.
Immediately after the release of the study report the
advocates and opponents of the designation of the Ex-
change Building began preparations for the public
hearing. Rupert Davis, a member of the BPA, coordin-
ated testimony in favor of the designation. Attorney
Phil Fine, representing the development interests,
prepeared the case against designation.
THE PUBLIC HEARING
The public hearing for the landmark designation of
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the Exchange Building, in one BRA staffmember's
words, was "the most crowded event in the history of
the BRA boardroom" 3 4 and lasted over six hours.
The voluminous transcript of the hearing documented
this single session as an intense condensation of the
entire controversy. The issues raised at this hear-
ing were debated and researched in the weeks and
months which followed.
The testimony in favor of designation followed sever-
al themes. The Massachusetts Historical Commission,
the Boston National Park Service, the Historic Neigh-
borhoods Foundation, and the City Conservation League
all endorsed the landmark designation, citing the
building's critical role in the character of the old
financial district, its prominence in Boston economic
and political history, its high architectural quali-
ty, and its comfortable human scale. As one witness
stated, destruction of the Exchange Building would
"massively alter the scale and environment of lower
State Street. It is one of many buildings that were
erected near the turn of the century, when Boston
maintained height restrictions."3 5 Witnesses
warned the Commission of the hazards of allowing the
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"Manhattanizing"36 of the city the urban design
costs of creating "an anonymous slot between imper-
sonal skyscrapers, as has happened in so many other
financial districts around the country." 37 These
sentiments were reinforced by testimony from the New
England Chapter of the Society of Architectural His-
torians, the National Trust for Historic Preserva-
tion, the Society for the Preservation of New England
Antiquities, and the Bostonian Society.
By contrast, the anti-designation testimony was prim-
arily economic in thrust. Deputy Mayor for Fiscal
Affairs James Young claimed that designation was
equivalent to a tax "appropriation" of two million
dollars per year assuming a million square foot tower
could be built on the site.38 The Executive Vice
President of the greater Boston Chamber of Commerce
testified that Boston was in dire need of Class A
office space. A major new tower was needed, he ar-
gued, to sustain Boston's growth as a regional employ-
ment and industrial center. He maintained that the
proposed office tower would create about 2000 con-
struction jobs and 6000 permanent jobs.
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Past BRA Director and Director of Public Facilities
Robert Kenney testified that the vacancy rate was
lower and the absorption rate higher than anticipated
and reported by the BRA. He argued that the develop-
ment planned for the Exchange Block was not only crit-
ical to the city's growth, but the lack of available
alternative sites made it impossible to redirect the
demand to another section of Boston. 3 9
A Senior Vice President of the John Hancock Insurance
Company testified that the 53 State Street location
was "one of the most desirable sites in the city for
a new office building40 . Ironically, he argued
that, from an institutional lender's point of view,
the exisitng building was a poor candidate for
rehabilitation.
A Certified Public Accountant testified that the
property had been operating at a loss from 1974-1978,
and needed redevelopment to become a viable income-
producing property. The President of the Massachu-
setts Building Trades testified that the new con-
struction proposal would bring more jobs to the local
economy. 41
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Following the economic and financial witnesses pre-
sented against designation, Fine called upon several
of the developer's own consultants. Chung Lee from
WZMH-Habib explained a rehabilitation feasibility
study his firm had prepared. His conclusions were
that the building was inefficient in layout, and
needed substantial repair and additional new
construction to overcome its circulation and
leasability handicaps. 4 2
A cost estimator from George B. Macomber Company,
working from these architect's plans, provided con-
struction cost estimates for the rehabilitation of
the building. Using the design drawings and the cost
estimate, a feasibility specialist from Carpenter and
Company claimed that a rehab scheme was -financially
infeasible. Finally, David Habib of WZMH-Habib test-
ified that the Exchange Building was not, in his
opinion, a good example of the work of Peabody and
Stearns. Furthermore, he argued, the demolition and
replacement of the building with new construction was
justified by centuries of architectural history, in
which demolitions and replacements were the customary
way to meet changing needs. 4 3
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Two witnesses in favor of designation made arguments
on economic terms--Roger Webb, President of Architect-
ure Conservation Trust (ACT) and developer of Old
City Hall, and J. Miller Blew, a developer and educa-
tor at the Harvard Graduate School of Design. Roger
Webb testified that the building was structurally
sound and was at the strongest possible lcoation of
any existing building in Boston. These two factors,
Webb argued, greatly enhanced the probability of a
successful reuse program.44 Blew argued that
designation was preferable to new construction
because: 1) straight rehabilitation of the building
was financially feasible; 2) only a development
scheme of at least 900,000 square feet was a superior
investment alternative; this required a hefty zoning
variance and introduced uncertainty; and 3) the
complexity of the issues a 53 State St. demanded a
closer look at available options and designation
could serve as a first step in this process. 4 5
THE ENSUING DEBATES
All the issues introduced at the public hearing were
intensely debated in subsequent months. J. Miller
Blew suggested in his closing comments that the
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preservation interests undertake a baseline rehabili-
tation study to confirm that straight reuse of the
building was feasible. This would not only place the
developer's reuse study, which did seem rather per-
functory, under close scrutiny, but would also serve
as a starting point for the two opposing parties to
make tradeoffs. On Novemder 26, the BPA announced
they had commissioned Mr. Blew's development and
consulting firm, Real Property Resources Corporation,
to undertake such a feasibility study of the Exchange
Building. Meanwhile, the Alliance submitted a list
of questions to the developer's feasibility analyst
in an attempt to clarify his underlying assumptions
and expose what they believed was a heavily biased
analysis.
Meanwhile, Attorney Fine and architects WZMH-Habib
met with the Landmarks Commission to discuss a pro-
cess whereby a compromise development scheme might be
worked out. The first of these meetings took place
on the 28th of November. The BPA was not invited to
these meetings, at the developer's insistence, des-
pite the BLC's expressed argument that no legitimate
compromise could be reached without their
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participation. Ultimately, the BPA and the original
petitioners were not involved in this negotiation pro-
cess until a settlment had already been reached. Dur-
ing the fall of 1978, WZMH-Habib had been busily re-
fining their compromise scheme. Phase Three of their
work, which was eventually accepted as the final dev-
elopment scheme, was the architects' second iteration
of the early compromise approach begun several months
earlier. The tower portion was "slenderized" as much
as possible, and the volume joining the new building
to the old was carefully reshaped. This scheme,
which was ready for discussion with the BRA by early
December, is shown in Exhibits 2-21 and 2-22.
A COUNTER-ARGUMENT
The Real Property Resources Corporation (RPRC) "Devel-
opment Feasiblity Study" was released on December 7.
It concluded,
"that the physical and financial program pre-
sented in this report is entirely feasible
and would be a great success on the market
if it is completed as scheduled in 1981.
This program is superior to all but the very
highest density new office developmigt which
might be accommodated on-the site."
The RPRC analysis assumed no increase in density on
the site from the existing base FAR of 10, but
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identified this as another possible option for
consideration. As a baseline rehab approach, the
scheme was preservationist in spirit. RPRC suggested
a new-construction addition to the Congress Street
wall, an existing "raw" brick facade (Exhibits 2-23
and 2-24). Otherwise, its intent was to retain and
rehabilitate the existing structure.
As an investment, RPRC saw straight rehabilitation as
only one of several attractive options available to
the developer. Differing in their estimates of con-
struction and operating costs, the RPRC analysts
reached an opposite conclusion from the developer's
analysts-- rehabilitation of the building was not
only desirable, but economically superior to any
other alternative schemes except one which included
over 800,000 square feet.
THE DEAL
As comprehensive thorough as the RPRC report was, it
arrived too late in the development process to
register any impact on the outcome. At the time of
its release, the development team and their attorneys
were already meeting with the representatives of the
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BRA and the BLC and attempting to refine the archi-
tectural design of the project, not its fundamental
parameters. Olympia and York's foresight in quietly
developing their compromise scheme paying handsome
dividends--they had an insurmountable headstart in
the negotiations.
Although December 1979 was yet another month of an
outpouring of pro-designation sentiment in letters to
the BRA, BLC, and the Mayor, this was the period dur-
ing which, in fact, the finishing touches were being
put on the compromise scheme and the standards and
criteria of the designation. In four meetings from
December 11 to December 21, settlements were reached
between the Commission and the developers regarding:
1. The actual boundary line of the
designation.
2. The retention of the last two bays of
the Kilby Street facade, which the
developer originally wanted to
demolish.
3. The depth of the facades to be
retained.
4. The retention of the existing floor
levels and spandrels.
5. The treatment of the end wall facing
Congress Street.
6. The type of glass used in the existing
building.
7. The reuse and/or relocation of the
historic stairway in the entrance.4 9
8. The format and substance of the
standards an1 7 criteria governing the
designation.
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On December 21, the Boston Preservation Alliance was
invited to see the compromise scheme. The Alliance,
believing it was seeing the scheme in its conceptual,
rather than final stages, was pleased to the devel-
oper moving towards a compromise strategy, and was
relieved to see at least partial retention of the
Exchange Building. They expressed dismay at the pro-
posed high density and skepticism over the appropri-
ateness of the chosen materials. They were not
aware, of course, that it was really too late for
these comments.
DESIGNATION
On January 2, 1980, the Boston Landmarks Commisssion
voted to designate a portion of the Exchange Build-
ing (Exhibit 2-25). Plans were announced for a
forty-story tower on the southern half of the site,
and the retention of the "L" portion of the original
Exchange Building. BRA Director Robert Ryan touted
it as an exemplar of development and preservation:
"Today, with the proposal for 53 State
Street, Boston can show once again how a
new and exditing building can be integrated
into the distinctive scale and character of
our downtown. This is an exciting proposal
because it will enable us to retain the
most important parts of the buildings which
now exist on site, namely the facades on
State and Kilby Streets.. .And most import-
ant to me, we will retain the present ggale
of building heights on State Street."
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THE RESPONSE
Angus Crowe, then Chairmain of the BPA, felt the
scheme did not respect the architecture of the exist-
ing building. 49 One radio announcer called it "a
strange blend, a 19th century granite building 11
stories tall wrapped around a modernistic office tow-
er perhaps 40 stories.',5 0 Globe columnist Ian
Menzies was more direct: "Has Boston really saved 53
State Street or is the city's preservation effort
merely a facade? Put it another way, how viable is a
venerable old Boston building that retains its face
but looses its behind?" 5 1
The Preservation Alliance, feeling they had been mis-
represented in the media as endorsing the compromise
scheme, promptly issued press releases clarifying
their role in the compromise process and dissociating
themselves from the proposal. They insisted they had
not been full participants in the design negotiations
and had only been asked on short notice to comment on
a fait accompli. Furthermore, they maintained,
they had been led to believe that the project was not
finalized when they were allowed to see it. They
claimed the Standards and Criteria, the "sole factors
on which the preservation, or lack therof, is
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grounded", 5 2 were shown to the Alliance members on-
ly two hours before the final hearing. They were
disgruntled not only with the substance of the desig-
nation, but resentful they had been excluded from the
secretive design discussions which took place after
the public hearing and determined the designation.
They restated their preference for a moderate and sym-
pathetic addition to the existing building, a concept
RPRC had originally suggested as well. 5 3
The original petitioners for designation were also an-
gry over the outcome of the six month effort. Spoke-
sman Richard Heath wrote that the compromise "is a
complete capitulation to the developer." He felt the
BLC process was one which ignored the original peti-
tioners and became an closed brokering game between
the city, the developer, and preservation profession-
als. In the process, he believed, the BLC had been
co-opted by the developer. He'd "rather the BLC and
the preservation constituency go out kicking and lose
than lay down and be carried out."54
THE AFTERMATH
There is no doubt that the final compromise reached
for the development of 53 State Street left many
94
participants and observers wondering if it was a net
gain or loss for the city. Not only is the end
product controversial, but many participants feel
that the process led more readily to confrontation,
and dispute than it did to constructive communication
and resolution. Actors on both sides (and in the
middle) of the issues in the case were left feeling
exploited and unfairly treated by the process.
What went wrong? What elements of the process led to
the compromise approach now under construction, of
which few are genuinely proud? How can we be sure
that all the alternatives were considered--and if
they weren't, why not? These questions still linger
in the minds of both participants and observers of
the 53 State Street Case, and are addressed in sub-
sequent chapters in this thesis.
The analysis of the process is only meaningful, how-
ever, if we can identify one or several outcomes
which can be judged superior to the one actually ac-
cepted. At 53 State Street, this range of alterna-
tives is bounded by the straight rehabilitation
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scheme developed by Real Property Resources Corpora-
tion on the one hand, and the original Phase One (to-
tal demolition and construction of a 900,000 square
foot tower) Olympia and York proposal on the other.
It is to this range of possible compromises, of which
the current Exchange Place development is but one
example, that the thesis now turns.
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CHAPTER 3
53 STATE STREET: RECONSIDERATION
This chapter considers alternative development ap-
proaches to the Exchange Block, irrespective of the
process recounted in Chapter 2. Four design varia-
bles are explained, and alternative approaches to
each are described. An illustrative proposal incorp-
orating these objectives is then presented. Next, a
computer model is used to measure the financial feas-
iblity of each identified alternative. Finally, a
comparative evaluation of these alternative devel-
opment scenarios is conducted.
DESIGN VARIABLES
The thesis investigates alternative development
schemes through the consideration of four variables:
1) the amount of the existing building retained;
2) site density; 3) building massing; and 4) the
relationship between old and new construction. Each
of these is explained and illustrated in the sections
following.
Design Variable 1: Retaining more of the Exchange
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Building. The value of a landmark in the city
extends beyond the preservation of a period facade or
certain selected details. An old building is useful
because it, in the company of other buildings of
varying age, documents and communicates the stream of
time. To perform this role meaningfully, however, a
landmark must retain its character and "content" as
well as its appearance. The notion of organization,
treatment of needs for light, air, views, the actual
construction system, and a building's sense of scale
and dimension are as important to conveying its place
in history as is its external facade.
The value of the Exchange Building, for instance,
extends beyond its granite facade. Its value is not
2-dimensional, as the eventual designation might sug-
gest, but spatial and architectural as well. The
building is organized as a modified "U" shaped plan,
a common strategy for maximizing natural light and
air for office space arranged in "wings" (Exhibit
3-1). Centralized circulation was located at the
union of the two wings, at the groin of the "U". The
third wing, extending to the south down the center of
the site, reflects the same objectives of providing
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Exhibit 3-1
Structural Analysis
I"
centrally located circulation and ample light
and views on both sides of the shallow, thin building
plan.
Landmark designation, even if it applies to only a
portion of a building, should attempt to capture the
"content" as well as the appearance of a building.
In the case of the Exchange Building, the content of
the structure includes the "U" Plan, the dimension
and materials of the atrium, and the placement of
vertical circulation elements in central locations, a
strategy which adds activity and interest to the atri-
um itself. The interior atrium walls, constructed in
utilitarian brick with segmented arches, are as rich
in meaning and content as the dressed granite facades
on State and Kilby Streets. Retention of the entire
"U" concept, maintaining the original atrium and wing
dimensions, is therefore the first parameter of the
attempted redesign.
Design Variable 2: Reducing the Site Density
and/or Building Height. The Olympia and York scheme
has an FAR of 21.47, including approximately 900,000
square feet in the new office tower and 200,000
100
square feet in the retained "L" portion of the
Exchange Building. This represents 41 stories of an
average 26,000 square foot each. Independent of
financial feasibilty, which is investigated in
subsequent sections of this chapter, arguments
against high density at the Exchange Block are:
Disruption of the scale relationships in
the district. WZMH-Habib's theory that
"framing" the Old State House with a family
of high rise towers will enhance its "center-
piece value" is dubious. The design strat-
egy the architects selected does, literally,
frame the Old State House; however, the
huge scale difference between the Old State
House and the very closely grouped towers on
all sides seems to ridicule, rather than en-
hance, what is the architectural focal point
of the district.
At certain times of the day, the Old State
House is now "spotlighted" by the sunlight
which penetrates between existing towers.
Its warm color and texture are highlighted
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in contrast to surrounding structures. Too
many tall buildings placed too close will,
however, keep the Old State House in a perp-
etual shadow of flat, subdued light, signi-
ficantly reducing the building's gemlike
quality.
Furthermore, the existing Exchange Building
is a "transitional building" between the
large recent structures and the finer grain-
ed fabric of the financial district south of
State Street. The building's massiveness
and deeply textured stone make it a strong
"gate" building to the district. This role
would be undermined by the placement of too
tall and large a building on the southern
portion of the site.
Adverse environmental effects of high site
density on the Exchange Block. Shadow stud-
ies conducted by WZMH-Habib as part of the
environmental analysis required under the
city PDA review process were interpeted by
the environmental consultants as follows:
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"additional incremental shadow components
due to the new tower will probably not be
significant. This is due to the proximity
and shadow effects of other similarly large
towers in the immediate vicinity." 1
This reassuring statement obscures, in fact,
a heavy bias in the analysis which considers
the area north of the site, the Faneuil Hall
Marketplaces, very important, but minimizes
the impacts to the other surrounding areas.
It is true, for instance, that the 39-story,
Sixty State Street tower already shadows a
substantial portion of the area to the
north, and the 41-story Olympia and York tow-
er will add only a small marginal shadow in
this direction. The sun and shadow effects
are more serious, however, for other parts
of the city.
Shadow impacts for Washington Street, Court
Street, and other areas to the southeast and
southwest, are considerable. Justifying
height by the existence of tall neighbors,
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some of which were also in the pre-devel-
opment stages at the time of the case, is a
persuasive but less than objective argument.
In the words of one BRA staffmember, "the
only mitigation measure available is to re-
duce the height of the tower by nearly
half."2 (For more shadow analysis, see
Appendix C).
Ground level wind effects of the tower
have been analyzed in wind tunnel testing
conducted by Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, con-
sultants for the environmental impact ana-
lysis. In fact, the final design was revis-
ed to improve the building's performance
relative to this criteria. Consequently,
the consultants claim, at certain locations
around the Exchange Block, pedestrians will
enjoy a net improvement in wind conditions
due to the design of the new tower and the
configuration of the atrium.
This writer is not qualified to either con-
firm or reject this claim. Assuming that
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similar mitigation measures could be achiev-
ed regardless of density, (the reduction in
wind effects was apparently achieved by shap-
ing the low atrium to allow air passage up
above the fifth floor along Congress Street)
the wind impacts of alternative development
schemes are considered "neutral" the compa-
rative evaluation presented subsequently.
The tower's impacts on traffic, sewage, and
other city infrastructure are claimed to
be minimal. Again, lacking the expertise to
evaluate this claim, this criteria is consi-
dered neutral in the evaluation.
The policy impacts of high density on the
site. The BRA, using the Greater Boston
Real Estate Board's projections for office
space absorption, predicted a yearly rate of
800,000 square feet through 1983. This esti-
mate has actually proved conservative-- ab-
sorption has run at an average of 830,000
square feet per year from April 1979 to
April 1981. Demand for office space in
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Boston is strong, substantial, and
sustained.
In each review of a proposed high density
development above the existing zoning base-
line FAR of 10, the BRA makes an implicit
policy choice. Market demand can be met by
approving a few projects of super high den-
sity, and concentrating investment in a few
areas. Alternatively, the same demand can
be met not by approving limited number of
super-density projects, but by stimulating
widespread and individually smaller rehabi-
litation or new construction projects on a
greater number of sites. In practice, of
course, the city can attempt to combine and
balance these two supply strategies.
Given these choices, each decision regarding
a major high density development can be seen
to have a significant impact on the entire
market. The policy preference implicit in
such decisions will either encourage a gener-
al development and reinvestment in a wider
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distribution throughout the city or will en-
courage supply through a very few intensive
developments of the highest density.
The approval of the FAR 21.47 at the Ex-
change Block, particularly on a site which
appears to have been able to support effic-
ient and feasible infill around the existing
building, clearly indicated a policy prefer-
ence for the latter strategy. The approval
of 1.1 million square feet, along with 1.2
million at Dewey Square, seriously weakened
the market position of the smaller investors
considering upgrading, infill, or more mod-
est new construction.
For the urban design, environmental, and policy-
related reasons cited above, the thesis adopts a
second design objective of a general reduction in
site density. The optimal FAR, in terms of financial
performance, is explored in the analysis presented in
subsequent sections of the chapter.
Design Variable 3: A building massing which
107
minimizes the perceived bulk of the building,
especially on Liberty Square. The eventual formula
of density, height, and site configuration results in
an average floor of 26,000 square feet located on the
southern half of the property. This building volume
covers nearly all the remaining site area around the
retained "L" portion of the Exchange Building, for
the full 41-story height.
The architects have used two massing techniques to
reduce this great bulk. By using a series of round-
cornered tubes to compose the shaft of the tower, the
overall mass is broken into more slender vertical
portions. These tubes are of varying height to
create the impression of stepped massing, even though
the top is actually flat. Although both these design
strategies add visual interest and successfully re-
duce the perceptual mass of the huge building,
several weaknesses in the overall massing can be
considered (Exhibit 3-2).
First, the actual, as well as perceived mass, on
the Liberty Square corner is still huge. The current
openness of this corner of the Liberty Square is an
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Phase II Tower
Massing Discussion
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important "release" to the tightening and funneling
of the triangular street pattern at this location.
However, no attempt was made to shift the building's
mass away from this corner of the site. The openness
and permeability now afforded by the Exchange Build-
ing will be replaced by a ponderous mass which will
close this end of Liberty Square. The massing is
even a bit ironic, given the BRA's insistence on a
pedestrian pass-through at the ground level; the
building massing above implies everything but easy
passage (See Exhibit 3-3 ).
Second, the stepped massing of the tower, although
certainly a commendable strategy for reducing the tow-
er's huge bulk, would have been more effective if it
had been more emphatic. The actual reduction in
floor areas first occurs at the 39th and 40th floors.
From the pedestrian level, therefore, the stepped mas-
sing accomplishes no perceivable reduction in bulk.
Since the first 39 floors of the tower are all the
same floor area, the positive effects of the stepped
massing are irrelevant except when viewed from above
or afar (Exhibit 3- 4 ).
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Exhibit 3-4
KLBY STRET
Stepped Massing
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Third, the use of the rounded corner, although a
direct effort to relate the new building to the old
(the intent was to echo the rounded corner of the
retained "L" portion of the Exchange Building) may
actually work counter to the effort to reduce the
mass of the tower. The rounded corners extend the
building visually and increase its perceptual mass,
whereas sharper, squared, or angled corners would
strike crisper lines and creates sharper reflections
and shadows, which culd help reduce the visual bulk
of the building.
An alternative design is therefore predicated on the
objectives of reducing the building mass at Liberty
Square, using a more aggressively stepped massing
with earlier floor area reductions (occurring at
lower heights in the building) and crisp, rather than
rounded corners.
Design Variable 4: Improve the architectural rela-
tionship between the old and the new. Identifying
the "proper" relationship between old and new parts
of a building "collage" is a question of current
interest in the architectural profession, and evades
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easy answers. In this section, the thesis proposes
an analytical framework for considering the issue,
and iden-tifies an alternative set of design strate-
gies for approaching an addition to the Exchange
Building.
An entire volume devoted to the subject of Old and
New Architecture: Design Relationship, was publish-
ed this year by the National Trust For Historic Pres-
ervation, summarizing the proceedings of a conference
held on the subject in December 1977.
Contributing to the volume were architects, preserva-
tionists, planners, critics, journalists, educators,
and public officials. And although it is the single-
most comprehensive work focussed specifically on the
subject, the publication evades firm conclusions.
All the contributing authors agree that the relation-
ship between old and new should be "a sympathetic
one ", or one based on mutual "respect" between old
and new. Definitions of what actually constitutes
this respect, and what specific design strategies pro-
duce such a relationship, however, are as numerous as
there are authors.
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Should a new building contrast or blend with the old?
Is "respect" for the old achieved by repeating archi-
tectural elements, materials, or details, or by pro-
viding a stark backdrop which accents the old by its
"neutrality"? Should the new portion look new or
attempt to mimic the old?. As with all design issues,
these questions escape easy and absolute answers.
Preferred design strategies seem to vary with each
designer's espoused philosophy, education, and/or
explanations of their work.
The lack- of consensus within the profession is
further frustrated by the absence of a logical
analytical framework for assessing the design
relationship between old and new strucutres.? What
are the different degrees to which a new building can
relate to an old? Is the relationship a question of
degree as well as character and quality?
This thesis proposes that the design relationship be-
tween old and new construction is expressed, inter-
preted, and can be evaluated at five different
"levels", from the most literal and direct to the
most cosmetic and superficial. In descending order
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of importance, these are: 1) functional and organiza-
tional; 2) spatial; 3) formal; 4) sensory or appear-
ance-related; and 5) illusory or allusory. This con-
cept is diagrammed in Exhibit 3-5. Each of the
"levels" is discussed below and used to formulate
design objectives for the illustrative scheme present-
ed later in this chapter.
1. Functional/Organizational
Apart from any manipulation of materials,
finishes, voids, reference lines, projecting
cornices, etc., the most fundamental level
at which new and original construction can
relate is through the basic functional or-
ganization of the two building pieces. The
conceptual arrangement of program elements,
primary vertical circulation, relationship
between building plans and sections are the
available design tools. In the writer's
view, this "level" of the relationship is
fundamental, and is unaffected by design
strategies of the other four levels.
For example, the retained major entrances,
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Exhibit 3-5
Degree/"Level"
1.
2.
3.
4.
5. illusory/allusory
Quality/Character
ie:
sympathetic
respect
rein orcingl
FRrasr-i=g
cating
reversa
me Ive
competitive
subordinate
reflective
independence
reinterpretive
literal
resonant
dissonant
repetittve
exaggeration
dependent
The design relationship can be formulated
using qualitative approaches to each degree or
level of the relationship. The levels are listed
in decscending order of strength.
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plan organization and site orientation, and
circulation patterns of an old building can
either be reinforced or changed by the plan
organization of the new addition.
The Helmsley Palace Hotel in New York, for
example, a building of compromise which
utilizes a "U" shaped set of townhouses as a
frontispiece for a 50-story hotel tower, is
very weak in this respect. The Villard
Houses (the townhouses) create a natural en-
try courtyard facing Madison Avenue. In the
new plan, however, the main entrances to the
hotel, are located a full floor level below
the courtyard and on the side streets,
rather than the front, unrelated to the orig-
inal, established entrance which organized
the entire complex. This incongruity weak-
ens both the function and the spirit of the
old building, the new addition, and whatever
synergy the two could have created (See Ex-
hibits 3-6 to 3-8). No amount of exterior
detailing, repetition or replication of
form, or faithful reproduction has the same
118
Exhibit 3-6
Floor Plans
Helmsley Palace Hotel
New York City
original
now
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Exhibit 3-7
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It's Dom Perignon and pheasant under glass.
Under crystal.
It's having your morning coffee overlooking the
spires of St. Patricks.
It's sipping 20 year old Scotch in a 100 year old
bar where all the spirits aren't in bottles.
It's strolling through a New York landmark -the
most historically significant grand entrance and
public rooms of any hotel in America.
It's 51 stories of gleaming gold and silver and
marble. With all the style and panache of a Cole
Porter lyric.
It's paintings by La Farge. And glass by Tiffany.
It's opening night on Broadway.
It's Scarlatti and F Scott Fitzgerald.
It's La Scala. the Louvre and tea from Fortnum &
Mason. It's the most magnificent hotel to open in
New York in a century it's The Helmsley Palace.
Exhibit 3-8
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impact of the functional strategy used in
the addition.
Likewise, the section organization of a new
addition can either reinforce or weaken the
old building. WZMH-Habib's scheme for 53
State Street is quite successful in this res-
pect. The first twelve floors of the new of-
fice tower were designed to correspond exact-
ly to the floor elevations of the original
Exchange Building. Although this incurred
greater costs (the original floors are not
regularly spaced and include some ineffi-
cient floor-to-floor heights) the architects
achieved a functional, literal connection
between the old and new and will be able to
create visual continuity in the treatment
of the facade (Exhibit 3-9).
2. Spatial
The next level of design relationship in-
volves three-dimensional strategies to
relate old to new. After the primary func-
tional relationship has been established,
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Exhibit 3-9 Matched Floor Levels
the placement, orientation, and configura-
tion of building masses can be used to ex-
press a number of design relationships. In
addition, the use of reveal lines, voids,
projecting string courses, etc. can be used.
Two useful examples are the addition to the
Ritz-Carlton Hotel and the One Post Office
Square project, both in Boston. At the Ritz-
-Carlton the addition is sized, proportion-
ed, and configured identically to the orig-
inal building. Projections and setbacks oc-
cur exactly as they do in the original struc-
ture (Exhibit 3-10).
The spatial strategies used at One Post Of-
fice Square, however, are quite different
and much less literal than those at the Ritz-
-Carlton. In this project the two building
masses are vastly different in size, but are
related through a series of three-dimension-
al strategies. The office tower was set
back from the street, a deliberate effort to
allow the original building to predominate
the site. The string courses in the
124
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Perspective drawing showing relationship of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel and the addition to the right (Skidmore. Owings and Merrill). k Drawing:
Skidmore. Owings and Merrill)
Exhibit 3-10
Near replication of dimension,
form, ordering, and materials
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original building are then used as reference
lines for massing changes in the adjacent
newly constructed tower. The lower portion
of the tower, for instance, is a deep void
in reference to the solid base courses of
the old building (Exhibit 3-11).
3. Formal
The forms in an original building can also
be used as cues for the new addition. This
can be a spatial (three-dimensional) rela-
tionship, but could simply be two-dimension-
al (painted or within the building skin).
At this level, the shape and dimensioning of
form conveys a relationship between new and
old. The addition to the Boston Public
LIbrary, with its overscaled replication of
forms found in the original structure, is a
notable example of this relationship at the
formal level (Exhibit 3-12).
4. Sensory/Appearance-Related
Two-dimensional strategies can also be used
to express the design relationship between
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Exhibit 3-11
One Post Office Square
Lower Level Massing
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Exhibit 3-12
Addition to the Boston
Public Library.
Philip Johnson, 1973
Repeating form and order,
different dimension
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old and new. As the functional level dis-
cussed above related primarily to plan and
section organization, the sensory level re-
lates primarily to the design of the eleva-
tion and selection of materials. An older
facade is often organized hierarchially with
a conventional set of ordering elements--
masonry base courses, pilasters, string
courses, projecting sills and lintels, corn-
ices, and parapets. These elements are com-
bined in a conventional building syntax.
The cornice, for instance, was used not only
as a decorative element, but as a convention-
al device for "ending" the building and giv-
ing a wall a defined top.
A new addition to an old building may at-
tempt to respond to these ordering devices
literally by replicating the elements in sim-
ilar dimension, material, and sequence. Alt-
ernately, the new addition may respond figur-
atively by using a similar form at a differ-
ent scale, a solid instead of a void, a pro-
jection instead of a recess. A third
129
approach is not to respond at all--to design
the new as if the old did not exist.
Similarly, materials used in a new addition
also communicate a relationship between the
old and the new. The color, texture, and
arrangement of material in an addition can
either match, contrast, or mediate between
the new and the old. At One Post Office
Square, for instance, great care was taken
to match the color and texture of pre-cast
concrete panels to the granite and limestone
in the existing building (Exhibit 3-13).
The designers of the Penn Mutual Tower in
Philadelphia, however, took exactly the op-
posite approach--to highlight and contrast
the old stone facade with a sheer dark glass
background (Exhibit 3-14). Which approach
is the most appropriate?
5. Illusory/Allusory
Finally, a relationship between the old and
new can be made through historical allusion
(adding eclectic or out-of-context elements)
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Exhibit 3-14
Penn Mutual Tower
Philadelphia, PA
Mitchell-Giurgola
Contrasting materials
original
facade
incorporated
in new %
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or illusion (murals, trompe-l'oeil). This
can create a relationship where actually, in
functional, spatial, formal, or sensory
terms, there is none.
At the Exchange Block this writer would have adopted
the following objectives in creating the design
relationship between the Exchange Building and the
new addition (refer to Exhibits 3-15 to 3-19):
1. Reinforce the Kilby Street entrance by
connecting it to the overall movement and
circulation plan of the new complex.
(functional)
2. Reinforce the State Street entrance by
making direct connections to the
circulation system for the new building.
(functional)
3. Match the first twelve floor levels of
the new building to those of the old, as
does the WZMH-Habib scheme. (functional)
4. The overall plan configuration and mass-
ing of the building should attempt to high-
light the original Exchange Building when
viewed from the Liberty Square side. This
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Exhibit 3q 15
Reinforcing Existing Circulation
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Exhibit 3-17 Massing from Libetty Square
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can be achieved by increasing the setback at
the southeast corner and using a lower mass
at this part of the site.
5. In the facade, use elements to refer-
ence but not literally replicate primary
existing facade elements on the Exchange
Building, particularly the ground level
colonnade. Because of the matched floor
heights, retention of continuous sill and
head lines in horizontal lines is possible.
(spatial, formal)
6. Use a combination of masonry/stone and
glass curtain wall to create a transition
within the new building from the old to the
new. Glass can be used on the upper floors
of the building, masonry in the lower
floors. This will establish a stronger rela-
tionship between the old and new at the low-
er levels, but responds to the different
requirements at various building elevations.
The masonry creates texture and visual com-
fort at the lower levels, the glass will
lighten the upper portions of the tower as
it reaches its full height. (sensory)
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Exhibit 3-18
Major Reference Lines
I II
*ssesmuuuuuu 3-dimensional/spatial
- - -- - 2-dimensional/visual
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Exhibit 3-19
Building Skin Material Zones
18+
high-rise zone
reflective, sheer
glass
- - -- - --  ----- ---- - --
12-16
mid-rise zone
smooth texture
fine-grained masonry
existing 11 flrs.
rusticated
textured masonry
zone
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Attempting to define the "proper" architectural rela-
tionship between old and new structures seems to pro-
duce more questions than ready answers. Each of the
strategies described in the sections above are at
the designer's disposal. The "correctness" of one
approach is over another is difficult to establish.
This is particularly perplexing when combining a
high rise program with a low-rise existing struc-
ture, because the meaning of the architectural el-
ements in an old structure may actually be irrele-
vant to the new building. For example, the cornice
line of an old building, the architectural conven-
tion for marking its ending, is irrelevant to the
new building, particularly if it soar upwards ano-
ther thirty floors. When an element's meaning and
intention is no longer applicable, it is difficult
to argue that the correct approach must involve its
repetition or referencing in the new design.
General rules may be not be useful solutions to
these issues. For example, a local Historical Com-
mission recently ruled categorically that an addi-
tion to a particular brick building could not be
brick, to "avoid mimicry".3 Such broad-sweeping
140
rules are needlessly restrictive of the design pro-
cess, and may very well eliminate as many superior
solutions as it prevents poor ones. Design object-
ives must be allowed to emerge from careful analysis
of the particular qualities of the district, site,
and building's under examination. In the writer's
view, it is more important in a design review process
to clearly identify and carefully consider alterna-
tive design strategies than it is to establish and
enforce generic, prescriptive standards.
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The four design variables governing addition to the
Exchange Building outlined in the preceding sect-
ions--retention of original building, site density,
new addition massing, and relationship between old
and new structures--are incorporated in an illustra-
tive development scheme in Exhibits 3-20 to 3-26.
This scheme is not intended as an architectural
counter-proposal to the Olympia and York/WZMH-Habib
design to be interpreted literally, but to serve as a
component of feasibility analysis and a testing
ground for some of the ideas explored above.
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Exhibit 3-25
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View down Court/State St. View of Kilby/State St. corner
Exhibit 3-26 A
H
&ON
Congress St. looking North View from northeast
Quincy Markets in foreground
Exhibit 3-26 B
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DESIGN INVESTIGATION: CONCLUSIONS
The physical feasibility analysis leads to the
following conclusions (Refer to Exhibits 3-20 to
3-26):
1. It was physically feasible to have retained the
"U" portion of the Exchange Building, rather than
just the Kilby/State Street "L", and still preserve
adequate open site area to construct an efficient and
eminently rentable new office building addition. The
original interior walls and dimensions of the atrium
could be retained. The tallest portion of the new ad-
dition could be setback from the face of the existing
south atrium wall to preserve its original dimension
and character.
2. It was physically feasible to manipulate the
mass of the building to reduce the impact and bulk on
Liberty Square. Retaining the openness on this pub-
lic space carries no significant costs in floor plan
efficiency.
3. It was physically feasible to have positioned
and oriented new central circulation in direct
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relationship to the original ones, thereby reinforc-
ing the meaning and functional utility of the retain-
ed entrances and street facades. By linking the
State Street entrance on axis with the new core
circulation, it becomes an integral and natural part
of the building's circulation.
4. It was architecturally feasible to use a combi-
nation of materials elements to achieve a smoother
transition between the old and new parts of the build-
ing without sacrificing boldness in the new addition.
By using masonry in the lower portion of the skin of
the new building, the transition from old, heavily
textured and massively dimensioned material (the
worked granite of the Exchange Building) and the new,
sheer, lightweight material (the glass) is more grad-
ual. This masonry could be a polished or textured
stone or concrete. These prefabricated panels, clip-
ped to the steel frame, will have less "load-bearing"
character than the Exchange Building granite, but
more than the glass above. Its color could also be
an intermediate one between the two other materials.
151
5. From an urban design standpoint, it was
desirable to reduce both the height and the bulk of
the tower on the south half of the site. This not
only helps establish a stronger relationship between
the old and new portions of the building, but also
reduces the adverse effects of such height on the
surrounding district.
FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
Financial feasibility can be measured by a several
different return measures and value concepts, and
profitablity indices. Density, or site yield, is not
necessarily the key variable in evaluating alterna-
tive combinations of adaptive reuse and new construc-
tion. In comparing such alternatives, measurement of
financial superiority is sensitive to the variables
of project cost, (the differential between construc-
tion costs for types of new construction and rehab-
ilitation) income stream, (the differential between
rent levels and operating costs for old space and new
space), and tax effect (the differences in tax treat-
ment of income from new and historic rehabilitation
development).4
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ALTERNATIVES FOR CONSIDERATION
Six alternative development programs are analyzed in
this section of the thesis. All of the schemes pre-
sented are physically feasible. These include the
two schemes presented by the developer (one was ac-
cepted and is now under construction), the straight
rehab scheme proposed by Real Property Resources
Corporation, the author's scheme presented in this
thesis, and two subsequent iterations. Each one
assumes a different proportion of new construction to
rehabilitated square footage. The overall site
density varies from 450,000 s.f. to 1.1 million
square feet. The six options are explained in chart
form in Exhibit 3-27.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
To perform this analysis, a computer model was creat-
ed using the Visi-Calc (a business forecasting and
"spread-sheet" program) software and a small business
computer. The model uses as its basic program inputs
site density, proportion of new versus rehab con-
struction, and the proportion of retail versus office
square footage. Secondary inputs involve construct-
ion costs and projected rents.
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EXHIBIT 3-27 CHART OF OPTIONS FOR THE EXCHANGE BLOCK
Option Description Source Date FAR Total SF New SF Rehab SF
1 Olympia and York 0 & Y Fall 1979- 18 900,000 100% 0%
Phase I Tower Summer 80
2 Real Property Resources RPRC Nov. 1979 7.99 400,000 88% 12%
Rehab Scheme
Ua 3 Olympia and York 0 & Y Sept 1980- 21.14 1,100,000 80% 20%
Phase II Tower present
4 Thesis I thesis April 1981 15 750,000 66% 33%
5 Thesis II thesis April 1981 12 600,000 58% 42%
6 Thesis III thesis April 1981 10 500,000 50% 50%
Given these inputs, the model is capable of computing
a full project cost estimate, and generating an opera-
ting pro forma for a ten year period. In its calcula-
tion of tax effect, the computer will differentiate
between new and rehab construction and treat each
according to the applicable depreciation regulations.
Finally, the model computes summary measures of value
and return, including Net Present Value at three
different discount rates and related profitablility
indexes. These results can be used to judge relative
financial performance of the six options.
UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
For the purposes of fair comparison, the underlying
assumptions and internal calculations of the model
are held consistent for all six of the analyses.
This results, for certain variables, biases in favor
of some schemes and against others. Rather than fine-
tune the model for maximum accuracy (in reality an
endeavor with diminishing marginal returns) for each
individual computer run, it is more useful simply to
identify these biases and estimate their effects.
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Project Cost Analysis
1. Time: all project cost estimates and income
pro forma statements are constructed as if they were
being done at case time; that is, from the point of
view of a decision-maker at the time of the case.
All construction costs, income and expense figures,
debt assumptions, and tax laws are applicable to
1979-80.
2. Construction Costs: For new construction, $74
per square foot. This is a discounted figure from to-
day's average for Class A new construction. Use of a
single, unadjusted figure for all six models in
technically unfair. For example, the cost per square
foot, assuming similar qualities of materials and con-
struction , for a 22-story building is not the same
as a for a 41-story building. This difference, after
balancing costs for foundations, elevators, roof, ser-
vices, and exterior envelope, can still be within 5%,
with the advantage going to the 41-story tower. Simi-
larly, this flat assumption is biased against Option
2, (the RPRC scheme), since the actual new construct-
ion would not require foundation, elevator, and envel-
ope costs equivalent to that of a new building.
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For major rehabilitation, including new core and
services, $34 per square foot, a discounted figure
from current comparables running $36-$40/sq. ft. 5
2. Demolition: Ranges from the RPRC estimate of
1.1 million for minimal demolition to Olympia and
York estimate of 2.5 million for major demolition,
with intermediate alternatives estimated pro rata.
3. Indirect Costs: Percentages given in model. A
slight bias here against new construction schemes,
since the compromise approaches are more complex and
involve detailed public review and revision.
4. Sources of Funds: Permanent financing is
assumed in each case @ 75% of total project cost.
Income and Expense Analysis
1. Inflation: Assumed at 8% per year for all
cases, applied to both income and expense items.
2. Rent Levels: New construction, assumed at $22
office and $24 retail. Rehab construction assumed at
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$18 office and $22 retail. Difference in rent level
is more valuable in comparing "pure" schemes, ie:
100% new vs. 100% old, since cost difference in case
of compromise is unlikely. 100% CPI escalation is
optimistic but neutral in bias across alternatives.
3. Vacancy: For all cases considered at 5%.
Given the current market, (Class A office vacancy
below 3%) a very minimal negative bias against
schemes with higher proportion of office to retail.
4. Operating Expenses and Real Estate Taxes:
Assumed @ $7.04 per square foot for office and net
for retail. (See breakdown) Minimal bias.
5. Ground Rent: assumed at $900.,000 per year for
all schemes, based on the reported ground lease
between Olympia and York and Old State Trust. Con-
sidered fixed, although could have been different if
allowable FAR had not been assumed at 19-20.
6. Debt Service: Assumed 11% fixed interest, 30
year term, k= 11.43 in all cases.
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7. Depreciation: For new construction, 150%
declining balance over 40 year term. For rehab -
construction, 5 year straight line depreciation.
(Old tax law)
8. Tax Savings: Assumed 50% bracket in all cases.
9. Capitalized Value: In tenth year, cash flow
capitalized at 12%.
9. Residual: In tenth year, capitalized value
less mortgage balance and capital gains tax. For
simplicity, transaction costs ignored. No bias.
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
The cumulative net effect of the internal biases ap-
pears evenly balanced in terms of favoring new or re-
hab construction, and is probably also within a 5-10%
sensitivity range.
In Exhibits 3-28 through 3-39, the six alternative
development programs are measured for financial per-
formance (two pages each option). Their performance
is then compared and summarized in Exhibit 3-40.
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Exhibit 3-28
Option 1 FAR: 18 total office retail
TOTAL SF: 898632 New Construction: 898632 858632 40000
Retail: 40000 Retained/Rehab: 0 0 0
Office: 858632
Developnent Cost Estimate
Direct
New Costruction/sf: 74 66499
Rehab. Construct/sf: 34 0
Denolition Costs: 2600
Total Direct Costs: 69099
Irdirect Costs:
cn Legal & Acct @ 2% TDC: 1382
o Arch/Eng. @ 6% TDC: 4146
Marketing @ 20% of rents: 3595
Project Administration @ 6%: 4146
Financing Fees @ 3% of 'IDC: 2073
Construction Interest
18 no. @ 45% @ 13% 6063
Rent-up Deficit @ 10% rents: 1797
Carrying Cost on Land: 825
Contingency @ 5% TDC: 3455
Tenant Finish @ $10/sf: 8586
Total Indirect Costs: 27482
Total Project Costs: 96581
New: 96581
OlM: 0
Sources of Funds:
Mortgage, assure @ 75% 72436
Equity: 24145
ncomile am mxpense Anaymias
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1994
Grose Potential Isoom
Office news 22 0 18890 20401 22033 23796 25700 27755 29976 32374 34964 37761 40782
*odo 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0
Retail I news 24 0 960 1037 1120 1209 1306 1411 1523 1645 1777 1919 2073
1olds 22 0 0 0 0
Totals 0 19850 21438 23153 25005 27006 29166 31499 34019 36741 39680 42854
VacancyS I Pu
Offices 0 -944 -1020 -1102 -1190 -1285 -1388 -1499 -1619 -1748 -1888 -2039
Retailt 0 -48 -52 -56 -60 -65 -71 -76 -82 -89 -96 -104
----------- 
---- ------------ 
----------- ----------------- ----- 
--------
Net Rental Inocaes 0 18857 20366 21995 23755 25655 27708 29924 32318 34904 37696 40712
office Coponents 0 17945 19381 20932 22606 24415 26368 28477 30755 33216 35873 38743
Retail Ccmponents 0 912 965 1064 1149 1241 1340 1447 1563 1688 1823 1969
-- ------------------- 
------------------------------- 
-
Operatingj Etpnoea & R. 3. Taxes
office @ $1.04/ats 6045 6528 7051 7615 8224 8882 9592 10360 11188 12004 13050
Enwrgy S $1.00/sf.
Insurance 0 .08/st.
Janitorial I .75/st.
Management 5 44, .88/at.
Haintenance 8 4%, .88/st.
Rep. Reserve 5 21, .44/st.
R.E. Taxes 0 $3.00/f.
Retails Net, carry vacantS 14 15 16 18 19 21 22 24 26 28 30
$7 /f. Assume 54 vacancy.
Net Incou Before Ground Rents
offices 11901 12853 13881 14991 16191 17486 13885 20396 22027 23789 25693
Retails 898 970 1047 1131 1222 1319 1425 1539 1662 1795 1939
Totals 12799 13823 14928 16123 17412 18805 20310 21935 23689 25585 27631
Ground Rents -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 - -900 -900
Free & Clear Incomes 11899 12923 14028 15223 16512 17905 19410 21035 22789 24685 26731
Debt Services (asuame 114, 30 yr., -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479 -8479 -479 -8479 -8479
72436 loan)
CFAFS 3420 4444 5549 6744 8033 9426 10931 12556 14310 16206 18252
Depreciations News 40/150 LWfes 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30
Daes 96581 -3622 -3575 -3528 -3481 -3432 -3383 -3333 -3283 -3232 -3180 -3127
Olds S/SL Bases 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amortination: k-11.4314 72436 -311 -545 -605 -672 -746 -828 -919 -1020 -1132 -1257 -1395
Taxable Incomes -202 868 2021 3263 4601 6043 7597 9273 11079 13026 15126
Tax Savings S 50O1 -101 434 1011 1631 2301 3022 3799 4636 5539 6513 7563
c 11talied values 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 222761
Mortgage Balances -63005
ReaIdal Value (includlem 20 cg tax) 160412
ATCF: 3521 4009 4539 5112 5733 6405 7132 7919 8771 9693 171161
tIV 5 124s
15%:
los
81230
64569
52030
Profitability InWas 0 124: 3.36 ams (yr. 11 12.320 154s 2.67 Camhtmb (yr. 11 14.16
I 18t 2.15
Exhibit 3-29
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Exhibit 3-30
Option 2 FAR: 7.99
total office retail
TOTAL SF: 398893 New Construction: 46368 46368 0
Retail: 48000 Retained/Rehab: 352525 304525 48000
Office: 350893
Development Cost Estimate
Direct
New Construction/sf: 74 3431
Rehab. Construct/sf: 34 11986
Demolition Costs: 1200
Total Direct Costs: 16617
Indirect Costs:
Legal & Acct @ 2% TDC: 332
Arch/Eng. @ 6% TDC: 997
Marketing @ 20% of rents: 1596
Project Adadnistration @ 6%: 997
Financing Fees @ 3% of TDC: 499
Construction Interest
18 mo. @ 45% @ 13% 1458
Rent-up Deficit @ 10% rents: 798
Carrying Cost on Land: 550
Contingency @ 5% TDC: 831
Tenant Finish @ $10/sf: 3509
Total Indirect Costs: 8057
Total Project Costs: 24674
New: 6877
old: 17798
Scurces of Funds:
Mortgage, assume @ 75% 18506
Equity: 6169
Incoms and Expense Analysis
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Gross Potential Income
o ice I newt 22 0 1020 1102 1190 1285 1388 1499 1619 1748 1888 2039 2202
* old: 19 0 5786 6249 6749 7289 7872 8501 9182 9916 10709 11566 12491
Retail I news 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
* old$ 22 0 1056 1140 1232
Totals 0 7862 8491 9170 8574 9260 10000 10800 11664 12598 13605 14694
ac es 0 -340 -368 -397 -429 -463 -500 -540 -583 -630 -680 -735
Retails 0 -53 -57 -62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Rental Iraccte s 0 7469 8066 8712 8145 8797 9500 10260 11081 11968 12925 13959
office components 0 6466 6983 7542 8145 8797 9500 10260 11081 11968 12925 13959
Retail Components 0 1003 1083 U70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
---------- ------ 
-- --------- - ---------- 
- ---- ----- -- ---------------- 
-
Operating Expenses 6 R. R. Taxes
Office 0 $7.04/st, 2470 2668 2881 3112 3361 3630 3920 4234 4572 4938 5333
Energy I $1.00/f.
Insurance I .08/at.
Janitorial 1 .75/st.
Management 0 48, .88/ut.
Maintenance 0 44, .88/at.
Rep. Reserve 0 28, .44/af.
R.. Taxes 0 $3.00/af.
Retails Net, carry vacant 1 17 18 20 21 23 25 27 29 31 34 36$7 /of. Assure 58 vacancy.
Net Income Before Ground Rents
Offices 3995 4315 4660 5033 5436 5871 6340 6848 7395 7987 8626
Retails 986 1065 1151 -21 -23 -25 -27 -29 -31 -34 -36
Total: 4982 5380 5811 5012 5413 5846 6314 6819 7364 7953 8590
Grounti Rent: -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900
Free a Clear Income: 4082 4480 4911 4112 4513 4946 5414 5919 6464 7053 7690
Debt Services (assure 118, 30 yr., -2115 -2115 -2115 -2115 -2115 -2115 -2115 -2115 -2115 -2115 -2115
18506 loan)
CFAF: 1967 2365 2796 1997 2398 2831 3299 3804 4349 4938 5575
Depreciations News 40/150 Lifes 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30
Bases 6877 -258 -255 -251 -248 -244 -241 -237 -234 -230 -226 -223
Old: 5/SL Bases 17798 -3560 -3560 -3560 -3560 -3560 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amortization: k-11.43M 18506 -80 -88 -98 -109 -121 -134 -148 -165 -183 -203 -225
----- ------------- 
- ------------------------------- 
------- ------------ 
---- - --
Taxable Inonre -1851 -1449 -1015 -1810 -1406 2590 3061 3570 4119 4712 5352
Tax Savings 0 508s -925 -724 -507 -905 -703 1295 1531 1785 2060 2356 2676
---------- ------ ------ 
- ---------------- 
- - - -
- -
Capitalized values 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64081
Mortgage Balances -16953
Residual Value (includes 288 cg tax) 46222
AIF: 2892 3090 3303 2902 3101 1536 1768 2019 2290 2582 49121
tWV 1 12: ,
158,
183
29172
24060
20157
Profitability Irdex # 124: 4.73 !AaM (yr. 1) 16.54
* 158: 3.90 Cash/cash (yr. 1) 31.89
* 1ots 3.27
Exhibit 3-31
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Exhibit 3-32
Option 3 FAR: 21.14
total office retail
TOTAL SF: 1055393 New Construction: 865000 847000 18000
Retail: 36000 Retained/Rehab: 190393 172393 18000
Office: 1019393
Development Cost Estimate
Direct
New Construction/sf: 74 64010
Rehab. Construct/sf: 34 6473
Denolition Costs: 2500
Total Direct Costs: 72983
Indirect Costs:
Legal & Acct @ 2% TDC: 1460
Arch/Eng. @ 6% TDC: 4379
Marketing @ 20% of rents: 4222
Project Administration @ 6%: 4379
Financing Fees @ 3% of TDC: 2190
Construction Interest
18 mo. @ 45% @ 13% 6404
Rent-up Deficit @ 10% rents: 2111
Carrying Cost on Land: 825
Contingency @ 5% TDC: 3649
Tenant Finish @ $10/sf: 10194
Total Indirect Costs: 29618
Total Project Costs: 102601
New: 93501
Old: 9100
Sources of Funds:
Mortgage, assune @ 75% 76951
Equity: 25650
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------
Income and Expense Analysis
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Gross Potential Income:
office @ new: 22 0 18634 20125 21735 23473 25351 27379 29570 31935 34490 37249 40229
* old: 18 0 3103 3351 3619 3909 4222 4559 4924 5318 5744 6203 6699
Retail @ new: 24 0 432 467 504 544 588 635 686 740 800 864 933
@ old: 22 0 396 428 462
Total: 0 22565 24370 26320 27927 30161 32574 35180 37994 41033 44316 47861
Vacancy @ 5% GPI:
office: 0. -1087 -1174 -1268 -1369 -1479 -1597 -1725 -1863 -2012 -2173 -2346
Retail: 0 -41 -45 -48 -27 -29 -32 -34 -37 -40 -43 -47
Net Rental Income: 0 21437 23152 25004 26530 28653 30945 33421 36094 38982 42100 45468
office couponent: 0 20650 22302 24086 26013 28094 30342 32769 35391 38222 41280 44582
Retail Ccponent: 0 787 850 917 517 558 603 651 703 760 820 886
Operating Expenses & R. S. Taxes
office 9 $7.04/sf: 7177 7751 8371 9040 9764 10545 11388 12299 13283 14346 15494
Energy @ $1.00/sf.
Insurance @ .08/sf.
Janitorial @ .75/sf.
Manageent @ 4%, .88/sf.
Maintenance @ 4%, .88/sf.
Rep. Reserve @ 2%, .44/sf.
R.E. Taxes @ $3.00/sf.
Retail: Net, carry vacant @ 13 14 15 16 17 19 20 22 23 25 27
$7 /sf. Assume 5% vacancy.
Net Income Before Ground Rent:
Office: 13474 14552 15716 16973 18331 19797 21381 23092 24939 26934 29089
Retail: 774 836 903 501 541 584 631 682 736 795 859
Total: 14248 15388 16619 17474 18872 20382 22012 23773 25675 27729 29948
Ground Rent: -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900' -900 -900 -900
Free & Clear Income: 13348 14488 15719 16574 17972 19482 21112 22873 24775 26829 29048
Debt Service: (assume 11%, 30 yr., -8987 -8987 -8987 -8987 -8987 -8987 -8987 -8987 -8987 -8987 -8987
76951 loan)
CFAF: 4361 5501 6732 7587 8985 10495 12125 13886 15788 17842 20061
Depreciation: New: 40/150 Life: 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30
Base: 93501 -3506 -3461 -3416 -3370 -3323 -3275 -3227 -3178 -3129 -3078 -3027
Old: 5/SL Base: 9100 -1820 -1820 -1820 -1820 -1820 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aortization: k-11.43%M 76951 -331 -559 -620 -688 -764 -848 -942 -1045 -1160 -1288 -1429
Taxable Iloe: -966 219 1496 2397 3842 7219 8898 10708 12660 14764 17034
Tax Savings @ 50%: -483 110 748 1199 1921 3610 4449 5354 6330 7382 8517
Capitalized Value: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 242063
Mortgage Balance: -67276
Residual Value (includes 28% cg tax) 174369
A'TCF: 4844 5391 5984 6388 7064 6885 7676 8532 9458 10460 185913
NPV @ 12%:
15%:
18%:
91580
73274
59465
Profitability Index 0 12%: 3.57 UIAt: (yr. 1) 13.01
* 15%: 2.86 Cash/tash (yr. 1) 17.00
* 181: 2.32
Exhibit 3-33
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Option 4 FAR: 15.00
total office retail
TOTAL SF: 748860 New Construction: 498860 481860 17000
Retail: 38000 Retained/Rehab: 250000 229000 21000
Office: 710860
Development Cost Estimate
Direct
New Construction/sf: 74 36916
Rehab. Construct/sf: 34 8500
Demolition Costs: 1600
H Total Direct Costs: 47016
Indirect Costs:
Legal & Acct @ 2% 70C: 940
Arch/Eng. @ 6% TDC: 2821
Marketing @ 20% of rents: 2995
Project Administration @ 6%: 2821
Financing Fees @ 3% of TDC: 1410
Construction Interest
18 m. @ 45% @ 13% 4126
Rent-up Deficit @ 10% rents: 1498
Carrying Cost on Land: 550
Contingency @ 5% TDC: 2351
Tenant Finish @ $10/sf: 7109
Total Indirect Costs: 19512
Total Project Costs: 66528
New: 54500
Old: 12028
Sources of Funds:
Mortgage, assume @ 75% 49896
Equity: 16632
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income and Expense Analysis
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
------------------------------------------------ 
- - - - ------------------------ --- -- - ---- --------
Gross Potential Inoe:
Office @ new: 22 0 10601 11449 12365 13354 14422 15576 16822 18168 1%22 21191 22887
* old: 18 0 4122 4452 4808 5193 5608 6057 6541 7064 7630 8240 8899
Retail @ new: 24 0 408 441 476 514 555 599 647 699 755 816 881
@ old: 22 0 462 499 539
Total: 0 15593 16840 18188 19061 20585 22232 24011 25932 28006 30247 32667
Vacancy @ 5% GPI:
Office: 0 -736 -795 -859 -927 -1002 -1082 -1168 -1262 -1363 -1472 -1589
Retail: 0 -44 -47 -51 -26 -28 -30 -32 -35 -38 -41 -44
Net Rental Income: 0 14813 15998 17278 18108 19556 21121 22810 24635 26606 28734 31033
office Coaponent: 0 13987 15106 16314 17619 19029 20551 22195 23971 25889 27960 30196
Retail CcUpanent: 0 827 893 964 488 527 570 615 664 717 775 837
Operating Expenses & R. B. Taxes
Office @ $7.04/sf: 5004 5405 5837 6304 6809 7353 7941 8577 9263 10004 10804
Energy @ $1.00/sf.
Insurance @ .08/sf.
Janitorial 8 .75/sf.
Management @ 4%, .88/sf.
Maintenance @ 4%, .88/sf.
Rep. Reserve @ 2%, .44/sf.
R.E. Taxes @ $3.00/sf.
Retail: Net, carry vacant @ 13 14 16 17 18 20 21 23 25 27 29
$7 /sf. Assune 5% vacancy.
Net Income Before Ground Rent:
office: 8982 9701 10477 11315 12220 13198 14254 15394 16626 17956 19392
Retail: 813 878 949 472 509 550 594 641 693 748 808
Total: 9796 10579 11425 11787 12730 13748 14848 16036 17318 18704 20200
Ground Rent: -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900
Free & Clear Incone: 8896 %79 10525 10887 11830 12848 13948 15136 16418 17804 19300
Debt Service: (assume 11%, 30 yr., -5702 -5702 -5702 -5702 -5702 -5702 -5702 -5702 -5702 -5702 -5702
498% loan)
CFAF: 3194 3977 4823 5185 6128 7146 8246 9434 10716 12102 13598
Depreciation: New: 40/150 Life: 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30
Base: 54500 -2044 -2018 -1991 -1964 -1937 -1909 -1881 -1853 -1824 -1794 -1764
Old: 5/SL Base: 12028 -2406 -2406 -2406 -2406 -2406 0 0 0 0 0 0
Anrortization: k-U.43%M 49896 -215 -237 -263 -292 -324 -360 -399 -443 -492 -546 -606
Taxable Income: -1256 -446 427 815 1785 5237 6365 7581 8893 10308 11834
Tax Savings 8 50%: -628 -223 213 408 893 2618 3182 3791 4446 5154 5917
Capitalized Value: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 160835
Mortgage Balance: -45717
Residual Value (includes 28% cg tax) 115886
ATCF: 3821 4200 4610 4777 5235 4528 5063 5643 6270 6948 123567
NPV @ 12%:
15%:
18%:
62932
50629
41330
Profitability Index @ 124: 3.78 Ram: (yr. 1) 13.37
8 15%: 3.04 Cash/ash (yr. 1) 19.20
@ 18%: 2.48
Exhibit 3-35
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Exhibit 3-36
Option 5 FAR: 12.00
total office retail
TOTAL SF: 599088 New Construction: 349088 332088 17000
Retail: 38000 Retained/Rehab: 250000 229000 21000
Office: 561088
Development Cost Estimate
Direct
New Construction/sf: 74 25833
Rehab. Construct/sf: 34 8500
Denolition Costs: 1600
Total Direct Costs: 35933
on) Indirect Costs:
Co Legal & Acct @ 2% 7DC: 719
Arch/Eng. @ 6% 7DC: 2156
Marketing @ 20% of rents: 2396
Project Administration @ 6%: 2156
Financing Fees @ 3% of IDC: 1078
Construction Interest
18 mo. @ 45% @ 13% 3153
Rent-up Deficit @ 10% rents: 1198
Carrying Cost on land: 550
Contingency @ 5% IDC: 1797
Tenant Finish @ $10/sf: 5611
Total Indirect Costs: 15203
Total Project Costs: 51135
New: 39039
Old: 12096
Sources of Funds:
Mortgage, assure @ 75% 38351
Equity: 12784
Income and Expense Analysis
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Gross Potential lrome:
office @ new: 22 0 7306 7890 8522 9203 9940 10735 11594 12521 13523 14605 15773
@ old: 18 0 4122 4452 4808 5193 5608 6057 6541 7064 7630 8240 8899
Retail I new: 24 0 408 441 476 514 555 599 647 699 755 816 881
# old: 22 0 462 499 539
Total: 0 12298 13282 14344 14910 16103 17391 18782 20285 21907 23660 25553
Vacancy @ 5% GPI:
office: 0 -571 -617 -666 -720 -777 -840 -907 -979 -1058 -1142 -1234
Retail: 0 -44 -47 -51 -26 -28 -30 -32 -35 -38 -41 -44
Net Rental Incone: 0 11683 12618 13627 14164 15298 16521 17843 19270 20812 22477 24275
office Conponent: 0 10857 11725 12663 13676 ' 14770 15952 17228 18606 20095 21702 23438
Retail Couponent: 0 827 893 964 488 527 570 615 664 717 775 837
operating Expenses & R. E. Taxes
Office @ $7.04/sf: 3950 4266 4607 4976 5374 5804 6268 6770 7311 7896 8528
Energy 6 $1.00/sf.
Insurance @ .08/sf.
Janitorial 6 .75/sf.
Managenent @ 4%, .88/sf.
Maintenance 8 4%, .88/sf.
Rep. Reserve @ 24, .44/sf.
R.E. Taxes @ $3.00/sf.
Retail: Net, carry vacant @ 13 14 16 17 18 20 21 23 25 27 29
$7 /sf. Assume 5% vacancy.
Net Incone Before Ground Rent:
office: 6906 7459 8056 8700 9396 10148 10960 11836 12783 13806 14911
Retail: 813 878 949 472 509 550 594 641 693 748 808
Total: 7720 8337 9004 9172 9905 10698 11554 12478 13476 14554 15719
Ground Rent: -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900
Free & Clear Incose: 6820 7437 8104 8272 9005 9798 10654 11578 12576 13654 14819
Debt Service: (assune 11%, 30 yr., -4383 -4383 -4383 -4383 -4383 -4383 -4383 -4383 -4383 -4383 -4383
38351 loan)
CFAF: 2437 3054 3721 3889 4622 5415 6271 7195 8193 9271 10436
Depreciation: New: 40/150 Life: 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30
Base: 39039 -1464 -1445 -1426 -1407 -1387 -1368 -1347 -1327 -1306 -1285 -1264
Old: 5/SL Base: 12096 -2419 -2419 -2419 -2419 -2419 0 0 0 0 0 0
Anortization: k=11.43%4M 38351 -165 -182 -203 -225 -250 -277 -307 -341 -379 -421 -467
Taxable Income: -1447 -810 -124 63 816 4047 4923 5868 6887 7986 9172
Tax Savings 8 50%: -723 -405 -62 31 408 2024 2462 2934 3443 3993 4586
Capitalized Value: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 123489
Mortgage Balance: -35135
Residual Value (includes 28% cg tax) 88996
NPV 6 12%:
15%
18:
48955
39484
32319
3160 3459 3783 3857 4215 3391 3809 4261 4750 5278 94846
Profitability Index 6 12%: 3.83 RUm: (yr. 1) 13.34
* 151: 3.09 CashACash (yr. 1) 19.06
* 18: 2.53
Exhibit 3-37
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Exhibit 3-38
Option 6 FAR: 10.00
total office retail
TOTAL SF: 499240 New Construction: 249240 232240 17000
Retail: 38000 Retained/Rehab: 250000 229000 21000
Office: 461240
Development Cost Estimate
Direct
New Construction/sf: 74 18444
Rehab. Construct/sf: 34 8500
Denolition Costs: 1600
Total Direct Costs: 28544
Indirect Costs:
Legal & Acct @ 2% 'IDC: 571
Arch/Eng. @ 6% 'IDC: 1713
Marketing @ 20% of rents: 1997
o Project Administration @ 6%: 1713
Financing Fees @ 3% of 'IDC: 856
Construction Interest
18 no. @ 45% @ 13% 2505
Rent-up Deficit @ 10% rents: 998
Carrying Cost on Land: 550
Contingency @ 5% TDC: 1427
Tenant Finish @ $10/sf: 4612
Total Indirect Costs: 12330
Total Project Costs: 40874
New: 28702
Old: 12172
Sources of Funds:
Mortgage, assune @ 75% 30655
Equity: 10218
Income and Expense Analysis
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Gross Potential Incofe:
office @ new: 22 0 5109 5518 5959 6436 6951 7507 8108 8756 9457 10213 11031
@ old: 18 0 4122 4452 4808 5193 5608 6057 6541 7064 7630 9240 8899
Retail @ new: 24 0 408 441 476 514 555 599 647 699 755 816 881
@ old: 22 0 462 499 539
Total: 0 10101 10909 11782 12143 13114 14163 15296 16520 17842 19269 20810
Vacancy @ 5% GPI:
office: 0 -462 -498 -538 -581 -628 -678 -732 -791 -854 -923 -996
Retail: 0 -44 -47 -51 -26 -28 -30 -32 -35 -38 -41 -44
Net Rental Income: 0 9596 10364 11193 11536 12458 13455 14532 15694 16950 18306 19770
office Ccnpanent: 0 8770 9471 10229 11047 11931 12886 13916 15030 16232 17531 18933
Retail Component: 0 827 893 964 488 527 570 615 664 717 775 837
Operating Expenses & R. E. Taxes
Office 0 $7.04/sf: 3247 3507 3787 4090 4418 4771 5153 5565 6010 6491 7010
Energy @ $1.00/sf.
Insurance @ .08/sf.
Janitorial S .75/sf.
Managenent @ 4%, .88/sf.
Maintenance @ 4%, .88/sf.
Rep. Reserve @ 2%, .44/sf.
R.E. Taxes @ $3.00/sf.
Retail: Net, carry vacant @ 13 14 16 17 18 20 21 23 25 27 29
$7 /sf. Assuse 5% vacancy.
Net Income Before Ground Rent:
Office: 5523 5964 6442 6957 7513 8114 8764 9465 10222 11040 11923
Retail, 813 878 949 472 509 550 594 641 693 748 808
Total: 6336 6843 7390 7428 8023 8664 9358 10106 10915 11788 12731
Ground Rent: -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900 -900
Free & Clear Income: 5436 5943 6490 6528 7123 7764 8458 9206 10015 10888 11831
Debt Service: (assum 11%, 30 yr., -3503 -3503 -3503 -3503 -3503 -3503 -3503 -3503 -3503 -3503 -3503
30655 loan)
CFAF: 1933 2440 2987 3025 3620 4261 4955 5703 6512 7385 8328
Depreciation: New: 40/150 Life: 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30
Base: 28702 -1076 -1063 -1049 -1034 -1020 -1005 -991 -976 -960 -945 -929
Old: 5/SL Base: 12172 -2434 -2434 -2434 -2434 -2434 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amortization: k=11.43%M 30655 -132 -145 -161 -179 -199 -221 -245 -272 -302 -335 -372
Taxable Inome: -1578 -1057 -496 -443 165 3256 3964 4728 5551 6440 7399
Tax Savings @ 50%: -789 -529 -248 -222 83 1628 1982 2364 2776 3220 3699
Capitalized Value: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 98591
Mortgage Balance: -28091
Residual Value (includes 28% og tax) 71070
ATCF:
NPV @ 12%:
15%:
18:
39647
32063
26320'
2722 2968 3235 3247 3537 2633 2973 3339 3736 4165 75698
Profitability Index @ 12%: 3.88 ROTA: (yr. 1) 13.30
* 15%: 3.14 Cash/Cash (yr. 1) 18.91
@ 18%: 2.58
Exhibit 3-39
EXHIBIT 3-40 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS
Option Project Const. ROTA Cash/Cash Net Present Value Profitability Ranking Ranking2
Value (yr. 1) (yr. 1) 012 @15% @18 812% @15% 6184
2
3
96.6 million
24.7 m
102.6 m
66.5 m
51.1 m
40.9 m
12.32
16.54
13.01
13.37
13.34
13.30
14.16
31.89
17.00
19.20
19.06
18.91
81.2
29.2
91.6
62.9
48.9
39.6
64.6
24.1
73.3
50.6
39.5
32.0
52.0
20.2
59.5
41.3
32.3
26.3
3.36
4.73
3.57
3.78
3.83
3.88
2.67
3.90
2.86
3.04
3.09
3.14
2.15
3.27
2.32
2.48
2.53
2.58
2
Notes:
SBased on unit profitability index only.
Based on volume profitability measure assuming six options compare favorably with alternative investments available to
developer in other cities, locations, markets.
tQ
From the above analysis, one can see that new con-
struction is less profitable, on a dollar-of-invest-
ment-to-dollar-of-return basis, than rehabilitation.
Rehab construction's combination of savings in pro-
duction (construction) costs and favored tax treat--
ment results in superior performance, on a per
square foot basis,.than new construction. This is
not, however, the single basis on which the decision-
maker chooses one over the other.. Assessment of
risk, timing, and change over time can favor new
construction.
By itself the profitability indices can only be used
to make a relative evaluation of identified alterna-
tives, and tells little about the environment in
which decisions are made. Because of this, their in-
terpretation can vary significantly. For example, an
international developer with ready access to capital
and debt markets and alternative development opport-
unities in other locations, such as Olympia and York,
has a different view of profitability than the smal-
ler entrepreneur with capability for only a smaller
venture. In addition, none of the large developer's
alternative investments in other locations may match
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the profitability performance of the even the weakest
of the six alternatives considered here. If this
were the case, the developer would choose to build
the scheme yielding the highest density regardless of
its performance relative to the other five, since it
would certainly outperform, in the aggregate and on a
per dollar basis, any other opportunity in the devel-
oper's pipeline.
Although financial performance of alternative develop-
ment schemes can be objectively measured, an absolute
"winner' cannot be identified without a full under-
standing of the decision-making environment. Super-
iority can be measured in several ways. If the devel-
oper will decide on a per dollar profitability, the
RPRC, straight rehab scheme is superior. If all six
of the identified alternatives out-perform a devel-
oper's potential investments in other locations, the
highest volume approach (the scheme now under con-
struction) is the clear favorite. Regardless of the
decision-rule, it is clear that a range of at least
six physically feasible altervatives were financially
feasible as well.
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OVERALL EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES
How can we comprehensively judge the relative merits
of the six alternatives available for the Exchange
Block? Given the apparent physical and financial
feasibility of the schemes, and assuming equal poli-
tical feasibility for each, which is the superior?
How can we measure it?
In this chapter criteria for the evaluation of build-
ings of compromise at the Exchange Block are propos-
ed. A rating system is designed, and comprehensive
evaluations of the six alternate schemes is then pre-
sented. This system of evaluation is then used to
demonstrate the differing preferences of several
actors in the case.
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATON
In order to compare alternatives, the thesis proposes
seven criteria for evaluating buildings of compromise
in Boston: urban design excellence, building pres-
ervation, environmental impacts, policy impacts, fin-
ancial performance, credibility of the public review
processes, and "demonstration value". Each is
explained below:
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Urban Design Excellence
Streetscape activity: the ability of the devel-
opment program and design concept to enliven the
site edges with activity and extend the active
daily time period.
Connection to movement systems: the ability of
the scheme to accommodate pedestrian movement
around, through, and to the site. The success at
resolving the conflicts between service, vehicu-
lar, and other (ie: subway) access to the site.
Massing and Configuration: the scheme's impact
on adjoining and adjacent structures, squares,
outdoor areas.
Preservation of Building
Appearance: the scheme's success at preserving,
enhancing, and renewing the value of the appear-
ance of the preserved structure.
Content: the demonstrated understanding and
integration of the new building with the old in
terms of building plan organization, section inter-
relationship, dimensional character, etc. Does
the new addition reinforce or weaken the meaning
and functional utility of the old?
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Density: Environmental Impacts
The success of the scheme at minimizing adverse
sun and shadow effects.
The success of the scheme at minimizing adverse
ground level wind effects.(treated neutrally)
The success of the scheme at minimizing overload
on public infrastructure.(treated neutrally)
Density: Policy Implications
The effects of the development on the type and
distribution of investment. Will a favorable
ruling on the development option encourage
or discourage widespread investment throughout the
city?
Financial Feasibility
Profitability-Based: using profitability index
Volume-Based: considering possible factors of
inferior alternative investments in other loca-
tions, limited opportunity in Boston,'etc.
Credibility of Boston's Design and Development
Review Process
What would the acceptance of each scheme imply
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}bout the competence and thoroughness with which
each body conducts its charge? How would accept-
ance of each scheme affect the future effective-
ness and credibility of the BRA, BLC, and Zoning
Board of Appeals?
Demonstration Value:
Few sites have flexibility of the Exchange
Block, or the adaptability of the Exchange
Building itself. Given the range of
alternatives available, and the amount of
controversy, what does the scheme demonstrate
about the prospects for reasonable compromise?
METHOD OF EVALUATION
In conducting any evaluation, there are two stages
where the evaluator's subjectivity is made explicit
--in the selection and definition of the criteria,
outlined above, and in the assignment of value to
these criteria for measuring performance. The
criteria outlined are those of the writer, and do
not represent those of actors or other observers of
the case.
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A simplified cost-benefit arithmetic rating system is
used to compare development alternatives. Each of
the above-defined criteria is assigned a value such
that their sum totals 1.00. Next, each alternative
scheme is rated by the writer for performance in each
criterion. Scores range from 1-10 (1 is the poorest
rating, 10 is the highest). By multiplying this
score times the criterion's value, a composite value
can be entered on the chart. Finally, the sum of
these composite values is an overall score for the
scheme, along the bottom line.
A series of analyses can be conducted adjusting the
valuation of criteria to refect the bias of other
actors or observers--the BLC or the developer, for
example. Four such alternatives are presented in
Exhibits 3-41 through 3-44. The first assumes the
writer's own valuation. The second is evaluated from
the Landmarks Commission's perspective. The third
and fourth analyses are from the point of view of the
developer.
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QUESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In the writer's view, the analysis of costs and bene-
fits leads to the conclusion that a scheme retaining
the "U" of the Exchange Building of FAR 12-15 would
have been a superior alternative to the scheme now
under construction. Using the -same valuation of the
criteria, the RPRC scheme of total retention is also
a strong performer.
The writer's intent is not to convince the reader of
the superiority of his scheme, but to argue for thor-
ough and complete evaluation of alternatives. No
doubt some readers will take issue with the author's
choice and definition of criteria, their relative
weights, and the resulting evaluation of the site
alternatives, but this is beside the point. What is
much more important than reaching agreement on these
specific points is recognizing the institutional need
for some framework which would facilitate more thor-
ough evaluation, discussion, and negotiation in im-
portant and compex cases.
So far, this thesis has presented evidence that an
intermediate density scheme falling between the total
134
retention approach and the final compromise scheme
was physically and financially feasible, and may
have been a superior scheme overall. Why wasn't such
alternative seriously considered? Was such a scheme
politically feasible?
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CHAPTER 4
POLITICAL FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
The alternative scheme of medium density and more
extensive retention of the original Exchange Building
was physically and financially feasible. Why was it
not even considered during the long and protracted
debates between the developer, preservationists, and
the city? What factors in the process prevented this
alternative from emerging?
In the writer's opinion, the scheme eventually ac-
cepted and now under construction was the inevitable
outcome of the process which governed the 53 State
Street case. Likewise, the process prevented the
medium density/further retention scheme developed in
this thesis from being seriously considered. This
chapter presents possible explanations for why this
was true.
GOVERNING FACTORS
The reasons for this are several and interrelated.
Referring to the flow chart (Exhibit 2-1) and the
narrative description of the development process
presented in Chapter 2, it can be demonstrated that
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seven central factors governed the interaction
between interest groups in the 53 State Street case:
1. Legacy of high density.
2. Poor information exchange.
3. Tacit approvals from the Mayor rendered city
agents powerless.
4. The issues of preservation and density were
confused.
5. The BLC had an undefined scope of power.
6. Arguments for preservation are outdated.
7. Designation, when viewed as an endpoint in a
process, may weaken the value of designation and
the likelihood of reaching a compromise.
In the following sections of this chapter, each of
these factors is examined. In Chapters 5 and 6, two
other cases of buildings of compromise are examined
for further insight into these issues. In Chapter 7,
possibilities for change are identified.
THE LEGACY OF HIGH DENSITY
The granting of zoning variances for FAR greater than
18 has been a commonplace event in recent the recent
187
development history of Boston. This implicit policy
leads the developer, as at 53 State Street, to expect
high site density "as of right".
It is clear in the 53 State Street case that the
developer considered an FAR of 20 a de facto right,
and not a variable for negotiation. Olympia and
York's planning for the site, if not their initial
interest, stemmed from their confidence in achieving
high density. Given the pattern established by
precedent, they can hardly be faulted. No major
commercial development in Boston since 1968 which
sought an FAR increase had been denied. It is easy
to understand why Olympia and York opposed the
designation so vehemently.
POOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE EARLY IN THE PROCESS
As Attorney Fine stated at the public hearing:
"...When an agreement was entered into in
this building and for a substantial period
of time thereafter, there was no Landmarks
designation filed.. .when Olympia and York
was shown the building by a brokerage firm,
when it entered into an agreement under
which it leased the property, and when i-t re-
tained its architect, there was no Landmark
petition filed. As a matter of fact...
there was no Landmark petition filed untjl
well after the closing on the property."
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More fundamental to the process than the exact chron-
ology of petition dates, leasing arrangements, and
closing on the property is the fact that the develo-
per was not informed, did not investigate, and/or
underestimated the depth and breadth of the preserva-
tion sentiment for the Exchange building from the out-
set. This information gap is the result of at least
three factors:
1. The Boston Landmarks Commission had not yet
assumed the more active planning role it has
since adopted. In subsequent episodes, such as
the planning study it commissioned for the
Broad Street district, the BLC sought to anti-
cipate, rather than respond to, development
initiatives.
At the time of the 53 State Street controversy,
the BLC was in the process of compiling an in-
ventory of over 144,000 downtown buildings to
provide vital statistics and an historic merit
rating of each property. This kind of
inventory, the BLC believed, would greatly aid
developers, preservationists, and planners to
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key properties and guiding development. This
inventory certainly would have been provided
the kind of information that Olympia and York
needed to have at the earliest stage of the
pre-development process if they were to alter
their development strategy for the site.
2. Olympia and York, as newcomers to Boston
development, relied on their formal contacts
(the Mayor and the BRA) for advice on the poten-
tial of a conflict in the public arena, sucn as
a dispute over the historic character of the
property. Contact with the BLC, a clearly a
more biased actor, but also a better barometer
for such issues, did not occur until designa-
tion process was already in motion. The devel-
oper's first interaction with the BLC, in fact,
was in the preventive mode; a more ideal pro-
cess would have them making contact earlier, in
an information-gathering mode.
3. During- the 53 State Street case, the BLC it-
self was in its relative youth, particularly in
large-scale downtown designation. Only the
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Federal Reserve Case, described in Chapter 4,
was of comparable complexity, size, and diffi-
culty. The Exchange Building designation was a
"toothcutting" case, during which the Commis-
sion's clout was being tested and defined.
Without major precedents demonstrating the Com-
mission's power, the developer may have under-
estimated not only preservation support for the
building, but the power of the public agent
charged with representing its interests. Had
this power been amply demonstrated in a preced-
ing case, earlier and more amiable interaction
between the Commission and the developer may
have been the result.
TACIT MAYORAL APPROVAL AND POWERLESS CITY AGENTS
One of the primary reasons the controversy over the
development of the Exchange Block was so bitter was
the high risk profile held by the developer at the
time the battle lines were actually drawn. Olympia
and York had proceed to such an advanced stage of
pre-development planning for their Phase One scheme
(demolition of the Exchange Building) by the time the
preservationists became involved that it was
191
impossible for them to consider any fundamentally
different alternative. For a comparison to other
cases, see Exhibits 5-1 and 6-1.
Olympia and York would not have proceeded to such a
high risk position without the tacit approval of the
Mayor very early in the process. Indeed, when the
controversy erupted, the developers may have felt
victimized by the Boston process. Having invested
considerable time, money, and effort into planning
for a high rise development on the site which they
had every reason to believe was politically benign,
they would be justifiably angry to learn, six months
into the process, of the passionate and organized
opposition to their project.
9irect communication between the mayor and the devel-
oper is, of course, not in itself a weakness in the
regulatory process, but its use and interpretation
can be. Exhibit 4-1 illustrates the writer's map-
ping of the organization of the regulatory depart-
ments which govern downtown commercial development.
All relevant departments fall directly or indirectly
within the Mayor's purview via the Redevelopment
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Exhibit 4-1: Organizational Chart
of Reviewing Agencies
for Downtown Development
agency/commission formal approval
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PDA or Ch. 121A
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Variances
Z .
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Zoning Map Amendme nt Zo
Co
Landmarks/O
-~-h 4m.. ........................... mmum~m.....m...m.... ..
LANDMARKS
COMMISSION
B 'rd
peals
B 'rd
peals
of
of
ning
mmission
C
review
Authority. Direct access to the Mayor, therefore,
can have the effect of emasculating these line
agencies. In addition, the ostensibly more
independent bodies, such as the Zoning Board of
Appeals and the Zoning Commission, are bypassed by
the special review processes which govern large scale
commercial development, and play a subordinate role
to the Redevelopment Authority.
Evidence indicates that the Mayor's predisposition on
a given development proposal exerts a powerful influ-
ence on its fate as it moves through the city's regu-
latory reviews.2 At 53 State Street, the BLC felt
it had to choose between losing the entire building
or accepting some sort of compromise, since the Mayor
had at the earliest stages of contact between the
city and the developer, endorsed the concept of high
density development on the site.
Further confirmation of the significance of an early
tacit approval can be seen in the fact that the final
scheme underwent an increase in density as a result
of the preservation battle. Overall site density in-
creased from 900,000 square feet (originally proposed
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in the total demolition scheme) to 1.1 million square
feet by the end of the process. This increase is a
kind of "compensation" to the developer for the costs
of the delay, or the "penalty" for having to retain
portions of the old building. No one had anticipated
this result. As one participant said, "This happened
at the end of the process. The bonus is something
strictly between the Mayor and the developer." 3
Thus, having committed the city to an early accept-
ance of a 900,000 square foot development on the
site, the Mayor left little margin for later bargain-
ing. This first scheme became the baseline for the
subsequent negotiations. In effect, the Mayor had
granted an FAR of 19 on a de facto basis. The
reason none of the other intermediate density
schemes, including the one presented in this thesis,
were investigated is because the tower became non-
negotiable at the earliest possible stage.
This style of leadership effectively emasculates and
demoralizes the city agencies. Each has a specific
charge, and explicit procedures by which to implement
it. But early commitments and tacit agreements be-
tween the mayor and the developer seriously undermine
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their purpose and effectiveness. With this in mind,
it is easy to see the near inevitability of the final
compromise scheme. In fact, despite the sophisticat-
ed and sustained lobbying directed at the BRA and
BLC, these two agencies had no point of entry and no
power to negotiate certain issues--such as density--
with the developer.
THE PRESERVATION AND DENSITY ISSUES WERE CONFUSED
THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE
TWO, AND IN WHOSE PURVIEW EACH LAY, WAS NEVER CLEAR
As outlined in the description of the development pro-
cess, support for designation fell into two categor-
ies: support based on the historic merit of the prop-
erty; and support based on opposition to the high den-
sity promised by redevelopment of the site. As well,
the opponents of designation argued that the building
was not worthy of landmark status, and that higher
density would offer greater net benefits to the city.
The two issues of preservation and site density were
endlessly and continuosly interlaced throughout the
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deliberations on the Exchange Block. It was never
clear, however, where the proper forum for the
discussion of each issue was--the BLC, BRA, or the
Zoning Board of Appeals. Should the issues be
debated together or independently? And in what
sequence?
In fact, both issues were argued before the Landmarks
Commission. Although the Commission's specific
charge is to study and designate landmarks, included
in their scope of powers is consideration of long-
term effects of their decisions on a subject proper-
ty. Since higher density was sure to govern the re-
placement of the Exchange Building were if it were
not to designated, the potential impacts of the event-
ual height, bulk, and density of the replacement or
addition became primary concerns for debate before
the Commission.
The participants were also indecisive in their will-
ingness to consider the density issue before the Land-
marks Commission. Both the preservationists and the
developers argued both sides of the issue. The pres-
ervationists warned that the high rise tower destined
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to replace the Exchange Building would destroy the
comfortable human scale of the district. On the
other hand, they tried to prevent the developer from
discussing high density when he framed the issue in
terms of the potential tax benefits of high density,
arguing that comparing an FAR 10 alternative to an
FAR 20 alternative was irrelevant to a landmarks
designation hearing.
Similarly, the developers were alternately in favor
of debating density and insisting that it was not
part of the Commission's purview. Attorney Fine
stated,
"I will make one continuing objection to any
reference to the height of any building which
may be built there. The issue before this
Commission is the preservation of the exist-
ing building... and not the issue as what may
be there ii there in the event we do not des-
ignate it"
The same attorney later argued, however, the tax
"penalty" imposed by designation by calling witnesses
who compared the tax yield from an FAR 10 development
to and FAR 20 development.
Only one witness, J. Miller Blew, proposed a
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potential resolution of this ambiguous overlapping of
issues. He suggested, although-emphasizing the legal
independence of the landmarks and the zoning reviews,
that some tradeoff might be reached via a zoning
bonus for the old building. 5 This was a prophetic
suggestion, although it would appear Mr. Blew was
proposing the bonus be added to the baseline FAR 10,
not the FAR 19, as the eventual concession to the
developer would indicate.
What is the procedure for the review of proposals for
changes in site density limits, and why was the 53
State Street process so confused? As can be seen
from Exhibit 4-2, downtown Boston is zoned almost
entirely B-10, with a maximum base FAR of 10 times
site area. There are three standard procedures to
gain approval of higher density:
1. Request a zoning variance. Using
this procedure, a deviation from existing
zoning limitations is obtained if the appli-
cant can demonstrate that special condi-
tions make the property different from
others in the district, such as an unusual
shape or difficult topographic features.
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ZONING DISTRICTS
< CITY OF BOSTON
MAP I BOSTON PROPER
RESIDENCE ,BUSINESS INDUSTRIAL
DISTRICTS DISTRICTS DISTRICTS
s- SINGLE FAMIL LOCA RETAL RE 
2 Alt I
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Exhibit 4-2
Downtown Zoning Map
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The Zoning Board of Appeals rules on the re-
quest, based on recommendations made by the
BRA staff.
2. Request a zoning map amendment. The
actual zoning map and text of the Boston
Zoning Code may be amended by the Zoning
Commission to accommodate special needs.
The Commission will rule after considering
the analysis and recommendations of the
BRA.
3. Request a special district designation
with the BRA. Under a Planned Development
Area (PUD), Urban Renewal Area, or Chapter
121A Agreement designation, flexibility in
application of the zoning code is allowed.
In each case, the proposal is reviewed by
the BRA; its recommendation to grant or re-
ject the requested deviations are forwarded
to the Commission and the Board of Appeals.
For a major downtown office building development such
as 53 State Street, the third approach is usually
chosen, with the developer applying for either or
both the PDA and Chapter 121A designation. Both of
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these reviews are designed to allow for numerous and
interrelated deviations from the zoning standards,
such as height, density, parking ratio, etc.
Application to follow either PDA or Chapter 121A is
not the beginning of the city's review of a proposed
project, but is actually the culmination of an inform-
al review and an indication that the development pro-
ject is entering the final stages of public review.
The BRA has usually been involved in shaping the pro-
ject for several months before a PDA or 121A applica-
tion is filed. Formal application to initiate these
procedures indicates basic agreement between the city
and developer on the fundamental development concept.
In the Exchange Place case, Olympia and York began
their discussions with the BRA in the early stages of
their site planning and programming, in the winter of
1978. From these discussions emerged the urban de-
sign objectives of opening the site to the Congress/
State Street corner and allowing the diagonal pedes-
trian movement through the site. At this time the
BRA staff also undertook a preliminary analysis of
whether a high rise building would be desirable on
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the site from an urban design point of view. No docu-
mentation of this analysis was made available to the
writer.
The major issues of density, financial feasibility,
and urban design were negotiated at these early
stages. The PDA process was used by the BRA to fine-
tune the development approach. This meant, according
to one BRA staffmember, maximizing the public plaza
area, minimizing the overall height, negotiating a
final density to provide a reasonable financial re-
turn, achieving the best quality of building skin as
possible, and getting the developer to assume as much
of the cost of public improvements as possible6
Under the PDA process, the Zoning Commission and the
Zoning Boards of Appeals, who officially amend the
map and grant the variances required for project ap-
proval, play "rubber stamp" roles in this process. It
is the BRA who makes the detailed study, refinement,
and modifications to the development scheme, and the
BRA who forwards a project to these two boards for
official approval.
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Although a public hearing is required for all three
steps, (the PDA recommendation by the BRA, the map
amendment by the Commission, and the granting of the
variance by the board of Appeals) all three partici-
pating authorities are much less accountable to the
general public than the BLC, which has a powerful,
well-organized, and articulate constituency in the
City. This compounds the confusion--the Landmarks
Commission becoimes the battleground for the debate of
all issues, including density.
The building of compromise introduces new stresses to
the regulatory system. One of the special ways is
that it forces the simultaneous consideration of den-
sity and preservation issues. The functional separ-
ateness of the Landmarks Commission, the BRA, and the
Zoning Board of Appeals, and the ambiguity in the ex-
tent and sequencing of their overlap, does not cur-
rently accommodate a thorough review of such pro-
jects. This is another factor in the process which
prevented the consideration of intermediate alterna-
tives for the Exchange Block.
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THE SCOPE OF BLC DESIGN REVIEW POWERS IS UNDEFINED
The 1975 statute establishing the BLC's power to des-
ignate landmarks and districts outlines specific pro-
cedures for operations. Included in these procedures
is the promulgation of standards and criteria which
define each designation and govern the future of the
property. Subsequent Certificates of Design Approv-
al, for any "reconstruction, restoration, exterior,
or interior replacement or alteration, or demolition
of any landmark"7 , are issued only if the proposed
work is consistent with these standards and criteria
running with the landmark.
The standards and criteria establish the actual sub-
stance of the designation. The statute, however,
does not specifically prescribe what the scope or con-
tent of the standards should be, and simply states
"general standards and other appropriate criteria con-
sistent with the purposes of this act"8 be writ-
ten. Their scope and specificity are established, in
effect, on a case-by-case basis.
The BLC Study Report, completed between the pre-
liminary hearing and the pubic hearing in each
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designation case, often includes the general stand-
ards and criteria which have been adopted as the Com-
mission's baseline for designation. In cases where
more specific guidelines are needed to define the
designation, as in compromise cases, a specific set
is written and supersedes this general set.
The content of the standards and criteria was another
controversial issue in the 53 State Street case. The
standards and criteria, written during an intense
three week period, covered the following issues: 9
1. General: the scope and intent of the
designation
2. Masonry: the treatment of existing
granite, limitations on removal, the number
of openings allowed to be filled or added,
the reuse of masonry to cover "raw" walls.
3. Doors and Entrances: the visual balance
of existing and proposed new entrances, the
retention of detail, ornaments.
4. Fenestration: the kind of sash and glaz-
ing allowed in each portion of the building,
the treatment of spandrels, retention of dec-
orative elements.
5. Signs and Lighting: retention of exist-
ing plaques, limitations on additional signs
and lighting, general lighting of the facade.
6. Additions: the sight-line criteria for
penthouse additions, the relationship of new
construction in scale, color, materials, and
facade organization.
7. Roofs: treatments of surfaces and
plantings.
8. Demolition: the allowed demolitions, as
outlined in the designation boundary map.
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At the time the original statute was drafted, land-
mark designation and substantial new construction
were thought to be mutually exclusive. In cases of
"pure" preservation or adaptive re-use, the standards
and criteria were written with a straightforward in-
tention: ensuring the character of a landmark, struc-
ture, or district by recommending the building tech-
niques and materials appropriate in future use of the
property.
A building of compromise, however, in proposing sub-
stantial new construction in addition to a landmark,
introduces unanticipated questions. To what extent
should the BLC have design review authority over the
new construction?
This issue was never resolved in the 53 State Street
case. The BLC argued that since the act's fundament-
al intent was to protect and enhance landmark struct-
ures, and its own charge was to set criteria "consist-
ent with the purposes of this act"1 , it had review
rights over any new construction which would impact a
designated structure. The 53 State Street tower,
they argued, was just such a case.
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.The deve.loper's attorney's, on the other hand, argued
that the BLC's charge was much more specific and lim-
ited in scope. They argued the BLC's mission and
specific powers were to study and rule on the desig-
nation of landmarks, and to issue standards and
criteria which governed those landmarks alone. In
the attorney's draft of the standards and criteria,
which he proposed in early December 1979, he stated,
"Construction of a high rise tower on the same block
shall be permitted... The design of this tower will
not be reviewed..." Although this passage was
removed in subsequent editing and negotiation, this
underscores the continuing debate over the ppwers and
authority of the Commission. As a compromise, no
specific references are made in the standards and cri-
teria relating to the development of the non-desig-
nated portions of the site at all, almost as if this
area were beyond the Commission's jurisdiction.
Ironically, the lawyers later asked the BLC to lend
its support to the high rise proposal during the sub-
sequent PDA Zoning Review. Although the developer's
attorneys earlier argued that the Commission should
have no review authority over proposed new
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construction, they did suggest that they appear as ex-
pert witnesses on behalf of the high rise development
proposal. Ultimately, after some internal debate,
the BLC declined lend such support, but this chain of
events is further evidence of the fundamental ambigu-
ity in the Commission's formal authority.
In a letter to BRA Director Robert Ryan declining to
appear in favor of the developer, the BLC wrote,
"Members of the Landmarks Commission do not
wish, however, in endorsing the restoration
of the Exchange Building, to be seen to be
supporting-the design or location of the
proposed high rise tower. The Commission
is concerned that there is no explicit city
policy guiding new high rise development,
and fears that without a strong policy,
such development will be detr iental to the
character of downtown Boston"
This issue still remains unresolved, as can be seen
from subsequent cases.1 3 In the 53 State Street
case, the controversy over the formal authority of
the BLC made it impossible to hold serious discus-
sions of the design and development issues presented
by the proposed new construction. The developer nev-
er accepted the legal standing of the Commission to
enter into such negotiations.
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CONVENTIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION ARE
RENDERED OBSOLETE IN COMPROMISE CASES, AND ARE NOT
COMPELLING TO AN INVESTMENT DECISION-MAKER
The building of compromise not only adds special
stresses to the regulatory framework governing down-
town development, but also changes the cost-benefit
ratio of rehabilitation to new construction in finan-
cial terms as well. By definition, the building of
compromise proposes high density. This poses an im-
mediate problem: conventional arguments and incent-
ives for reuse, which have been increasingly well
articulated and developed over the last decade, are
simply unconvincing to the developer.
Arguments in favor of preservation and adaptive re-
use fall into three broad categories: tax benefits,
gains in efficiency, and enhanced marketability.
Each of these is discussed in the context of the 53
State Street case in the sections below.
1. Taxes
The most conspicuous adjustment in the
development formula forced by a building of
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compromise relates to the tax benefit package
of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and subsequent
amendments in 1978. Often a strong point of
leverage in persuading an owner to choose ren-
ovation over demolition and new construction,
the relative size of such benefits is minis-
cule in the development equation for construc-
tion of a major high rise tower. There are
at least three reasons why the tax advantages
are no longer compelling:
A. The actual amount of the tax benefit is
too small to be an effective incentive. When
compared to a $125 million typical project
cost, the tax benefit from the rehabilitation
of an existing, and usually smaller, building
are inconsequential, and hardly seem worth
the effort, expense, and delay of the requir-
ed local, state, and federal reviews.
B. A developer who undertakes a project of
this magnitude (at least 85 million dollars
investment) may not be interested or cannot
use the rapid amortization offered by the tax
package. Both the form of ownership and the
income stream represented by the typical
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portfolio of properties calls for extended
and sustained depreciation rather than rapid
depletion of negative income benefits. Al-
though the tax losses can be syndicated, the
larger, cash-rich and diversified real estate
firm may prefer long-term steady deprecia-
tion. In fact, in the One Post Office Square
project, a directly analogous case, the owner
/developer is not taking advantage of the
accelerated depreciation allowed under the
Tax Act. This is an archtypical example of
how the formula changes for a building of
compromise.
C. In a rapidly inflating market, such as
the Boston Class A office market, the ratio
of tax benefit (a function of construction
cost and investment) to taxable income (a
function of market rent, occupancy, and
operating expenses) is constantly decreasing
--swinging from rehabilitation in favor of
new construction. This margin continues to
widen as long as the market rent inflation is
greater than construction cost inflation, as
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has been the case in the Boston market. In
October 1979, just before the BLC hearing,
average rents for Class A office space in Bos-
ton was 16.00 per square foot. By late 1980,
when Olympia and York began pre-leasing,
rents were quoted at $30 to $40 per square
foot. This represents an increase of 75 to
150% in 18 months, or 50% to 100% annual rent
inflation. This exceeds even a high construct-
ion cost inflation rate of 10% per year. 6
This differential in inflation rates contin-
ually reduces the relative value of tax ad-
vantages to the developer over time. The de-
lay imposed by the certification process for
the historic rehabilitation design, cost esti-
mating, and certification process continually
reduce their upside potential.
D. The "demolition penalty" in the Tax Act--
not allowing demolition costs to be deducted
if the structure was listed on the National
Register, also fails as an incentive in build-
ings of compromise. It is only an incentive
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if the envisioned replacement for the struc-
ture is small enough for such a "penalty" to
register an impact. This may work only at
the smallest scale of total project invest-
ment.
In cases where the ultimate site density is
an open question, however, as with 53 State
Street, the non-deductability of demolition
costs may, in fact, create incentives counter
to the legislation's objectives. If, for in-
stance, the Exchange Building were success-
fully listed on the National Register in its
entirety (this was probable) and the site
density were still undefined, powerful incent-
ives for demolition would be established. In
order to offset the demoliton penalty imposed
by the federal listing, (a fixed cost) the
developer will naturally seek, under the ap-
parently "ceilingless" Boston density review,
the highest possible site FAR. The National
Register listing, when combined with a negot-
iated density ceiling, therefore, can be act-
ually fuel the desire for increased site den-
sity--a kind of policy backfire.
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This is in fact the case in the United Shoe
Machinery Corporation Building case, an
analogous case analyzed in Chapter 6.
2. Efficiency Arguments
Efficiency arguments also irrelevant in cases
of buildings of compromise. The argument
that rehabilitation takes less time, and can
happen year round (because the existing shell
affords weather protection) is irrelevant.
Not only can construction be phased effective-
ly year-round, but the cost of the time lag
for new construction is clearly outweighed by
the benefits. In an inflationary market,
with deep demand, the margin between construc-
tion costs and rent levels can widen in fa-
vor of the developer. Over time, this can
actually make it advantageous to complete a
new construction project at a later date than
anticipated for a rehabilitation program, as
long as the market demand is still suffi-
cient. Furthermore, the fact that rehabili-
tation is faster than new construction is ir-
relevant when comparing 400,000 of one and
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800,000 square feet of the other. The time
cost of money is irrelevant if the longer
schedule can yield -a higher volume project
with comparable profitability.
3. Marketing Arguments
Marketing arguments for preservation claim
that old buildings add charm to their sites
and districts, increase property values, and
tangibly contribute to the successful market-
ing of the project. The achilles heel of
this argument is that it only applies to weak
markets, which by definition will not produce
a building of compromise situation. Under
the tight market conditions which generate a
building of compromise the demand is so
strong and projected absorption so substan-
tial that no developer would prefer 300,000
"charming square feet" to 1,000,000 less
charming, but easily rentable square feet.
The boom market conditions which set the stage for
buildings of compromise present a paradox for the
conventional incentives for rehabilitation
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development. The preservation incentives, however,
are not the only casualties. The same market condi-
tions remove incentives for the developer to interact
with the city in other ways as well, some of which
have been points of entry for winning concessions on
development issues in the past. The Chapter 121A tax
agreement is a prime example of this phenomenon.
The Chapter 121A provision allows the developer to
gain deviations from conventional zoning and tax regu-
lations, in exchange for agreeing to a more thorough
public review procedure. This may result in negotia-
tion with the city of project design, area improve-
ments, etc. Under a 121A agreement, a municipality
can stimulate and direct investment by substituting a
negotiated in-lieu of tax payment to the city for con-
ventionally assessed property taxes. This negotiated
payment is customarily a proportion of project in-
come, and ranges from 15-20% of annual rent roll.
However, the inflationary market which produces the
building of compromise, removes the incentive to seek
a 121A agreement. As office rents soar, the marginal
benefit of a 121A agreement over a standard
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assessment diminishes. This eliminates a potential
point of entry for the city to effectively negotiate
urban design issues, including historic preservation.
VIEWING DESIGNATION AS AN ENDPOINT IN A NEGOTIATION
PROCESS RATHER THAN AS A STARTING POINT MAY WEAKEN
BOTH THE VALUE OF DESIGNATION AND THE PROBABILITY OF
REACHING A REASONABLE COMPROMISE
The enabling statute for the Commission implies that
designation, although the endpoint in a study and
analysis process, is not the endpoint in the process
of guiding the future of the landmark. The statute
provides for appeals to the Commission, and to County
Superior Court, if necessary, to challenge a desig-
nation ruling. Designation can be, in some cases, a
baseline from which subsequent deviations are subse-
quently allowed.
In practice, designation is seen and used as an end-
point in the design and planning for a site. Parti-
cipants in the process attempt to resolve all issues
upon designation--the design review of new construc-
tion, the economic issues, and the site density
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issues. And although the Commission must consider
these issues in making an intelligent designation dec-
ision, it cannot reassonably be a forum for such a
broad range of issues. The current process makes
landmarks designation a proxy for other important
reviews, each of which deserves a separate and expert
forum.
Each actor--the Commission, developer, and the pre-
servationists has several motivations for viewing
designation as an endpoint in the process. For the
BLC, designation is their last official opportunity
to have input into the development project. Given
the limited voice they are allowed both before and
after their official involvement, they feel they must
maximize their impact through designation itself.
Their interest is to influence as many issues of con-
cern, directly or indirectly, as they possibly can in
the designation.
The developer shares this preference for an expedi-
tious resolution of controversy and a definitive des-
ignation as well. Although the developer's consult-
ants could not themselves reach consensus on the
21 9
substance of the standards and criteria (the lawyers
drafted and advocated standards and criteria giving
the developer carte blanche, whereas the architects
were more willing to negotiate), the desire for
finality and clarity was shared by all. For the
developer, whose life is governed by uncertainty, a
definitive designation with clearcut guidelines is
preferable to time consuming and expensive
negotiations in subsequent stages of the development
process.
The preservationist lobby, usually in a reactive
position, are equally interested in establishing
irrevocable rules through designation. Their
involvement is short and temporary, and the threat
(real or imagined) of the developer's evil intentions
encourages them to win hard guarantees from the
developer as soon as possible.
Ultimately, the designation proceedings on the Ex-
change Building was used as a proxy for the consider-
ation and review of a series of separate and inter-
related issues. Some feel this compressed review
process, which collapses several issues into one,
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dilutes the meaning and value of designation. Not
only does this process confront the Commission with
issues (density, for instance) it may not be
qualified to consider, but it removes the
responsibility from other city agencies who are
charged with conducting those reviews.
Under an alternative model, designation would not be
seen as a strict endpoint in the Commission's involve-
ment. For example, the designation process, could
be revised to provide a two step designation. A pre-
liminary designation would be more "pure"-- based on
historic issues rather than on consideration of den-
sity, economic, or other issues. Revisions to such a
designation could then be allowed through subsequent
discussions of those issues. The level of discussion
for modified, or partial designations, would be rais-
ed, since the burden of proof of hardship would be
shifted to the developer. Under the current model,
by contrast, it is incumbent upon the preservation-
ists, or the Commission itself, to argue for full des-
ignation and to accept partial designation. This con-
cept is further discussed in Chapter 7.
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It is of course not at all clear that such a change
would actually enhance the effectiveness of the Com-
mission or raise the standard of the city's overall
review of development alternatives available for a
given site. However, it seems clear that the collap-
sing of multiple issues under the rubric of a land-
mark designation reduces the probability of esta-
blishing effective discussions between city and
developer.
222
CHAPTER 5
THE OLD FEDERAL RESERVE COMPLEX
Another way to consider the possible alternative
outcomes in the 53 State Street case is to look at
other buildings of compromise governed by the Boston
system. There are two such cases, the Old Federal
Reserve Bank Complex, and the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation Building. Although governed by the same
real estate economics, historic issues, and
regulatory frameworks as 53 State Street, the three
cases vary widely in their outcomes. An analysis of
the causes of these variations is useful in
considering alternatives for working with buildings
of compromise.
The United Shoe Machinery Corporation Building, the
subject of another controversy and now at a decision-
making impasse, is examined in Chapter 6. In this
chapter, The Old Federal Reserve Complex, renamed as
One Post Office Square and currently nearing comple-
tion, is analyzed. First, a brief background narra-
tive and flow chart (Exhibit 5-1) describe the prop-
erty, the problem, the actors, and the landmarks pro-
cess. Next, governing factors which account for the
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EXHIBIT 5-1: OLD FEDERAL RESERVE COMPLEX LANDMARK DESIGNATION PROCESS
CONSULTANTS
BOSTON
PRESERVATION
ALLIANCE
BOSTON
LANDMARKS
COMMISSION
BOSTON
REDEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY
MAYOR
OWNER
DEVELOPER
ARCHITECT
OTHER
CONSUL TANTS
PETICm1
July 1977
Emmh............u......
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differences in process and result between the 53
State Street case and One Post Office Square are
identified.
DESCRIPTION AND BACKGROUND
The Federal Reserve Bank complex is located on the
block bounded by Milk, Pearl, Franklin, and Oliver
Streets, facing Post Office Square near the heart of
the downtown financial district (Exhibit 5-2). The
complex consists of three buildings which contain
both small offices and large ceremonial banking halls
and meeting chambers. The two main buildings are six
stories tall, flat-roofed, steel-framed and faced
with limestone. One was built in 1922, and was the
first built-to-suit home for the Federal Reserve Bank
in Boston, since it occupied various spaces in the
city from 1914. An addition to this original struc-
ture was planned in the 1940's, and after delays
imposed by the death of the commissioned architect
and the second World War, was constructed in 1953.
A one-story structure was built behind the two main
buildings in the 1975. A parking garage, built in
1972, occupied the remainder of the site (Exhibits
5-4 and 5-5).
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The area surrounding the Federal Reserve Complex is
populated by a mixture of commercial buildings built
both before and after the Boston fire of 1919. Rang-
ing in height from 4 stories to high rise towers of
28 stories, these buildings house the regional and
state headquarters of many of Boston's most establish-
ed financial institutions. Known as the financial
district, the area land use is almost entirely commer-
cial office space with limited supporting retail.
The complex was the home of the regional office of
the Federal Reserve System from 1922 until 1978, when
it moved to its new office tower in the South Station
area. Planning for the future of the old site was
begun in early 1977.
THE PROPERTY DISPOSAL
As a quasi-public agency, the Federal Reserve Bank
had three central objectives in the disposal of the
property:
1. Identifying a new use for the property
which was consistent with the city's overall
planning objectives for the district, and
participating in the planning and programming
process to ensure this outcome.
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2. Guiding the redevelopment of the property
to maximize the tax yield to the city and min-
imize the probability of future blight due to
prolonged vacancy.
3. Accepting, if necessary, a below-market
value for the property to help ensure a high
quality development project.
The Federal Reserve Bank retained a prominent Boston
leasing agent to market the complex. Over a three
year period, however, no suitable purchaser was
found. The bank reviewed redevelopment proposals of
each of the prospective purchasers. It was clear the
existing buildings would be difficult to reuse. Al-
though structrally sound and well maintained, the
previous banking uses left some peculiar and diffi-
cult spaces--such as solid concrete vaults, very high
ceilings, and a fortress-like architecture which suc-
cessfully conveyed the image of security but would be
extremely expensive to alter for new use. None of
the preliminary schemes presented seemed feasible.
The physical difficulties presented by the existing
buildings translated directly into weak financial
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feasibility. Some of the schemes seemed unrelated to
the market at that time, such as a proposal for a
high rise condominium tower attached to the rear of
the 1951 building.
THE BEACON COMPANIES
In February 1978, The Beacon Companies, a real estate
development company known for its office and indust-
rial developments in both downtown and suburban Bos-
ton, became interested in the property. The Beacon
Companies approached the Federal Reserve Bank and in-
itiated a planning process for the site, led by arch-
itects Jung/Brannen of Boston.
This planning process, which Beacon partner Edwin
Sidman remembers as "one of the most creative pro-
cesses I have ever been involved in" produced nine
schemes for the site. The alternatives for reuse of
individual buildings, overall site density, and
program uses were defined and explored. Each of the
schemes was based on differing assumptions and
interpretations of the overall market, the reusab-
ility of the various buildings, and the appropriate
density in the district.
232
Emerging from this planning process was one scheme
which seemed to have both design and financial feas-
ibility. This scheme called for the retention of the
1922 building, widely acknowledged as the more hist-
oric and architecturally attractive of the two main
buildings, and the replacement of the 1953 and 1972
buildings with a new office tower. The 1922 building
would be restored and reused for either office or
hotel use.
The Federal Reserve Bank was also impressed with
Beacon's scheme. It seemed to combine the best por-
tions of the original comppex with bold enough new
construction to anchor the entire site in the market.
The office market, although no yet experiencing the
dynamic boom it has in the years since, did seem to
warrant development of this size.
THE BLC's DESIGNATION PROCESS
The Landmarks Commission had received a petition seek-
ing the designation of the Federal Reserve Complex al-
most one year before this time, in August of 1977.
The Commission had not yet considered the case, since
its redevelopment seemed far from imminent, but had
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*proceeded to the study report stage. This report was
completed at the same time the Beacon Companies
planning effort was conducted and speculation about
the proposed development began to appear in the local
press.
The study report recommended that the entire complex
be designated a landmark. It found that the 1922
building, in particular, was a significant part of
Boston and New England banking history, and a quality
example of the Renaissance Revival Style in America.
Furthermore, it maintained, the building was an
important work of the architect R. Clipson Sturgis.
The 1953 addition was also deemed worthy of designa-
tion. The study report called it a fine example of
"Governmental Modern Style" or "Academic Classicism",
a suitable addition to the 1922 building, and a major
work of Paul Philippe Cret. The study report recom-
mended that it, and the 1922 building, also be nomin-
ated to the National Register of Historic Places. 2
The public hearing for designation was scheduled for
August 15, 1978. In the interim, letters of support
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for the Beacon scheme were received by the BLC. En-
dorsements of the Beacon scheme, and opposition to
the overall designation, followed four themes: 1) the
proposal was the only financially feasible alterna-
tive available for the site, and the only proposal
the bank had seen in its three years of planning
which met the city's and bank's objectives for
redevelopment; 2) designation would adversely affect
the bank's effort to sell or lease the property; 3)
the 1953 building and other minor site structures
were very difficult to reuse, and had been inadequate
even for the bank; and 4) the 1953 addition was not
architecturally significant, and contrary to the BLC
report, was not the work of Cret.3
Undaunted, the Beacon Companies entered into a pur-
chase and sale agreement with the Bank on August 15,
1978, the same day the public hearing before the
Landmarks Commission was scheduled.
THE PUBLIC HEARING
At the August 15 hearing, proponents argued for the
architectural and historic significance of the com-
plex, the importance of the complex in maintaining
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the scale and integrity of the district, and the feas-
iblity of reuse. Reuse of both the 1953 and the 1922
buildings, they argued, was financially and physic-
ally feasible.
The Beacon Companies presented the oppposite argu-
ments. They exhibited the nine alternatives they had
developed, and explained the relative strengths and
weaknesses of each. The physical obstacles to alter-
native reuse approaches, and their likely financial
consequences, were identified.
Following this presentation of alternatives, wit-
nesses appeared in support of the Beacon scheme which
proposed the retention of the 1922 building, and the
clearance of the rest of the site for copnstruction
of a high rise office tower. These witnesses argued
that: 1) the 1953 addition was not architecturally
significant; 2) the 1953 building had many peculiar
strucutral and architectural features which made its
reuse difficult; and 3) the "fortress=-like" archi-
tecture of both the 1922 and the 1953 buildings offer-
ed little amenity to the pedestrian; and 4) locating
an office tower on the rear of the site behind the
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1953 addition, as some had suggested, would signifi-
cantly reduce the attractiveness of the site for high
grade office tenants. 4
The developers were concerned that designation of
even the 1922 building would be too inflexible to
allow for a reuse program. He felt a premature desig-
nation would only thwart the Bank's and the develo-
per's efforts to achieve a successful rejuvenation of
the property. The mere threat of designation, Sidman
reported, was creating difficulty in the Beacon Comp-
anies' efforts to attract hotel operators. Although
there was unanimity among the particpants in the pro-
cess, Sidman felt, the preservation interests did not
seem to understand the financial and physical con-
straints on redeveloping the existing buildings.
Although the hearing produced no clear conclusion, a
mutual interest in a compromise scheme which retained
portions of the Federal Reserve complex emerged.
Over the two months which followed, until the desig-
nation on October 10, 1978, the exact substance of
the designation was negotiated. During this period,
the developer's primary concern was to build flexi-
bility into the standards and criteria which would
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govern the reuse of the 1922 structure. Two key is-
sues were central to the redevelopment plan: 1) the
"permeability" of the ground floor--the developer's
concern for achieving adequate access, light, and vis-
ibility between the inside and outside of the build-
ing; and 2) retaining the option of adding additional
rooms above the existing structure, which might be
needed to achieve the efficiency and economies of
scale necessary for financial feasiblity.
DESIGNATION
The developers felt strict standards and criteria
from the Commission would not accommodate their
needs. During September 1978, several versions of
the standards and criteria for the 1922 building were
drafted by the preservationists, developers, and Com-
mission. Designation under these criteria was approv-
ed by the Commission on October 10, 1978.
The PDA Zoning Review Process was set in motion for
the proposal, and the project received approval in
April of 1979 for a thirty-nine story.tower adjacent
to the 1922 building. The 1922 building was to be
converted into a 300 room Class A hotel. The
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original parcel was divided into two independent
sub-parcels. The project was built to an overall FAR
of 14.6, with an FAR of 21.6 on the office tower
sub-parcel.5
GOVERNING FACTORS
The One Post Office Square project, now nearing com-
pletion and nearly fully leased, has been a stunning
commercial success. It combined adaptive reuse and
high rise new construction in a way which had not
really been attempted before. In many ways, it is a
pioneering building of compromise.
This development is a product of the same public re-
view and regulatory system which governed and produc-
ed the 53 State Street resolution. Yet, this compro-
mise was reached with less bitterness and conten-
tion, and resulted in less political fallout for the
Commission, developer, and preservationists. What
factors account for the differences in the tone and
quality of the negotiating process?
An analysis of the process in the One Post Office
Square case indicates that several factors are
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critical to a successful negotiation of buildings of
compromise: 1) physical separability; 2) legal and
financial separability; 3) original owner's position
and objectives; 4) analytical thoroughness of the
developer; 5) risk profiles; and 6) availability of
precedents.
PHYSICAL SEPARABILITY
Unlike the Exchange Block, the Federal Reserve Com-
plex was an ensemble of distinctly independent build-
ings which were historically and physically sever-
able. As can be seen in Exhibits 5-2 to 5-4, the
buildings of the Federal Reserve complex occupied
corners of the site, whereas the Exchange Building
occupied portions of its entire site. Thus, on the
54,326 square foot Federal Reserve Site, buildings
could be independently considered for rehabilitation
or demolition while enough site area could be
reserved for the construction of an efficient office
building.
Ease of physical separation is clearly one of the key
factors in generating a building of compromise. The
physical independence of parts of a building or
complex have direct political implications as well as
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the more obvious structural and architectural
implications. In cases where decisions to retain or
demolish some portions of a building or complex are
negotiated between preservationists and developers,
the historical independence of individual components
is critical.
LEGAL AND FINANCIAL SEPARABILITY
The original Federal Reserve Site was eventually part-
itioned into two sub-parcels, one for the 1922 build-
ing, and another for the development of a new office
tower and a low-rise parking garage. Separate devel-
opment entities for each sub-parcel were also esta-
blished.
The physical separability of existing structures can
be easily translated into convenient legal frameworks
as well. This separation enhances construction and
management of the building of compromise. Since the
new construction project follows a different review
process than the historic rehabilitation, it is con-
venient to separate them legally. In this way,
reviews for site density for the office tower, for
example, can be handled independently from the
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historic rehabilitation certification process.
Pre-development and construction phase efficiency is
enhanced.
Legal separation between old and new can also accom-
modate multiple forms of ownership which might be con-
venient in the operation of a building of compromise.
For instance, the One Post Office Square project com-
bined hotel use with an office program. A separate
ownership structure for the two components allows un-
encumbered relationships between operators and joint
venture partners that the deal may require. The dif-
ference in tax treatment for historic rehabilitation
and new construction can also be easily accomodated.
Ownership groups can be structured to optimize these
differences and strengthen the overall project.
The partitioning of legal and financial interests is
possible, of course, without the physical severabil-
ity offered by the One Post Office Square project. A
skilled deal-maker can successfully accommodate the
diverse interests and objectives of multiple parties
on a site such as the Exchange Block. However, if
the separation of project components is clearly
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exists in the physical form of the property (as at
the Old Federal Reserve Site, and not at the Exchange
Block), the legal and financial separation required
in a building of compromise is made easier.
Reaching a superior compromise is easier without a
controversy over where to draw the line between old
and new. Physical as well as legal alternatives are
more readily grasped, considered, and refined by all
actors involved.
POSITION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ORIGINAL OWNER
A major factor in the success of the One Post Office
Square process was the active and sophisticated part-
icipation of the Federal Reserve Bank itself, the own-
er of the property. As a quasi-public agency, the
Bank's primary motive was the successful and appro-
priate reuse of the site -- returning the property to
tax generating use and complying with the City's over-
all planning objectives for the district.
By contrast, the typical private owner, such as Old
State Trust in the 53 State Street case, has a very
different list of objectives and order of priorities.
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Whereas the Federal Reserve Bank had no immediate fin-
ancial constraints but did have an important public
reputation to protect, the private owne-r typically
needs to maximize cash gain and carries less public
responsibility.
The Federal Reserve Bank tried to market their proper-
ty for three years before The Beacon Companies was
selected. This time-consuming process, involving sol-
icitation and review of numerous redevelopment propo-
sals, none of which seemed appropriate or feasible,
must have been frustrating to the Bank. This commit-
ment to a long period of exploration performed an in-
valuable service to the city, since it allowed a full
range of alternatives for the site to be examined.
The standard of evaluation and discussion was natural-
ly elevated through this process.
No private owner can be expected to have such an avid
interest in the future development of a site after
its disposition. In reviewing the One Post Office
Square case, therefore, it is critical to remember
the critical role the Federal Reserve Bank played in
building an atmosphere conducive for detailed study
244
and analysis of development alternatives for the
site.
The owner need not be public to assume such a role,
however. Likewise, public ownership is no guarantee
of such leadership. (Witness St. Bartholomew's Church
and the Museum of Modern Art in New York) In the
absence of such enlightened leadership by an owner,
however, the public process must somehow endeavor to
achieve similarly successful results.
ANALYTICAL THOROUGHNESS OF THE DEVELOPER
One distinction which can be drawn between the 53
State Street and One Post Office Square cases is that
one involved a Boston developer and the other involv-
ed a Canadian company. Although an apparently super-
ficial observation, this distinction could account
for some of the tonal differences in the negotiation
of a compromise.
Olympia and York's proven track record and continued
success in the United States is adequate evidence of
their extreme overall competence, as well as of their
ability to enter new markets and negotiate unfamiliar
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political landscapes. In a controversial development
process such as in a building of compromise, however,
there are distinct advantages to being a local actor.
For example, the Canadian developers clearly under-
estimated the interest and political clout of the Bos-
ton preservation community. Since they operated from
a distance, they relied upon official sources--the
Mayor or the BRA--for indications of possible con-
flicts. It was clearly difficult to read the nuances
of the political climate through surrogates, however.
The Beacon Companies, by contrast, were long-standing
citizens of Boston. With their offices only a few
blocks from their site and city hall, and with a
proven local track record spanning three decades,
they, were much better equipped to sense, anticipate,
and respond to the political controversy which
surrounds a building of compromise.
Olympia and York responded to this disadvantage by
hiring a local law firm to represent them in public
forums against the preservation lobby. This strategy
was successful in insulating Olympia and York from
direct involvement in the controversy. In fact,
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whereas Beacon Company partner Sidman and his staff
participated heavily in the public hearings and
discussions with the Landmarks Commission, not a
single person from Olympia and York appeared at the
highly contentious public hearing for designation.
This insulation may have achieved the developer's
objective of maintaining a low profile, as is Olympia
and York's style, but it may have worked against the
formulation of a well-developed compromise as well.
Although the lawyer's involvement afforded the devel-
opers legal protection, it also seemed to increase
the contentiousness of the process. Discussion often
focused on the legal and technical dimensions of
decisions and issues of legal precedent, rather than
on the substance of the design and financial issues
being negotiated.
More important than the fact that Olympia and York
was a foreign developer, or the impacts of their us-
ing a lawyer to represent them, is their attitude
towards the preservation issues and public review pro-
cess. By underestimating the depth of the preserva-
tionists' interest in the Exchange Building, Olympia
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and York simply did not recognize the need for a thor-
ough investigation of development alternatives. By
contrast, Beacon took almost an opposite approach in
the Old Federal Reserve Complex case by initiating an
exploration of alternative development approaches.
This difference in approach set the tone for the en-
tire process. The Beacon Companies developed nine
alternative schemes for their site before the desig-
nation hearings, before signing their purchase and
sale agreement with the Bank, and before negotiations
with the BLC. Having done their "homework", the Bea-
con Companies was better prepared to argue for their
scheme and against other alternatives. This not only
set the tone for more friendly negotiations, but also
facilitated discussion at a high level of specificity
and sophistication. The Beacon Companies' options
were available for scrutiny, challenge, and debate,
which were supported by the design and financial ana-
lyses the developer had prepared.
The reader will recall in the 53 State Street case
that a primary difficulty in seeking a compromise was
identifying alternatives for comparison and finding a
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forum in which to have them recognized and considered
by the participants. The developer provided only one
site approach. The BPA-sponsored, RPRC scheme
provided the polar opposite, and arrived too late in
the process to register any impact on the outcome.
The scheme now under construction, although developed
over a six month period before made public, was
offered late in the process as the only possible
resolution of a hopelessly advanced confrontation.
The inferiority of the Federal Reserve Site to the
Exchange Block may account for the difference in the
developers' attitudes toward generating alternative
development approaches described above. The extreme-
ly favorable market conditions under which Olympia
and York began pre-development planning for the Ex-
change Block, and the "textbook perfection" of the
site for high rise development made the detailed and
thorough analysis of alternatives demanded by a build-
ing of compromise seem unnecessary. By contrast, the
comparatively weak office market and the physical
difficulty of reusing the Federal Bank buildings
prompted a very thorough and patient search for an
appropriate development approach to the Federal -
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Reserve Site.
RISK PROFILES
The uncertainty of success which characterized the
Federal Reserve site and the Beacon Companies' in-
volvement from the outset led the developers to mini-
mize their risk profile. By contrast, the Olympia
and York's high confidence in success at the Exchange
Block led them to develop a very high risk profile
earlier in the landmarks process. This difference is
fundamental to understanding the successes and fail-
ures of the two processes. (Refer to Exhibit 5-6)
The Beacon Companies, wary of market softness and the
growing preservation concern over the Federal Reserve
complex, invested considerable time and resources in-
to exhaustive preliminary planning before they began
formal acquisition. Of course, the ownership status
of the property allowed them this time and patience.
Therefore, when the landmark designation process was
initiated, the developers had not committed signifi-
cant resources beyond this exploratory stage.
By contrast, Olympia and York were well into design
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development on their Phase One scheme when the pres-
ervation controversy erupted. They had reportedly
already entered into a leasing understanding with Old
State Trust based on an anticipated FAR of 19. Given
this high risk profile, Olympia and York's interest
in exploring fundamentally different approaches to
site development was understandably low.
It is clear that a low risk profile at the time of
negotiations is helpful in setting the stage for a
strong compromise. The regulatory process which gov-
erns this kind of development might be refined to
minimize the developer's risk profile. Clearly the
Boston process currently does not. Some possiblili-
ties for improvement are suggested in Chapter 7.
AVAILABILITY OF PRECEDENTS
One Post Office Square was one of the first buildings
of compromise. At the same time it was being
planned, the Helmsley Palace Hotel and early schemes
for St. Bartholomew's church complex in New York were
being developed. The only completed examples of
buildings of compromise available at this time were
the Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary in Boston and
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the Penn Mutual Tower in Philadelphia (Exhibits 5-7
and 5-8). And although both these buildings do com-
bine high rise construction with portions of original
structures, no attempt was made to integrate them
spatially as well as architecturally. These two pro-
jects do not raise or address the range of architect-
ural, financial, and urban policy issues raised by
both 53 State Street, One Post Office Square, and the
subsequent United Shoe Machinery Building case.
The resolution of the Old Federal Reserve Complex
case was, therefore, an immediate and direct prece-
dent for the 53 State Street case. This worked both
for and against the process of reaching a compromise.
Although it served as a tangible example for visual-
izing what might be achieved at the Exchange Block,
it also served to galvinize the positions of opposing
parties.
Preservationists who objected to the One Post Office
Square solution and considered it a sellout to devel-
opers were much more determined to defeat any similar
scheme for the Exchange Block. Likewise, the
developer, who was apprehensive about the financial
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and physical liabilities of an old building, would be
aware of the precedent established by the One Post
Office Square Project, and would prepare to argue
against a similar resolution on his site (Exhibits
5-9 and 5-10).
Thus, while the concept of compromise may have ap-
pealed to the imaginations of both the preservation-
ists and the developers in the One Post Office Square
case, thereby bringing them closer together, an avail-
able real-life example of such a compromise may
have polarized these interests at 53 State Street.
SUMMARY
The Federal Reserve Complex and Exchange Block cases
occurred roughly nine months apart. Both these pro-
jects resulted in high rise, high density towers con-
nected to low-rise, rehabilitated structures. The
two cases, however, are extremely different, both in
process and results. Before drawing any conclusions,
it is useful to examine a third Boston case, the
United Shoe Machinery Corporation Building. It
offers yet another view of the city's regulatory
capability in dealing with buildings of compromise.
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CHAPTER 6
THE UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION BUILDING
This chapter examines the landmarks designation of
the United Shoe Machinery Corporation Building,
another downtown office building site. The latest of
the three Boston examples, the USMC case is useful to
analyze for evidence of "public learning" during the
three major buildings of compromise. As for the Old
Federal Reserve Complex, the chapter first describes
the designation process for the USMC Building (See
Exhibit 6-1) and then compares it to the 53 State
Street case.
BACKGROUND
The United Shoe Machinery Corporation (USMC) Building
is located on the block bounded by Federal High, and
Matthews Streets and High Street Place in downtown
Boston (Exhibit 6-2). This site is at the southern
edge of the financial district of the city, an area
characterized by a mix of low and medium rise commer-
cial buildings dating to the turn of the century and
several modern high rise office towers.
USMC was formed by the consolidation of three
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companies which held the rights to the manufacture
and distribution of machinery for making shoes.
From its creation in 1899, the USMC grew to a posi-
tion of near total market domination. By 1909, the
Corporation controlled 98% of the shoe machinery in
the United States. This explosive growth continued
internationally during the 1920's to South America,
Canada, England, Scandanavia, South Africa, and
Australia.
In 1928, the Corporation began acquiring property on
High and Federal Streets in Boston for the construc-
tion of a corporate headquarters building. The USMC
Building, as it it now known, was designed by the
architectural firm Parker, Thomas, and Rice, and was
constructed from 1929-30. The building is a compli-
cated ziggurat form built over an irregular trapezoid-
al floor plan which follows the exact site shape cre-
ated by the city streets. The base of the building
is built out to the sidewalks without setbacks, and
the building steps back in massing as it rises to its
peak of twenty-four stories. Although not as renown-
ed an example of the style as the Chrysler or Empire
State Buildings in New York, the USMC Building is one
of the few major commissions in the Art Deco style in
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the city of Boston (Exhibits 6-3 and 6-4).
In 1964, after thirty-four years of ownership, the
USMC decided to sell the building. It had fully de-
preciated the property from its balance sheet and
felt it could uses its investment in the building in
other areas of its business. Maurice Gordon, of Mau-
rice Gordon and Sons, one of the largest private real
estate owners in New England, purchased the building
under a sealed bid process in February of that year.
Mr. Gordon operated the property until his death in
1977, when it was purchased with several other prop-
erties in his estate by a trust in the names of Herb-
ert Vaughn and Thomas M. Horan. The beneficiary of
the trust is Diamand Bay N.V., a Netherlands Antilles
corporation, whose stock is fully owned by a Kuwaiti
Corporation. Mr. Horan is a Chairman of the Board of
Meredith and Grew, one of the prominent Boston commer-
cial real estate brokers which now manages the plan-
ning for the future of the site.1
In late 1979, Meredith and Grew began planning for a
new office tower on the USMC Building site. Faced
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with a building they-considered obsolete, in poor and
deteriorating condition, and in a prime development
location near public transit and in the financial dis-
trict, the firm felt they had acquired an underutiliz-
ed asset. Furthermore, the sustained growth in the
commercial Class A office market in metropolitan Bos-
ton made them confident that such a development would
be a commercial success.
The developers envisioned a building of roughly
800,000 square feet. By adding portions of an adjoin-
ing parcel under the same ownership, they could assem-
ble a base site area of 59,100 square feet. The new
building would represent an FAR of 13.5.
PETITION AND STUDY REPORT
On January 8, 1980, a petition was filed with the
Boston Landmarks Commission by Pauline Chase Harrell,
chairperson of the BLC, and nine other Boston voters.
On January 22, the Commission voted to hear the case
and to proceed with the study report on the property.
A preliminary hearing was scheduled for May 27, 1980.
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The BLC staff study report was released May 6, 1980.
It found that the USMC Building was the finest and
most intact example of the Art Deco style in Boston,
and whereas it did not rank in overall excellence
with other examples of the era found in New York and
Florida, it was the apex of the style in Boston. Fur-
thermore, the study reported that the buildings was
one of the first built under the 1928 amendment to
the Boston Zoning Code, and was therefore both a lead-
er and an important surviving artifact of the ziggur-
at massing which resulted from these revised poli-
cies. The report recommended the building be desig-
nated a Boston landmark and that it be nominated to
the National Register of Historic Places.
The study report cited, interestingly enough, both
the One Post Office Square and the Exchange Place
developments as reasons to support the "pure"
rehabilitation of the USMC Building. The report
claimed that these cases demonstrated the city's
interest in combining new construction and historic
preservation. However, the study wondered, "Will the
character of Boston be destroyed by continued high
rise development?" 2
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The report argued that, because the city faced a
strong commercial real estate market and could look
forward to continued high absorption, it should pick
and choose from numerous development proposals which
seeking approval. Healthy market conditions, the BLC
staff argued, were the ideal context in which the ci-
ty should aggressively bargain for the highest in de-
sign quality, economic development, and public im-
provement.
EARLY NEGOTIATIONS
The developers continued to develop their plans for
the USMC site. They were concerned, however, about
the progressing landmarks designation process. Begin-
ning in March, as the BLC staff prepared their study
report, a series of meetings were held between the de-
velopers and the preservationists. Called "compos-
ite" meetings, these sessions were held between the
developers, architects Hugh Stubbins & Associates,
and members of the Boston Preservation Alliance.
These exploratory meetings were held, as one partici-
pant wrote, with the hope that "the development of a
'better process' might avert a confrontation similar
to that of 53 State Street." 3
268
The meetings were held to discuss historic issues, in-
cluding designation, urban design issues related to
new construction, and the feasibility of rehabilita-
tion. There were three meetings before the public
hearing.
PUBLIC HEARING
At the public hearing on May 27, 1980, testimony was
heard both for and against designation. Proponents of
designation included the Boston Preservation Alli-
ance, the Society of Architectural Historians, the
Essex Institute, and several individual architectural
historians, all of whom lent support to the BLC staff
report on the building. These witnesses argued that
the USMC Building was an exemplar of a major archi-
tectural style, representative of major forces in Bos-
ton and regional history, and the work of a noted
architectural firm. Also appearing in favor of land-
mark designation was an office leasing agent who ar-
gued that any new building which replaced the USMC
Building would, because it would obstruct prime views
and the relationships of the skyline to the street-
scape, negatively impact the desirability and market-
ability of adjacent office buildings.
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An owner of a nearby building, claiming to represent
owners in the district, appeared and lent his support
to designation.
Opponents of designation included an attorney for the
owners, who disputed the contention that the building
had historic value. He maintained, furthermore, that
landmark designation would impose substantial
economic hardship on the owner.
William LeMessurier, a noted structural engineer, pre-
sented his analysis of the cost and feasibility of re-
pairing the exterior. Using a strict interpretation
of the BLC guidelines (he assumed all exterior cast-
ings would be replicated in original materials) he es-
timated a renovation cost of over $7 million dollars,
which he claimed was too expensive for feasible rehab-
ilitation of the property.
An appraiser from C.W. Whittier & Co. appeared and
testified that the property was generating cash defi-
cits, and needed repairs whose cost exceeded the val-
ue of the property. It was not feasible for rehabi-
litation, he claimed.
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Several architects, including the firm hired for the
development of a new tower for the site, appeared at
the hearing. They argued that the building was not
of high architectural distinction, and that a super-
ior ground-level relationship could be achieved
through new construction. In terms of urban design,
they argued, the existing building offered no pedes-
trian amenities. A new building could provide, they
explained, deeper pedestrian level setbacks, an open
public plaza, and improved overall pedestrian circu-
lation patterns.4
The hearing provoked another round of planning and re-
search by the Landmarks Commission, preservationists,
developers, and other consultants. Meanwhile, in its
capacity as local historical commission, the BLC had
voted to nominate the United Shoe Corporation Build-
ing to the National Register. This recommendation
was forwarded to the Massachusetts Historical Commis-
sion on April 9, 1980. MHC approved this recommenda-
tion and forwarded the nomination to Washington for-
final acceptance by the Department of Interior on May
14, 1980.
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FURTHER STUDY AND ANALYSIS
In August, the Commission was approached by prominent
Boston adaptive reuse architect Charles Tsekeres of
CBT Associates. Tsekeres oppposed designation of the
USMC Building, but was concerned about its potential
replacement. He suggested that the Commission use
its power to designate the USMC Building a landmark
as a point of entry to becoming more actively involv-
ed in the overall planning for the site. Designation
should used as a tool, he reasoned, "to advance the
aesthetics of the City of Boston." 5 He felt the
BLC should establish development guidelines and parti-
cipate in the pre-development planning for the site.
Preservation Alliance chairman Angus Crowe also ap-
peared before the Commission during this time period
and expressed concern over the gap in the planning
process for the site. He, hoiwever, did not feel the
BLC was the proper body to assume responsibility for
the overall planning of the site. "...some agency or
organization should be looking at appropriate loca-
tion, density, height, massing9, and other aspects of
new development," he said, "but the Commission is not
necessarily that entity." 6
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This issue confused the Landmarks Commission. The
Commissioners were not certain their statutory charge
included such broad, over-arching planning powers.
In the end, the Commission decided not to participate
in the planning for the site, but to commission an in-
dependent consultant' s report to explore the feasibi-
lity of rehabilitating the USMC Building. Economic
Research Associates (ERA), a national market research
and consulting firm, were selected to do this analy-
sis.
The ERA report was released in November 1980. It was
a thorough and well-documented report, but failed to
state a definitive conclusion. It presented a synop-
sis of the factors involved in evaluating rehabilita-
tion -- cash flow, financing, tax treatment of in-
come, etc. in an very general "textbook" manner. It
failed, however, to isolate the specific physical
(the configuration and condition of the USMC Building
itself) and economic (the needs and objectives of the
property managers, investors, and developers) facts
in the case which would lead to a recommendation. In
summary, the ERA report expressed a preference for re-
habilitation, but recommended simply that "...there
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is a potential for significant returns, mainly in the
form of tax savings."
As non-committal as it was, the ERA report still-pro-
voked several more months of debate between its au-
thors and the developer's own feasibility consultants
who had reached an opposite conclusion about rehabi-
litation of the United Shoe Machinery Building. In
correspondence over this time, the two consultants
challenged each other on the underlying assumptions
concerning tax rates, acquisition costs, financing
costs, and several other pivotal terms of the finan-
cial analysis.
Although these spirited debates continued without sig-
nificant conclusion throughout the fall and winter,
the "composite" meetings betweeen the developers,
architects, and preservationists broke down. Appa-
rently, after several months of consultation, the two
interests still found themselves in such disagreement
that they saw no hope of forging a workable compro-
mise. Preservation Alliance Chariman Crowe was la-
ter to comment, "I believe the intent of the owners
and the Architects was/is to convince the Alliance
that the positive aspects of new development
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outweigh retention of the USM Building, and to fur-
ther convince the Alliance to withdraw its support
for designation."8
Meanwhile, other interest groups in Boston became in-
volved in the case. The Greater Boston Chamber of
Commerce (GBCC) had formed a Special Project Review
Committee to study cases like the USMC Building case
as part of its Boston 2000 campaign. The Chamber had
adopted, as part of their 1980-81 agenda, an effort
to participate in development cases related to pres-
ervation and new construction. No doubt this was a
result of the 53 State Street case, which crystalliz-
ed so many of the key economic and urban design is-
sues confronting the city. Their objective was to
endorse and encourage development or rehabilitation
projects which they felt were compatible with their
"Guidelines for Development", a policy document the
Boston 2000 Committee produced in January 1981.
As part of its project evaluation, the Special Review
Committee invit'ed J. Miller Blew, of Real Property
Resources Corporation, to comment on the feasibility
of rehabilitating the USMC Building. By now a
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familiar expert witness in such cases, Blew presented
a third analysis of the case -- different in its con-
clusions from both the ERA and the developer-sponsor-
ed feasiblity studies. He argued that the building's
location and the overall market conditions made oper-
ating success a distinct probability if the building
were rehabilitated. For his analysis he assumed a
more lenient interpretation of the preservation stan-
dards for rehabilitation, prevailing interest rates
(which was higher than the ERA analysis by 3 points),
and devised a deal structure which he felt reflected
the needs of foreign investors. His conclusion was
that rehabilitation was feasible. 9
The Special Project Review Committee then made a re-
commmendation to the BLC, the contents of which empha-
size the dilemmas posed by the building of compro-
mise. It wrote, "the building does not merit Land-
mark designation, but what is worthy of preservation
are the qualities of scale, massing, and height embod-
ied in the existing structure"10 The Chamber did
not support the replacement of the existing building
with a 40-story tower, but instead suppported the
idea of allowing replacement of the structure with a
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new one of roughly the same size and scale. Again,
the issues of density and preservation were hopeless-
ly intertwined, and the regulatory review framework
seemed unable to accomodate their decoupling.
AN INTERIM RESOLUTION
The Landmarks Commission met in December with the dev-
elopers to explore possible areas for compromise. It
was clear from this meeting that a compromise in the
One Post Office Square or 53 State Street manner was
not possible. Much to the dismay of the Commission,
the developers' proposed "compromise" was a 800,000
to 1 million square foot tower which incorporated
some materials from the existing building in an Art
Deco entrance lobby. This was unacceptable to the
BLC.
On February 10, 1981, the Landmarks Commission voted
to designate the USMC Building, in its entirety, a
Boston landmark. This recommendation was forwarded
to the Mayor for review and approval. On March 4,
1981, the Mayor rejected this finding and wrote:
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"My reason for disapproval is that at this
time I am not convinced that the historical
significance of this building warrants de-
signation and imposition of such constraints
on the owners. My action should not be
interpreted as an an endorsement of further
development on the site."1 1
Under the 1976 statute, the Commission may respond
to a mayoral veto in two ways -- accepting it or
voting to reconsider the case. On March 10, 1981,
the Commission voted 6-3 to rehear the USMC Building
case. This reopened the case and essentially
restarted the designation process all over again.
By now the owners were frustrated and growing con-
cerned with the review process process. If the case
were reconsidered, and designation reaffirmed, the
probability of their being able to build new con-
struction would.be even more remote. As well, the
time delay imposed by another designation process
would be costly, both in terms of staff resources
and in the potential loss of credibility with their
foreign investor group.
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The developers were interested in keeping their
options for the site open. With BRA Director Robert
Ryan serving as an intermediary, the owners sought
to reach a "cease-fire agreement" with the Landmarks
Commission. This agreement was reached in May of
1981, a full fifteen months after the landmark desig-
nation process was initiated. The Commission agreed
not to take any further action on the case. In re-
turn, the owners/developers agreed not to demolish
the building for a period of one year, during which
they would work with the city to explore development
alternatives, including a rehabilitation
approach. 12
At last update, the cooperative process between the
developer, city, and landmarks commission supposedly
established by this May settlement seems to have
broken down. The outcome of the controversy, and
the future of the USMC Building, is yet uncertain.
The nomination of the USMC Building to the National
Register of Historic Places was successful, however.
In August 1981, the building was listed and became
subject to the package of economic and legal
advantages and constraints. This success at the
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national level, when coupled with indecision at the
local level, may create motivations counter to the
pro-preservation intentions of the Tax Act and list-
ing on the Register. The impact of such circum-
stances on the outcome is yet unkown, and is one rea-
son to monitor the progress of the USMC case over
the next several months.
GOVERNING FACTORS
Like the One Post Office Square case and the 53
State Street case, the USMC Buiding story can be
used to shed light on the way Boston deals with
buildings of compromise. The case not only confirms
several of the weakness in the system observable
through the 53 State Street case, but also suggests
possibilities for reform.
Five themes in the USMC case are useful in consider-
ing the process of brokering a compromise solution:
1) the impact of physical separabilty on the likeli-
hood of compromise; 2) the importance of risk pro-
files; 3) an interest in compromise but an absence
of a forum in which to reach it; 4) the power of pre-
cedents; and 5) the possibility of using designation
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as a starting, rather than ending point, in
negotiations. Each of these themes is discussed in
the sections following.
PHYSICAL SEPARABILITY
As illustrated in the One Post Office Square case,
the ease of physical separability is instrumental in
building a process for compromise. From physical
separability follows not only convenient and open-
minded planning, but financial and legal convenience
as well.
The USMC Building, however, did not lend itself to
any form of physical compromise. The building cov-
ered its entire site to its edges, leaving little
possibility for infill. The building itself was exe-
cuted in highly specific architectural style which
is not easily adapted or interpreted. The overall
composition and building massing is so individual,
and so self-sufficient, that it is impossible to re-
move a piece without destroying the whole. Subtract-
ion on the order of One Post Office Square or 53
State Street is unthinkable.
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Only one compromise option seemed available -- leav-
ing the USMC Building intact. (it covers 37,300
square feet of the entire 59,100 total assemblable
property) and building a new office building on the
remaining 21,800 square feet of site area. Although
this floor area falls within the "ideal" range for
office buildings, this full site footprint is unde-
sirable from an urban design point of view, and this
scheme never emerged as a serious alternative.
THE IMPORTANCE OF RISK PROFILES
As illustrated in the comparison of the One Post
Office Square case to the 53 State Street case,
keeping the developer's risk profile low greatly
increases the likelihood that a compromise can be
seriously considered. Is this verified by the USMC
case?
The ownership structure enabled the developer to
maintain a lower level of risk in the USMC case than
at 53 State Street (Exhibit 6-6). Since the
property had been acquired as part of the Maurice
Gordon estate, it was not single-mindedly targetted
for new construction as was Olympia and York's,
arrangement
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with Old State Trust. Presumably the objectives of
the Kuwaiti ownership werer reasonable financial
return and inflation protection. Unlike Olympia and
York's agenda, which was to maximize the income
yield from high intensity development of the site,
the Kuwaiti interests may have been more receptive
to less intense, although profitable, uses of the
property.
The stable ownership of the property no doubt aided
the process of examining alternatives. Whereas Olym-
pia and York's ground lease with Old State Trust, an
arrangement which was interrupted by the designation
process, exposed the developer to added risk, the
USMC Building was under stable control and ownership
by Meredith and Grew. This stability allowed the ex-
ploration of alternatives to proceed in a more thor-
ough manner.
In the USMC case several key actors demonstrate a in-
creased sophistication in dealing with a building of
compromise. The developer's interest and initiation
of contact between themselves and the preservation-
ists was not only a sign of reckoning with their
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proved political clout, but a strategy to limit the
risk exposure of the developer, as well.
AN INTEREST IN COMPROMISE, AN INABILITY TO REACH IT
Even though the USMC Building site was extremely dif-
ficult to consider as a compromise site, the actors
in the process were much more willing to attempt to
forge a compromise than at 53 State Street. Meet-
ings between the developer and the preservationists
were held early in the process, both before and af-
ter the designation hearing.
It is by no means clear that the developer's object-
ive in suggesting these negotiations was to actually
reach a compromise. It is probable, as Angus Crowe
suggested, that their hope was to co-opt the preserv-
ationists before the controversy reached "53 State
Street proportions". At any rate, the ostensible in-
terest in compromise was doomed for two reasons at
USMC Building -- the fundamental difficulty of find-
ing a physical compromise, and the lack of a forum
in which to reach such an agreement.
At USMC, the participants appeared willing to
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negotiate a compromise, but the physical constraints
on the site were insurmountable. The participants,
frustrated by the same lack of forum which plagued
the 53 State Street case, even went as far as to
devise one of their own--the "composite meetings".
Hugh Stubbins and Associates, architects for the dev-
elopers, registered this familiar frustration with
the process in explaining the need for the compos-
ite meetings:
"There currently exists no forum in which
all three issues (urban design, historic,
and economic) can be recognized and discuss-
ed. Without such a discussion, fully in-
formed opinions cannot be developed, and
consequently, positions are set, for and
against, without a complete understanding
of the alternatives."1 3
The situation was quite the opposite at 53 State
Street. The physical facts at the Exchange Building
ifvited compromise. The developer, however, was
not interested in one -- and the governing political
framework presented no forum in which a genuine one
could be negotiated.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF PRECEDENTS
As noted in the analysis of the One Post Office
Square case, each building of compromise has signi-
ficant impacts on the process and results of subse-
quent ones. In much the same way that the resolu-
tion of the One Post Office Squiare case affected
the attitudes and strategies of the actors in the 53
State Street case, 53 State influenced the USMC
case.
The 53 State Street case seemed to establish several
key facts: the strength of the Boston preservation
consituency, the use of preservation as a way of win-
ning high density, and the political acceptability
of partial designations. Each of these was brought
to bear in the USMC case, which followed.
The 53 State Street case clearly announced the
strength of the Boston preservation community. The
"composite meetings" initiated by the developer, in
which the preservationists were primary partici-
pants, was in recognition of their authority.
Unfortunately, this healthy impact is balanced by
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potentially negative ones as well. The developer's
proposal to make a compromise -- the offer to reuse
some lobby materials and adapt an Art Deco vocabula-
ry in the new building -- was a disappointing devel-
opment in the effort to deal with the complexity of
by a building of compromise. The site density is-
sue, still inextricable from the preservation ques-
tions, is only further confused by such attempts to
win concessions through hollow "historic preserva-
tion". This event may signal the further erosion in
the meaning and significance of landmark designa-
tion. At the Old Federal Reserve, individual build-
ings within a larger complex were removed and ex-
empted from designation. At 53 State Street, major
portions of a single structure wre removed. Fin-
ally, at USMC, the developer proposed designation
based on portions of individual spaces, and the
adoption of a stylistic similarities in the new
architectural style.
This progression may be helpful in developing the
compromise building type. Certainly the full range
of partial designations should be considered in
choosing a proper solution for any single site.
288
Nonetheless, the difficulty of reaching a compromise
be increasing. Developers may now see the opportuni-
ty to force partial designations as a way of circum-
venting strict regulations. The baseline for
negotiation was previously biased towards total, or
near total, retention. The Landmarks Commission
will find it increasingly difficult to justify its
reasoning for a full structure designation and to
defend such decisions against the backdrop of
previous concessions and partial designations.
THE POSSIBILITY OF USING DESIGNATION AS A STARTING
RATHER THAN ENDING POINT IN A NEGOTIATION PROCESS.
Interestingly enough, the USMC Building case demon-
strated one model for a revised designation process
suggested in the thesis -- using designation as a
starting point, rather than an endpoint.
Because of the difficulty in reaching a compromise
scheme, the Commission voted to designate the USMC
Building in a "pure sense"; that is, rather than
brokering a phsysical, financial, and historic set-
tlement between the parties and fashioning a custom-
ized designation to govern it, as they did at 53
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'tate and One Post Office Square, the BLC used desig-
nation as a way to force a process leading to a
resolution.
The mayor's subsequent veto of the designation, al-
though interpreted by some as a stalemate, when comb-
ined with the Commission's decision to reconsider
the case, may have initiated a very healthy process.
The settlement which emerged from this apparent dead-
lock was a year-long "ceasefire" in order that the
parties could explore alternative approaches to dev-
eloping the site. This "pure" designation, there-
fore, may have marked the beginning of a period of
thorough analysis of alternatives, rather than the
end, as it did with 53 State Street and One Post
Office Square. It may have been made a clearer
statement of the Commission's objectives and estab-
lished its standing in the future of the project.
It is also quite possible, as some readers of this
thesis have argued, that this "pure" designation,
and the subsequent interim settlement actually
marks the end of the Commission's involvement and
influence over the property. There is evidence
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that this is true. Since the settlement in May, as
has been noted, little substantive communication has
occurred between the developer and the Commission.
If the settlement was to initiate a more open
planning process, including the preservation
interests, and under the overall guidance of the
BRA, it seems thus far to have failed.
It is too early to know, however, if this approach
will fail altogether. As the expiration of the
agreement approaches, the process will be reopened.
Although other factors have changed in this twelve-
month period (the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, for
example), the potential for using designation as a
way of provoking, rather than ending, a negotiation
process may then be known--does this tactic enhance
the Commission's influence, or does it disenfran-
chise it from the process?
SUMMARY
Chapters 5 and 6 have recounted the landmarks
process for One Post Office Square, and the United
Shoe Machinery Corporation Building, Boston
buildings of compromise which preceded and followed
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the 53 State Street case. From these comparisons,
the thesis has identified several key factors which
seem to govern the actors' abilities to consider,
negotiate, and forge a compromise. These factors
involve the physical adaptability of the site, the
risk profile of the actors, particularly the
developer, the forums for discussion, and the use of
precedents.
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CHAPTER 7
POSSIBILITIES FOR CHANGE
The preceding analyses in this thesis lead to the con-
clusion that the process followed in resolving the 53
State Street controversy was incomplete; it did not
include at least one feasible solution which may have
been, in this writer's view, a superior development
approach. Chapter 4 analyzed why this alternative,
which may have been only one of several physical and
financially feasible alternatives, was politically in-
feasible. Chapters 5 and 6 confirmed several of
these hypotheses by examining two comparable cases.
What factors in the political process could be
changed to promote a more complete evaluation of
alternatives? What new analytical tools would lead
to more successful buildings of compromise?
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
In this chapter, several possibilities for change are
identified. These factors are numerous and inter-
related, but fall into four general categories: 1)
information gaps; 2) weaknesses in city policy; 3)
flaws in city procedures; and 4) inadequate
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analytical tools. Each of these areas is discussed
in detail in the sections following.
INFORMATION GAPS
In the 53 State Street process, there were
intentional and unintentional information gaps
between the developer, preservationists, the
Commission, and other city departments. The
following reforms would contribute to closing these
gaps:
1. Identify historic resources. The
comprehensive inventory of downtown buildings
commissioned and completed by the BLC in the
last year greatly enhances the flow of inform-
ation between the Commission and developers.
This document, which runs some 1200 pages,
identifies and legitimizes preservation inter-
ests in the city, and reduces the likelihood
that a prospective developer would progress
as far as Olympia and York did before recog-
nizing the potential for conflict.
Documents such as this protect the develo-
per's risk profile, and reduce the
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probability of an adversarial relationship
between developer and preservationist. As
well, the process of inventorying and giving
priority ratings to individual structures
forces preservationists to establish
objectives on a citywide, rather than
piecemeal basis. In the absence of such a
comprehensive review, preservation battles
are fought on a case-by-case basis, where the
potential for abuse of the designation
power--to halt new construction, for
instance--is greater.
2. A potential by-product of an early declar-
ation of intentions by the Commission, which
a survey in part represents, is that develop-
ers may also volunteer more information earl-
ier in the process. In dealing with many el-
ements of uncertainty at simultaneously, the
developer is suspicious of unknown forces
such as a Landmarks Commission, whose initia-
tive might jeopardize even the best of invest-
ment opportunities. Reducing his uncertainty
by providing information or a clear statement
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of objectives may pay off handsomely; he may
approach negotiations more cooperatively.
3. Information exchange between city agenc-
ies could also be improved. The fact that
the BRA saw the Olympia and York development
scheme so early, and yet did not notify the
BLC until much later may have contributed to
the difficulty all parties had in resolving
the dispute in subsequent stages of the pro-
cess.
Early communication between the BRA and BLC
could have prevented several specific events:
(1) the developer's risk profile would have
been protected, since the Commission would
have alerted the developer to the interest in
the building's landmark potential; (2) the
mistrust between city departments, the feel-
ing each had that the other was trying to
"slip something by" would not have been as
powerful an undercurrent in the subsequent
events. The contentiousness of the review
process was at least partially a result of
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the each participant's feeling of defensive-
ness for having been excluded from other
parts of the process.
4. Preservationists need to learn more
about development, and developers need to
learn more about preservation. The gap be-
tween these traditionally opposed parties, as
suggested in the introduction to the thesis,
has narrowed significantly in recent years.
Experience has shown even the most skeptical
observers that sound business investment and
preservation are not mutually exclusive.
Still, the two parties approach a given situ-
ation with near polar opposite objectives.
Olympia and York never intended to retain the
old building--they simply did not consider it
a development alternative until it was forced
upon them by a political process. How differ-
ent the events might have been if the develop-
er had considered, from the earliest stages,
that reuse might have some investment
potential.
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It should be noted that the 53 State Street comprom-
ise, imperfect as it may be, was a direct offspring
of the compromise reached for the Old Federal Reserve
Complex reached only a year earlier and just a few
blocks away. This kind of public learning must be
encouraged. If it continues, the knowledge and in-
formation gaps between the two parties will grow
progressively narrower.
WEAKNESSES IN CITY POLICIES
The 53 State Street process, and all future comprom-
ise cases in Boston, could benefit from overall clar-
ification of zoning policy in the downtown. As ex-
plained in Chapter 4, the legacy of zoning variances
for nearly double the base FAR leads to high expect-
ations by owner, seller, and developer, and places
each of these actors at unnecessary risk in a comprom-
ise negotiation.
There are two generic approaches for responding to
the upward pressure exerted on an existing FAR ceil-
ing during growth cycles of the local economy: 1)
review each development proposal on a case-by-case
basis; or 2) perform an across-the-board revision
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and/or increase in the density ceiling. Both these
options are available and workable in dealing with
buildings of compromise, but one concept is key: un-
certainty caused by inconsistent enforcement is the
achilles heel of any zoning policy.
Case-by-Case Zoning
The case-by-case strategy is currently practiced by
the City of Boston. The BRA prefers this approach,
according to one staffmember, "because we are convinc-
ed it gives us better control over the p-roject."
There is reason to doubt this. Although it almost
guarantees BRA review over all projects (virtually
every proposed project will exceed the existing FAR
10), this strategy has three distinct drawbacks.
First, consistency is difficult. Each site possesses
peculiarities of views, orientation, shadow, neighbor-
ing buildings, etc. and has varying reasons to argue
for its approval or disapproval. However, the credi-
bility of the case-by-case method is rooted in rules
established by precedent, and as such presents a para-
dox--although designed to allow consideration on a
project specific basis, each decision is conditioned
and limited by its precedents. Substantive concerns
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may have to be subordinated to create a track record
of consistency and fairness.
This precedent-related system has created a "shadow"
FAR of 18 or more. The developer's expectations for
the future and his tacit and explicit business ar-
rangements are made with this in mind. As the devel-
oper's risk profile rises, the probability of intelli-
gently and fairly resoving a conflict involving a
compromise diminishes.
A high shadow FAR removes incentives for smaller-
scale investment are removed. Fear of citywide over-
building, due to the widespread belief that every-
thing will eventually be 40 stories tall, encourages
owners to incubate property until they are offered a
price based on FAR 19 or more.
The case-by-case method is likely to remain favored
in Boston in the foreseeable future. Even within
this, the substance as well as the procedures for pro-
ject review can be improved. These possibilities are
discussed in subsequent sections.
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Across the Board Reform
Instead of allowing.variances above the base FAR on a
case-by-case basis, the city could consider an across-
the-board FAR increase from 10 to 12 or 14. The opt-
imal number is a worthy subject of detailed analysis,
but is beyond the scope of this thesis. If this new
FAR ceiling were strongly enforced, unlike current po-
licy, several improvements in the development and pre-
servation environment would be registered.
1. The medium density ceiling would encour-
age smaller scale and more widely distributed
investment in the city. Infill on sites with
current FAR's of 8-10 could be improved with-
out the massive density now required to en-
courage investment on a downtown property.
2. The overall review of city property and
zoning districts will demand the same perform-
ance from the BRA and Zoning Commission as
the landmarks inventory did of the preserva-
tionists and the Landmarks Commission. With-
out periodic comprehensive analysis such as
this, the BRA is ruling on important cases
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The key to successful re-zoning lies in the consist-
ency of its application. When William Whyte recom-
mended a similar approach to improving zoning in Man-
hattan earlier this year, he emphasized,
"Cut the density limit to a floor area ratio
of fifteen, and keep it there. People who
bought sites in anticipation of higher den-
sity will scream, and a grandfather clause
may be necesssary. But developers could live
with less, as some have indicated, if it
were matched with the certainty of clearer
rules and faster procedures."2
The value of certainty to the developer cannot
be overstated, particularly in the rapidly changing
financial climate which has characterized recent dev-
elopment history. For example, consider a typical
$100 million project on a 40,000 square foot site.
Assuming a $25 per square foot rental, a single per-
centage point increase in permanent financing is
equivalent to an added $1 million of debt service per
year, or a net cash flow of $1.25 million per year.
This greater cash flow requirement ius equivalent to
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rent from an additional 59,000 square feet. In other
words, a delay causing a cost of permamanent debt in-
crease of a single interest point also costs the dev-
eloper 1.5 FAR points as well. A balance point ex-
ists between the added income provided by an increase
in allowable site density and the costs associated
with the time required to seek and win one. The vol-
atility of the debt markets is a strong argument for
certainty in allowable site density (Exhibit 7-1).
FLAWS IN CITY PROCEDURES
The procedures followed by various city departments
in the 53 State Street case could also be modified to
encourage more constructive negotiations. Several
possibilities are discussed below:
1. Reinforce the individual charge of each
of the departments, and improve the sequenc-
ing of their participation. The BRA, BLC,
and Zoning Board of Appeals processes are
too interwoven to allow sufficient focus on
individual issues.
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Exhibit 7-1
Project Profile Relating Site
Density to Cost of Permanent Debt
Project Profile: 1,000,000 sq. ft. office tower
40,000 sq. ft. parcel
$125/ sq. ft. total project cost
1.25 debt coverage
Total Permanent Loan:
$100,000,000
Each pt. increase in interest rate constant =
$ 1,000,000 in required debt service =
$ 1,250,000 in net income =
$ 1,562,000 in gross income =
62,500 sg. ft. @ $25/ sq. ft.
Assumes rent levels remain constant over period.
The FAR equivalent 62,500 sq. ft. building area
40,000 sq. ft. total parcel
1.5 FAR points
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Since the building of compromise demands a
simultaneous review of several difficult is-
sues, the reviews for density and preserva-
tion need to be either sharply partitioned
and clearly sequenced or incorporated in a
more coherent overall review. As discussed
in Chapter 5, the current process makes the
designation review a proxy for the density
review. For these cases, the idea of hold-
ing a density review first, independently of
preservation issues, and then conducting the
landmarks designation process, may have some
merit. In this way, the important issues of
wind, shadow, and infrastructure impacts
could be independently considered, and not
confused with preservation issues.
The fatal flaw in this idea, of course, is
that landmark designation could be used as a
"stonewalling" strategy against any proposed
development which had passed the density re-
view. This would argue for an alternative
procedure which formally incorporated the
multiple reviews.that are now unofficially
subsumed in the designation ruling.
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Devising such a procedure, of course, is far
from easy. The advantage of a comprehen-
sive, multi-department review is, in theory,
that independent city agencies are not plac-
ed in direct competition and given the
opportunity to nullify each other, but are
instead forced to work together to reach a
mutually agreeable solution. A model for
this kind of one-stop review is the "Design
Advisory Group" found in some small cities
and towns in Massachusetts. Something
approaching this process was attempted on a
de facto basis in the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation Building case, as discussed in a
Chapter 6. In several months, when that dif-
ficult case is resolved, we will be better
equipped to judge the potential of such an
approach.
2. Insulate the city departments from the
Mayor, and protect the Mayor and developer
from forming early tacit agreements. The
thoroughness each of the city department's
project review is directly related to the
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independence it feels from prior informal ap-
provals and the potential for later revers-
als of its decisions.
Reform in this area is highly dependent on
the style of leadership held by the Mayor,
and can be expected to vary from administra-
tion to administration with the identical or-
ganizational structure. Specific ideas for
structural changes are also possible, and
are discussed in subsequent sections of this
chapter.
IMPROVE ANALYTICAL TOOLS
It is clear from interviews with the participants in
the 53 State Street case and a review of the mater-
ials documenting the proceedings that the building of
compromise introduces a level of complexity to the
development formula requiring new and improved analy-
tical tools. These needed tools fall into three
broad categories: design tools, financial tools, and
regulatory tools, and would ideally be employed by
developers, preservationists, and the city depart-
ments in considering buildings of compromise.
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Design Tools
The building of compromise demands the highest level
of design professionalism and the mastery of the arch-
itect's and urban designer's tool kits. Because the
building type can offer the developer a range of fin-
ancial alternatives, the designer and the public offi-
cal reviewing proposals must make use of the full
range of design strategies now available.
Particularly promising is the potential for computer
applications to conduct physical feasiblity studies
and environmental impact analyses. Sophisticated
computer-aided design now conducted in several of the
larger domestic firms allows the designer to perform
sensitivity analyses on a given development program,
adjusting the model for building massing, height,
shape, configuration, efficiency, thermal perform-
ance, and evaluating attendant impacts on surrounding
sunlight, wind, and public infrastructure. The forg-
ing of a building of compromise demands this higher
level of analysis and decision-making.
The ability to systematically develop, compare, and
refine alternatives with a common basis for analysis
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should be substituted for the piecemeal, out of se-
quence process which plagued the 53 State Street
case. This level of analysis is not technologically
difficult, and will become increasingly accessible to
design professionals in the public and private
sectors.
The "vocabulary of negotiation"--that is, the array
of design strategies available to relate old to new,
large to small, massive to light, smooth to rough,
etc.--is important to develop and disseminate. The
53 State Street case will add to this vocabulary, as
did the cases which preceded it. Without such a com-
mon design vocabulary, intelligent discussion, negot-
iation, and brokering will be difficult and inade-
quate. Architects, developers, and Commissioners
must make an effort to stay fluent in this developing
language. The natural result will be higher stand-
ards of historical interpretation and innovative
design.
Financial Tools
As in the design domain, existing financial incent-
ives and tools for analysis need updating or
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replacement to facilitate careful consideration of
the building of compromise. Conventional arguments
must be reevaluated and revised in light of the new
possibilities introduced by the building type. Argu-
ments dating from the earlier win-loss game between
preservationist and developer still endure, but are
no longer relevant.
The choice between new and rehabiliation construction
is complex economic equation, involving differentials
in production cost, income potential, and tax treat-
ment. In Boston, the issue of site density, as it
straddles this question, is another source of varia-
bility. This relationship is one, however, which can
be accurately modelled manually or with the aid of
small business computer. Sensitivity analyses, such
as the ones conducted in this thesis, could be used
in tandem with design analyses, to reach a resolution
or, at the very minimum, illuminate the fundamental
issues to be considered. In a short while, integrat-
ed software for small stand-alone computers will be
able to evaluate both design and financial alterna-
tives simultaneously. For a modest investment, most
planning, design, and consulting firms and public
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agencies will be able to have this capability in a
very few years. A research agenda can be identified.
1. The perennial debate over the difference
in taxes generated by new construction/high
density versus rehab/existing density can
and should be systematically researched.
What variables are involved in recapturing
demand if a high density proposal is
rejected from a particular site--can it in
fact be recaptured by the city by developing
another site, and how? How can this be
documented?
2. How can internal contradictions in the
tax code be removed? The demolition
"penalty", for instance, can clearly operate
counter-intentionally, when coupled with a
variable limit on site density.
3. How can we identify the "optimal" FAR
for a given compromise site? A computer
model performing iterative calculations ad-
justing for site density, production costs,
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rent potential, and tax effects, could be
easily developed.
Regulatory Tools
As well as more sophisticated inputs to decision-
making, there is a need for refinements in the deci-
sion-making process itself. More explicit tools for
evaluating alternative approaches, of which the cost-
benefit analysis presented in Chapter 4 is but one
elementary example, will help to organize performance
measurement, identify criteria, and reveal biases.
ENHANCING THE INFLUENCE OF THE BLC
The modifications suggested above for improving the
assume, to a certain extent, that the current admini-
stration, the BRA, and the developer share an inter-
est in improving the process between the BLC and the
developer in cases of compromise. As can be seen in
other examples (see discussion of the Old Federal
Reserve Complex and the United Shoe Building in Chap-
ters 5 and 6), this can be the case. It is quite pos-
sible, however, that these actors would resist any
reforms which would enable a more comprehensive
review of buildings of compromise. If this is the
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case, what changes in the formal powers and author-
ities of the Landmarks Commission would force a simi-
lar "equalization" of power between the developer and
the Commission?
There are at least three structural changes which
could increase the BLC's ability to force more
careful reviews of compromise cases. Each of these
reforms, in the author's estimation, has a very low
probability of being politically palatable to the
other actors involved. A discussion of them is still
useful, however, since it further illuminates how the
Commission currently functions and how buildings of
compromise are produced.
Allow the Commission to Designate Protection Areas
and/or Districts
The Commission is not empowered to designate protect-
ion, architectural, or landmark districts in the
downtown central district. Their power in this area
of Boston is limited to the designation of landmark
structures. This restriction contributes to the con-
fusing merger of site density review with preserva-
tion deliberations. In some cases where the concern
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for preserving a structure is based not on its histor-
ic merit, but on a desire to retain the scale, mass-
ing, and overall site density that the building repre-
sents, landmark designation is used as a proxy for a
density review.
Allowing the Commission to designate districts or pro-
tection areas in the downtown might de-couple these
issues, and return designation to is original intent
-- to protect distinctive historic resources--and dis-
courage its use as a tool to unilaterally prevent
new construction. Decisions on the issues of
density, building scale, massing, etc. would be re-
viewed explicitly. Whatever the outcome--rehabili-
tation or total demolition and new construction--the
developer's, city's and general public's ability to
focus on these issues would be enhanced. The stand-
ards of argument, and the acceptability of the resol-
ution would naturally rise.
Remove the Mayor's Veto Power
In the 53 State Street case, the BLC felt forced to
to choose betweeen a compromise proposal authored by
the developer, or face losing the building entirely.
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The mayor's veto power, and his expressed interest in
avoiding a "weak compromise", led the Commission to
believe it should accept the developer's scheme.
Some believe this erodes the significance of desig-
nation, and lowers the standards by which structures
are designated landmarks.
If the Commission had been free to operate without
the Mayor's veto, it almost certainly would have forc-
ed a more thorough consideration of alternatives. The
threat of a "pure" designation can bring the develop-
er to the negotiating table in the same way the
threat of demolition often persuades a preservation-
ist to make concessions on design controls and restor-
ation standards. Real political power for the Commis-
sion--the authority to demand careful evaluation of
site alternatives--stems from it's ability to prevent
development from occurring. The Mayor's veto power,
and his early and direct contact with the developer,
effectively nullifies this source of power. If this
single factor were changed, the balance of power
between developer and the Commission would be one
which facilitated a higher and more serious level of
discussion.
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The original purpose of the mayoral veto power
-- establishing checks and balances in the system--
would need replacement. The possibility for abuse of
the designation power by the BLC, if the veto pwwer
were removed, must be acknowledged.
Allow the BLC to act in a Planning Capacity
In recent years, the BLC has adopted a more aggres-
sive planning approach to their work. The Broad
Street/Custom House District Study, commissioned by
the BLC last year, is a notable example of this more
"pro-active" strategy.
In this case, the BLC assumed this posture because
they believed no other city department had taken the
initiative to guide development in the district.
Frustrated by their position of constantly reacting
to the initiatives of others, the Commission took it
upon themselves to act as the planning department of
the redevelopment authority for the area.
This raises fundamental questions about the BLC's
role within the city government. Overall comprehen-
sive planning is clearly not what was originally in-
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tended for the landmarks commission, and may in fact
dilute its central mission of studying and designa-
ting landmarks, structures, and districts. Other city
agencies and departments are already charged with the
responsibility for setting and implementing overall
planning policies.
The effect of the BLC's entry into the "planning bus-
iness" will be two-fold. First, it will position the
Commission to better understand, influence, and nego-
tended for the landmarks commission, and may in fact
dilute its central mission of studying and designa-
ting landmarks, structures, and districts. Other city
agencies and departments are already charged with the
responsibility for setting and implementing overall
planning policies.
317
CHAPTER 8
LESSONS AND QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
It is clear from examining the 53 State Street case
in detail, and comparing it to One Post Office Square
and United Shoe Machinery Corporation Building, that
there has been significant "public learning".100
The interest in compromise, the serious consideration
of alternatives, and the struggle to clarify the
relationship between preservation issues and site
density issues currently occupy the planning agenda.
This was not the case when 53 State Street occurred.
53 State Street was a watershed case. It crystalliz-
ed a series of seemingly disjointed, but inextrica-
ble urban development issues. Although this thesis
has argued that the process governing the develop-
ment was a weak and incomplete one, it is clear that
the case-has had a significant impact on planning and
development in downtown Boston. A comprehensive
zoning and development policy review is now in the
works at the BRA. Responding to both internal (from
groups like the BLC) and external pressure, the city
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has realized the need for a stronger, more explicit
downtown development policy. Groups such as the
Boston Chamber of Commerce, provoked into action by
the 53 State Street controversy, are now participat-
ing in a significant way to balance the interests of
preservationists with the development and growth
Boston continues to enjoy.
The news may not be all good. With budget cutbacks
and institutional reorganization, the BLC may be one
of the first of the city departments to be reduced.
What has been learned from these precedent-setting
cases may be lost if the Commission cannot translate
its expertise into action.
The thesis has documented how a special development
project, a building of compromise, introduced new
demands on the Boston system. Both the public and
private frameworks governing development were pushed
to the limit in trying to conduct the sophisticated
level of analysis demanded by this new building
type. And although the solution may not have entire-
ly pleased anyone, it is clear the building of com-
promise performed at least one invaluable function--
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Exhibit 8-1
500 Park Avenue
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Exhibit 8-2
New Yorker Hotel
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it heightened our interest in urban development
and enabled us to see weaknesses in our regulatory
decision-making environment.
It seems likely that the building of compromise will
become a common element of the urban landscape of
the 1980's. All cities with low or medium rise arch-
itectural resources will be confronted with comprom-
ise cases during strong growth phasees. The current
flurry of examples, the current architectural inter-
est in ecclecticism, and the architecture profes-
sions's ceaseless fascination with building types
will, no doubt, lead to a proliferation of such
solutions.
One cannot discount, as well, the considerable poli-
tical convenience offered by the building of comprom-
ise. As suggested in the thesis, there is the dan-
ger that the compromise approach will become an
expedient favorite of the developer, the preserva-
tionist, and the city official as well. This will
hopefully not happen before we develop better analy-
tical and political tools to generate alternatives,
evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, and forge a
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superior compromise. This thesis represents what
might be the first steps in understanding these
challenges and developing these tools.
AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE
This thesis has focused exclusively on three local
cases, and has examined them in their own time
frames. Significant changes have since occurred in
the regulatory and financial environments, both at
the local and national levels, with important impli-
cations for buildings of compromise.
This thesis has intended to provide a foundation for
understanding the past and present of the building
of compromise. In the process, it has identified
several areas that are in need of further study and
development. If we continue to develop and refine
specific tools in the urban design, financial, and
political arenas, and are able to devise strategies
for employing them in a responsive and responsible
decision-making framework, the building of com-
promise may hold exciting promise for the future of
our cities.
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Appendices
A. Summary of Historic Significance,
excerpted from Boston Landmarks
Commission Study Report, "The
Exchange Building".
B. Standards and Criteria for'-the
Exchange Buillding, excerpted
from BLC Study Report.
C. Shadow Studies
Conducted by author on base
analysis provided by WZMH-Habib,
Architects, Boston.
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3.0 SIGNIFICANCE
3.1 Historical Associations:
The site of the Exchange Building on State Street has historical
significance in political and economic arenas. The site has been
associated with merchants and stock exhanges for 138 years and
earlier has been associated with colonial and Revolutionary era
events and persons.
State Street (originally called King Street) was one of the original
streets in the City of Boston. In the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, the eastern end of the street led into the
Long Wharf. Among the first building that one met on land when
coming from- this wharf was the Bunch-of-Grapes Tavern, which
occupied the corner of State and Kilby Streets. Also, on this
block stood the mansion of John Winthrop, first Governor of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony. Further up the street was Town
House, now known as the Old State House, which served as the
principal seat of government for the Province, County, and Town.
An open air market place was also found in this area. State
Street was the center of the colony's governmental and commercial
activities.
The Bunch-of-Grapes Tavern was in operation from the mid-seventeenth
century until the end of the eighteenth century. It provided a
popular meeting place for merchants and the masters of vessels
and later for leaders of the Revolution. The newly-arrived
governors were often taken there for an elegant dinner. In 1798
the tavern was replaced by a brick store. The Bunch-of-Grapes
Tavern is commemorated by a plaque which is displayed on the
State Street facade of the Exchange Building, as is a similar
plaque for Governor Winthrop.
After the Revolution, the area around State Street continued to be
the business center of the city. In 1837, 22 of the 35 banks in
Boston were located on this street. (Winsor, Vol. IV., p.55). In
1840, the Boston Exchange was organized by a group of prominent
citizens, who determined that is was necessary because of the
increased amount of business transactions and the large number of
out-of-town businessmen that were visiting the City. Boston was
at its height of prosperity in foreign and, domestic commerce.
The corner stone for the Merchant's Exchange was laid in August,
1841. The four story, Greek Revival structure was designed by
Isaiah Rogers. This building served a number of purposes; it was
the seat of the Boston Board of Trade in the 1860's, and the Post
Office occupied a part of the building in 1865. In 1873 the Board
of Trade established a central headquarters for all the business
exchanges of the city in the Merchant's Exchange. Some remodeling
of the building was done to accommodate this purpose.
These alterations to the Merchant's Exchange, however, were not
sufficient to serve the purposes of Boston's continuously growing
lausiness concerns. In 1889 the Merchant's Exchange was torn
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down, and the Exchange Building was built in its place. It still
serves its original functions as the location of the stock exchange
and of commercial offices. For a period of time the Stock Exchange
was located in a newer building, constructed in 1908, at 30 Congress
Street, also designed by Peabody & Stearns in the Neo-classical
Revival style.
The other remaining building on the block, 10 Congress Street,
was built in 1924 by the State Street Trust Company which merged
with the National Union Bank, chartered in 1792. The National
Union Bank occupied the State Street-Congress Street corner site
prior to 1924. The new State Street Trust Company, chartered in
1891, leased its first office at 53 State Street but moved next door
to the Union Bank in 1900, the property that it later purchased
and demolished.
When State Street built the structure now occupying the site,
Allan Forbes was the bank president. Mr. Forbes is largely
responsible for the image of 10 Congress Street, although Parker,
Thomas & Rice were the architects of record, and Richardson,
Barott, & Richardson were responsible for executing the interior
banking hall which occupied 10 Congress and a portion of The
Exchange Building. Contemporary writers described the building
as Colonial in type, and the Bank's own description of the structure
in 1926 suggested that it was "patterned after the old counting
rooms of Boston merchants during the first part of the eighteenth
century, arranged on a much larger scale." (Log, p.9). Walter
Whitehill summarized the State Street Bank building aptly; "...they
did not reproduce it archeologically, for it was rather an original
creation of Allan Forbes' imagination." (Whitehill, "Allan Forbes,"
p.19).
The building at 10 Congress Street and the interior banking hall
of the State Street Bank are important historically as period repro-
ductions in the Neo-Colonial Revival era.
3.2 Architectural Significance:
The Exchange Building is architecturally significant for several
reasons. It represents in both style and scale the type of archi-
tecture that became prevalent in Boston's financial district at the
turn of the century. It is also significant because it is an almost
unaltered example of Peabody & Stearns' early commercial archi-
tecture. This firm made an extraordinary contribution to the
architecture of Boston and the New England region.
Robert Swain Peabody was the son of Reverend Ephraim Peabody
and Mary Jane Derby Peabody, who were both members of prominent
New England families. He was born in 1845 in New Bedford.
Peabody received his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1866 from Harvard
College. Upon graduation, Peabody worked for Gridley J.F.
Bryant. A few months later he took a job with Henry Van Brunt,
where he met John Goddard Stearns, who was the chief draftsman.
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Peabody was exposed to the methods and traditions of the Beaux
Arts while working for Van Brunt, who had received his training
from Richard Morris Hunt. Peabody left for Europe in 1867. He
studied in London for a short time, and then transferred to the
Ecole des Beaux Arts. Two of this fellow students were Frank W.
Chandler and Charles Follen McKim. Peabody returned to Boston
in the spring of 1870, and entered into partnership with his former
colleague, John Goddard Stearns, Jr. With Peabody in charge of
design, the firm of Peabody and Stearns flourished for nearly fifty
years. In his later years, Peabody became involved in many
professional and civic organizations. He also spent much of his
time writing, and he produced over fifteen books, articles and
addresses. Both Peabody and Stearns died in 1917.
John Goddard Stearns, Jr. was born in New York City in 1843.
He received his primary and secondary education in New York and
Brookline, Massachusetts. Stearns entered the Lawrence Scientific
School of Harvard College in 1861, and he graduated with a Bachelor
of Science degree in Engineering in 1863. He worked for the firm
of Ware and Van Brunt from 1863 to 1870. As mentioned above, it
was during this time that he met Peabody, and in 1870 the successful
partnership was formed. Stearns was in charge of supervision of
all building construction.
Scholars Wheaton Holden and Anthony Bond have provided insight
into the method by which the firm could accomplish the large
volume of work which they produced. Peabody was the initial
designer for their commissions with the staff then fleshing out his
sketches but not without final approval by Peabody; Stearns was
the expeditor and superintendent of construction. The division of
responsibility was efficient and cooperative according to contem-
poraneous reports. (Holden, JSAH, p. 116; Bond, P. 16).
The firm's work was prolific and encompassed nearly every building
type from railroad stations to office buildings to boathouses. While
their commissions were largely located in the northeast, examples
of Peabody & Stearns' designs were found as far west as Colarado
and Oregon.
The firm's commercial buildings (including office buildings, stores,
banks, hotels) numbered about sixty of which thirty-four were
located in Boston. Of these thirty-four, twenty-one remain,
generally intact. In the first decade of the partnership, about
nine commercial buildings were constructed of which eight were
located in Boston, and of which only one is known to remain. .
Stylistically, the structures displayed variety and ranged from
French Second Empire to Queen Anne to High Victorian Gothic. In
the 1880's, the second decade of the firm's existence, the designs
for commercial buildings numbered twelve, spread from Boston to
New York to St. Louis, showing the geographical expansion of the
firm's activity. Of the four of these that were built in Boston,
only two remain: The Exchange Building of 1887-1891 and The
Fiske Building of 1888-1889 at 89 State Street. The latter has
been unrecognizably altered.
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The designs of this decade were critical in the development of
Peabody & Stearns' commercial style. The various electic styles
were abandoned, and a personal style began to emerge: the
Romanesque Revival style fused with Italian palazzo tradition. The'
Romanesque Revival style was popularized by H.H. Richardson in
the 1870's. The onset of the late Renaissance Revival Style is
first seen in Boston in the Boston Public Library of 1888, designed
by McKim, Mead & White. It is the merging of these two stylistic
strains that characterized Peabody & Stearns' commercial style in
the 1880's and, as importantly, was the precursor of their future
design direction which remained firmly in the Italian Classical
Revival mode. After 1892, no vestiges of the Romanesque style
are seen in Peabody & Stearns' commercial work, but the handling
of materials and large-scale forms learned from their Romanesque
experience remain throughout their work. Aside from the 1874
Boston Post Building, a small but important cast iron High Victorian
Gothic building in its own right, and the irrevocably altered Fiske
Building, The Exchange Building is the only remaining example in
Boston of this nationally renowned firm's formative years.
Architectural historians contend that the most important work of
these early years was the widely published R.H. White Warehouse
Store of 1882-1883 on Bedford Street and Harrison Avenue because
of its effect on other architects of the day, namely Richardson and
Sullivan. The demolition of this building with the last decade
makes the intact Exchange Building all the more important.
Besides the stylistic impact of the Exchange Building on the late
19th Century Boston commercial architecture and its decisive role
in the development of the firm's personal commercial style, The
Exchange Building is the city's prime and earliest existing example
of the monumental elevator office block. Noted architectoral historian,
Henry Russell Hitchcock in his Guide To Boston Architecture (1607-1954)
found several buildings worthy of mention to illustrate Boston's
Financial District. Of the eight structures itemized, only two date
prior to 1922; these two are McKim, Mead, and White's New England
Trust Company Building at the corner of Milk and Devonshire,
demolished for a parking lot, and The Exchange Building. After
mentioning the 1928-30 United Shoe Machinery Building, Hitchcock
states, "More Bostonian is the much earlier Exchange Building."
(Hitchcock, p.13).
Sheer size and the ability to organize the facades of the new
elevator buildings coherently is characteristic of Peabody & Stearns'
work. It is not surprising that an examination of office buildings
built from 1885 through 1915 indicates the gradual increase in bulk
of most downtown Boston office structures. (The Exchange Building
itself housed 1,100 rooms). What is surprising, however, is that
Peabody & Stearns were consistently responsible for' the largest of
them.
Peabody & Stearns has been best known for the Custom House
Tower, begun in 1909, at the foot of State Street. At one time
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seven (now five) of their buildings stood on State Street. The
Exchange Building at the head of State Street, is the most dis-
tinctive early work and provides a critical counterpoint to the
Custom House Tower, the culmination of their Boston career and
the only skyscraper in Boston until the 1960's.
The Exchange Building also represents the work of a notable firm
of builders, the Norcross Brothers. This remarkable firm is
associated with many of Boston's most significant later 19th century
buildings, and with almost all of H.H. Richardson's best known
designs. Well-known for their innovative construction techniques,
the Norcross firm was among the earliest builders to become general
contractors, due in considerable measure to the need for efficiency
in building the increasingly complicated later 19th century structures.
The craftsmanship of Norcross Brothers is well known and evident
in the handling of the granite on The Exchange Building. The
firm owned granite quarries and for many of Richardson's commissions
supplied the materials. Although Norcross Brothers were active
after the disappearance of the Boston Granite Style, the firm
carried out the traditions of expert handling of the material intrinsic
to the style.
3.3 Relationship to the Criteria for Landmark Designation
The Exchange Building clearly meets the criteria for landmark
designation as established by Section 4 of Chapter 772 of the Acts
of 1975 in that it is of distinguished architectural design, embodying
distinctive characteristics of construction, of a style which makes
it inherently valuable for study, and as a notable work of an
architectual firm whose work influenced the development of the
city, the Commonwealth, and the Nation.
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The Exchange Block
53 State Street, Boston
10.0 SPECIFIC STANDARDS AND CRITERIA
10.1 General
1. The intent is to preserve the overall character and appearance
of the exterior of the building, its importance in the definition
of the city block, and its richness of detail.
2. Although the designation applies only to the exterior of the
building, the Commission encourages the preservation of the
rich materials and details that exist in the interior.
3. The elevations along State and Kilby Streets shall be subject
to the guidelines for the building exterior.
10.2 Masonry
1. No granite element will be painted. Masonry cleaning will be
done in a manner that, in the judgement of the Commission,
will have no destructive effect on the masonry.
2. No granite elements will be removed or obscured on the State
or Kilby Street facades.
3. No new openings will be allowed on the State or Kilby Street
facades. Existing and original openings will not be closed or
framed down.
4. If altered, the masonry infills to the left of the Kilby Street
entrance should be removed and the original detail restored.
10.3 Doors and Entrances
1. The primary entrances on State and Kilby Streets will be
retained as visually dominant.
2. All existing original details in the two entrances will be
retained and restored.
3. Retention of original interior elements visible from and sup-
portive of these entrances is encouraged.
4. The iron and copper lanterns flanking the State Street entrances
will be retained in situ and restored.
5. The existing corner entrance may be altered or eliminated.
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10.4 Fenestration
A . Base Portion
1. Any replacement sash will have a profile not greater
than the existing profile and will be shaped to exactly
match original opening.
2. Contemporary glazing and sash will be permitted.
3. The small-paned windows to the right of the State Street
entrance may be removed and replaced with contemporary
windows. If altered, the masonry side panels will be
removed and the original granite opening restored.
4. The iron spandrels of the ground floor will be retained.
5. Retention of all iron grill and decorative ironwork is
encouraged.
6. If altered, the raised sills of the ground floor windows
should be removed and the original detail restored.
B. Shaft and Attic Portion
1. Any replacement sash will have a profile not greater
than the existing profile and will be shaped to exactly
match original opening.
C. 1. The color and material of all replacement or existing
fenestration will be reviewed.
10.5 Signs and Lighting
1. The three existing placques will be retained in situ.
2. No additional signage or lighting fixtures will be attached to
or allowed to obscure any granite portion of the facade.
3. General lighting of the building facade is encouraged. Fixtures
should not be visible from the street and the lighting patterns
should enhance the original design elements.
10.6 Additions
1. No addition shall obscure or replace any masonry portion of
the State and Kilby Street facades of the building.
2. Penthouses will be located to be not visible from any public
street at a distance equal to that between the existing State
Street and Kilby Street facades and the Old State House.
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3. Any portions of the existing building exposed to public view
because of demolition or new construction will preserve the
visual character of the building. Reproduction is discouraged
in favor of simple, contemporary design.
10.7 Demolition
1. Demolition of portions of the original building and 10 Congress
Street will be considered providing it has minimal adverse
effect on the State or Kilby Street facades.
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